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Professor Chu Tuan Nha
Minister of Science, Technology and Environment
Hanoi, Viet Nam
Dear Minister,
I am pleased to be able to send you the final draft of the report of the
Science and Technology Policy Review Mission to Viet Nam. This version of the
report contains a section on the return visit of the international team and our
responses to a set of questions posed to us at that time. Indeed, in preparing the
report, we have tried to address all of your concerns and requests, as well as those
of Dr Pham Gia Khiem. Thus, specific suggestions are made throughout the re-
port. For ease of reading, the most central of these have been placed in boxes and
are highlighted.
The international economic situation has changed dramatically since we
carried out the main review. The extent of the East Asian crisis is only now be-
coming clear. That crisis will make Viet Nam's own efforts to enter the global
economy even more difficult than when we wrote the first draft of the report. We
addressed some of the implications of the crisis for Viet Nam in Chapter 15. We
believe that the sort of reforms we suggest are even more vital if Viet Nam is to
succeed in its goal of industrialization by 2020.
I would like to highlight a few of the points raised in the report that I think
are particularly important:
The sense of urgency identified by Dr Khiem and yourself is fully
justified. Viet Nam has not adjusted its systems of science, technology
(S&T), and education enough to respond to the new economic and
social circumstances facing the nation. With full membership in the
Asian Free Trade Area only a very short 7 years away, Viet Nam is at
serious risk of entering into its new regional partnership from a position
v
of serious disadvantage. The recent and continuing financial and eco-
nomic crisis in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand can
only serve to heighten competition over the next few years as those
nations attempt to recover from debilitating losses. The required reduc-
tion of tariffs by 2006 will expose the entire Vietnamese economy to
that competition. Under these circumstances, step-by-step approaches
are unlikely to serve the medium-term needs of the nation.
Some of the Vietnamese we met on our visit felt that it was impossible
to prepare policies for S&T and innovation until the nation has a clear
socioeconomic policy framework. To the extent that S&T policies and
economic policies must work together and be complementary, this is
true. But it is not true that nothing can be done. As the report makes
clear, S&T policy should inform economic policies just as much as
economic policy needs to inform S&T policy. The importance of ap-
proaching national economic policy and management from a clear S&T
perspective has been clearly demonstrated in the cases of Korea,
Singapore, and Taiwan. The forthcoming White Paper on a new na-
tional S&T strategy for Viet Nam should make unequivocally clear
Viet Nam's intention to make S&T thinking lead and inform economic
thinking. It seems to me important that this approach be reinforced from
the very highest levels of the Vietnamese government with both encour-
agement and guidance for the Ministry of Science, Technology and
Environment and the National Institute for Science and Technology
Policy and Strategy Studies.
In our report, we stress the need to apply S&T to the agricultural sector.
Although it seems to be generally agreed that much higher levels of
domestic savings are needed for modernization and industrialization, it
appears not to be fully appreciated that in the short and medium term
this must come from the traditional sectors. Also inadequately appreci-
ated, especially in the economic ministries, is the ability of agriculture
to be very high-tech, involving some of the leading applications of
biotechnology and science. Also, at a very fundamental level, the nation
is committed to socialist values, including equity. High-tech manufac-
turing is, by definition, capital intensive, and it tends to reward very
highly a very few professionals and skilled technicians. Throughout the
world, as the report indicates, income distribution is worsening as a
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result of this. Because of this, the S&T priorities (and the investments
based on these) involve a profound social-policy issue. The new govern-
ment of Prime Minister Khai has begun its stewardship by emphasizing
the importance and centrality of agriculture and the traditional sectors.
This, in the judgement of the international team, should be put into
practice through its integration into the forthcoming S&T strategy.
Among the suggestions made in the report is that a new international
consultative mechanism be established (the Viet Nam Forum for Sci-
ence, Technology, and Modernization). This would be modeled on the
very successful China Council for International Co-operation for
Environment and Development and would comprise a distinguished in-
ternational group of leading industrialists, financiers, and technology
and development specialists. In addition to affording to you and your
government a mechanism for ongoing advice and comment on all mat-
ters pertaining to S&T, the forum would, in my view, send a very
positive political signal throughout the world. I also believe that the
very existence of such a forum would encourage investment and inter-
national support for Viet Nam. I suggest this arrangement strongly for
your consideration, and if it does interest you, I would be pleased to do
anything I can to help to put the idea into practice.
May I take this opportunity to thank you most sincerely for having
entrusted to us this very important assignment. My hope is that you will find the
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PREFACE
The idea for this international review of Viet Nam's science and technology
(S&T) policy stemmed from a conversation in January 1997 between Dr Pham Gia
Khiem, Minister of Science Technology and Environment (now Vice Prime
Minister responsible for science, technology, education, training, health, social
affairs, culture, environment), and Dr Keith Bezanson, then President of the
International Development Research Centre of Canada (IDRC).
The declared intention of the Government of Viet Nam is to become an
industrialized society by the year 2020. The general idea is to follow the path that
the Asian newly industrialized countries adopted some 25 years ago: gradually
moving up the technological ladder in industrial production to penetrate interna-
tional markets. Central to this transformation is to be a national S&T strategy,
which the government plans to announce before the end of 1998.
IDRC had just completed an S&T policy review for China, and it seemed
that the approach followed in that review might make a useful contribution to the
preparation of the long-term strategy. Dr Khiem, on behalf of the Vietnamese
government, asked IDRC and the Canadian International Development Agency
(CIDA) to conduct an S&T policy review, along the broad lines of an approach
pioneered by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, as
adapted by IDRC. The approach followed in such reviews is highly pragmatic:
A multinational team of specialists is assembled to bring a number of
experiences and diverse perspectives to bear on the examination of na-
tional S&T policy and practice;
The country prepares an assessment of its S&T policy (including its
history, its evolution over time, its current characteristics, and its per-
formance) and presents any major contemplated changes; and
The international team examines the strengths, weaknesses, and per-
formance of the stated policy from the perspectives of its principal
ix
stakeholders (government agencies, research institutes, universities, tech-
nical institutes, national and international investors, multinational and
national companies, joint-venture operations, small to medium-sized
enterprises, international development organizations, etc.).
Thus, the central feature of an S&T policy review is that it attempts to
capture and distil the experiences, assessments, and views held of national policy
and to engage in dialogue (to provide a mirror) about those experiences and
experiences from other parts of the world. IDRC and CIDA agreed with the
request, and in September 1997 the team spent 3 weeks in Viet Nam, conducting
the review. The government appointed the National Institute for Science and
Technology Policy and Strategy Studies (NISTPASS) to be the Vietnamese coun-
terpart in the review.
During the visit, the team met with some 70 organizations, institutions,
departments, firms, and associations and some 320 Vietnamese S&T policymakers,
policy implementers, and people affected by the policies. The views of these insti-
tutions and individuals were solicited on a range of important policy issues
specified by the Vietnamese government. Most of the interviews took place in
Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, but some members of the Mission also visited
research institutes, government offices, and the university in Can Tho in the
Mekong Delta. In Part II of this report, we present results and impressions arising
from this extensive range of discussions and meetings.
For the most part, this report reflects what we were told and what we
observed in Viet Nam. We were, however, also specifically requested by Dr
Khiem to draw on our knowledge of other countries and to make specific
suggestions for the long-term S&T strategy of Viet Nam. We did this with some
trepidation, for two reasons. First, we are very mindful of the many examples in
the second half of this century of development advice to countries by outsiders
that has subsequently proven seriously wrong. Second, we are most conscious of
the fact that 3 weeks is a dangerously short period of time to try to obtain an
accurate appreciation of the current and the evolving situations of S&T policy in
Viet Nam. We have, nevertheless, done our best to comply with the request of Dr
Khiem, and our report includes a number of suggestions to be considered in
preparing Viet Nam's national S&T strategy.
We were also asked to provide an overview of major issues and trends in
the regional and global economy, an assessment of changing issues in technologi-
cal transformation, and a qualitative assessment of whether, how, and under what
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circumstances the successful and rapid transformations of other East Asian coun-
tries, such as Korea and Singapore, might be repeated. These requests were all
daunting. Again, we have done our best to comply, knowing that the purpose of
the requests was to help define the context in which Viet Nam's own development
strategy will have to be located.
The Mission coincided with a particularly significant moment in the
political history of Viet Nam. A new government was formed during the last week
of September 1977. It assumed its responsibilities at a time of international tur-
moil and of changes that have been, in the eyes of many knowledgeable observers,
unprecedented since the time of the industrial revolution, some 200 years ago. The
distribution of both wealth and poverty is changing and will change further. The
Economist magazine has predicted that, by 2020, 9 of the 15 richest countries will
be countries we now call developing and that China will have replaced the United
States as the world's largest economy (The Economist 1993).
The forces of globalization, driven by the explosion in new information
technologies, are accelerating and changing much more than trade and investment
patterns. They are also modifying the institutional, political, and social arrange-
ments set up after World War II. It is certain that by 2020 our world will have
produced a very new line-up of winners and losers. It seems equally clear that the
next 5 years — the period of Viet Nam's new government — will be most critical
in determining the category into which Viet Nam falls.
Our report has four parts. Part I is an introduction, in which we address the
reasons why we believe it is important, even essential, that Viet Nam develop a
long-term S&T strategy to help it attain its goal of modernization and industriali-
zation by 2020. In this introduction, we wrote a second chapter in response to a
request from the Vietnamese government, and this chapter describes some trends
that will set the international context within which Viet Nam's own modernization
will take place.
Part II contains the findings of our 3 week mission in Viet Nam. We iden-
tify nine key S&T-policy issues. Each of these is treated in a separate chapter, and
for each we report our impressions of what is happening in Viet Nam, based on
what we were told, saw, and read. In discussing many of the issues, we have also
referred to international experience and have responded to Dr Khiem's request to
provide some suggestions for Viet Nam to consider in preparing its long-term
S&T strategy.
Part III comprises two related reports, on Viet Nam's traditional sector and
high-tech parks, respectively, written by members of the mission. These reports
elaborate on important S&T-policy issues.
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Part IV contains our conclusions and a chapter summarizing the outcome
of the return visit of the team to Viet Nam in February 1998.
The appendixes contain short biographies of the team members and a sum-
mary of some important statistical material on Viet Nam's S&T system.
Throughout our Mission and in all parts of Viet Nam that we visited, we
were accorded the warmest of hospitality and full cooperation. To list all those to
whom we are indebted and grateful would require many pages. To make matters
simple, therefore, we wish to extend our deepest thanks to all those people with
whom we met; to our friends in NISTPASS and the Ministry of Science, Technol-
ogy and Environment, who organized and facilitated our work; and to Vice Prime
Minister Khiem for having entrusted to us this important mission. We also ac-
knowledge the support of IDRC and CIDA, which extended far beyond the financ-
ing that made this possible.
In this report, we have tried to highlight opportunities as well as barriers,
strengths as well as weaknesses, and advantages as well as disadvantages. We
hope that our observations will be useful to Viet Nam in determining its new
long-term S&T strategy and will help ensure that Viet Nam is among the winners.
If we have dealt with the negatives that were brought to our attention, we have
sought throughout to make the suggestions requested of us that might provide
solutions. The usual disclaimer applies: any errors of omission or commission are
ours.
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Chapter 1
THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE REVIEW
Why a national S&T policy? Arguments against
In recent years, considerable debate has focused on whether national science and
technology (S&T) and national industrial policies can still play a role. Starting in
the 1980s, researchers in industrial countries have argued that national S&T poli-
cies have become obsolete. The argument goes this way: national S&T policies
are designed to benefit a national economy by creating and facilitating a competi-
tive edge for the goods and services it produces. A globalized trading arrangement
means that not only goods, business, and finance but also S&T move unrestricted-
ly across national borders. Thus, any possible benefit from national S&T policies
will quickly move ("leak") outside a country, and in a globalized world, such poli-
cies are therefore doomed to failure.
In its extreme form, the argument against national S&T policy goes further.
It is generally accepted that national policies are desirable for macroeconomic sta-
bility (for example, exchange-rate policies, fiscal balance). Beyond such funda-
mentals, however, rather than facilitating a national competitive edge, national
S&T policy actually prevents development. Effective S&T decisions, it is argued,
can only be made at the level of the individual company or firm; approaches to
S&T must be entirely flexible to take advantage of rapid technological change; but
national (that is, government) policies are necessarily rigid and run counter to the
interests of development.
Again, starting in the 1980s, researchers widely asserted that this same
argument against national S&T policy applied in developing countries. Policymak-
ers strongly recommended open borders, liberalization, and privatization. They
frowned upon such measures as industrial strategies and S&T policies as counter-
productive and wasteful.
Why a national S&T policy? Arguments for
There are also strong arguments to show that S&T policy has a role to play in
national economic development. First and perhaps most significantly, the strong
argument raised in the past 15 years against national S&T policy is changing as
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a result of new evidence. For example, in the 1997 World Development Report,
the World Bank, following extensive examination, concluded that the role of
national policy is critical to establishing conditions for development that go be-
yond those the market is likely to create (World Bank 1997). In arriving at this
conclusion, the World Bank made it explicitly imperative that poorer countries
build up the appropriate human capital and fine-tune the complex relationship
between the market and society. In this regard, the World Bank observed that the
experiences of the East Asian Tigers, as well as the failures of national efforts
elsewhere, strongly supported the need for appropriate instruments of moderniza-
tion, including instruments of national S&T strategy.
Second, firms and companies target the investments that come with global-
ization, and on which it depends, to locations with a comparative advantage not
only in low-cost labour but more often in S&T. For example, companies will
invest in research in one country, industrial design and engineering development
in another, production in a third, initial sales in a fourth, and the headquarters of
after-sales service networks in a fifth. Long-term national policies and actions,
particularly in Asia, have been critical in attracting and retaining such investments.
Third and of great significance, if the strength of globalization is in its
wealth-creating capacity, its weakness, if undirected and uncontrolled, is in its dis-
regard for, and damage to, the environment and in its exacerbation of gross ine-
qualities both within and between nations. In Japan, such negative consequences
are increasingly defined as evidence of market failure, as they deleteriously affect
such national purposes as social cohesion, reasonable equity, and political stability.
Why an S&T policy review?
Given the above, it is not surprising that an increasing number of governments,
business associations, and communities assign importance to having arrangements
to directly support the production, access, and mastery of S&T. A number of
S&T-policy approaches and methodologies have emerged, including some that
build scenarios and others directed to technology foresight.
An S&T-policy review is a further such approach to developing an appro-
priate S&T-policy framework. An S&T-policy review assumes that S&T policy
must be made in, and adapted to, local conditions and that any model that is sim-
ply imported is unlikely to yield the desired benefits. Thus, the intimate involve-
ment of national leadership is a prerequisite for undertaking such a review. The
essential features of an S&T-policy review are
The assembly of a number of S&T-policy professionals from both
developed and developing countries;
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The assessment and sharing of previous experiences and the lessons
learned from these;
A substantive national assessment; and
The juxtaposition, open examination, and tabulation of national views,
observations, and recommendations (obtained from government, scien-
tists, technicians, and the business community) and those of the interna-
tional team of policy professionals.
The traditional review — that is, of the type undertaken by the Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) — has three parts. The
first is to prepare a report describing the S&T system in the country, together with
identifying current S&T policies. The practice is for this report to be prepared by
nationals, although the OECD may provide some assistance.
The second part is to have the review team visit the country. This team
comprises S&T-policy professionals from other countries. They are aware of the
sort of policy issues of concern in their own countries but are not usually experts
concerning those in the country being reviewed. The length of time spent in the
country varies but is usually 5—10 days. During that time, the team meets with key
policymakers, policy implementers, and stakeholders influenced by the country's
S&T and innovation policies. The team writes a report to summarize its findings
and impressions. This report is sent to government officials, who circulate it to the
people the team interviewed and to an even wider audience.
The third part is to have the review team pay a return visit for a final
meeting. This final meeting usually includes a debate between country stakehold-
ers and the members of the review team. It also provides an opportunity for team
members to explain their observations and findings but often leads to a vigorous
debate among national stakeholders about future directions for S&T and innova-
tion policy in their country. This debate forces different views into the open and
subjects them to rigorous review.
This three-part process has been applied over several years and in a sig-
nificant number of countries. It has usually been found to offer major benefits and
advantages to national policymakers by providing
• A fully independent viewpoint on national policies and practices;
• An opportunity for national policymakers to discuss and debate all
aspects of S&T policy;
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An examination of experiences, both successful and unsuccessful, in
other countries;
An opportunity to compare multiple viewpoints (that is, those of gov-
ernment, business, foreign investors, banks, and scientists) from within
the country; and
An open-ended examination of policy alternatives, which has often led
to new policies.
International Development Research Centre adaptations
Based on its own experience and consultations with developing-country partners,
Canada's International Development Research Centre (IDRC) has adapted the
OECD approach in slight but important ways. First, IDRC has found that having
a local team prepare a substantive country report before the arrival of the review
mission has often proven counterproductive, as the local team often produces
reports of varying quality and tends to overemphasize existing practice, rather than
examining what is and what is not working. Although preparation beforehand is
not ruled out, IDRC has concluded that local circumstances may make it desirable
to take a flexible approach and allow national authorities to prepare a substantive
country report following the first visit of the S&T policy team and after having
taken its findings into account.
Second, IDRC review teams have found it important to devote more time
to in-country assessment than is devoted to this when the normal OECD approach
is taken and to visit more locations than the traditional OECD review team would.
Finally, IDRC has concluded that on return visits it is most valuable that the
review team meet not only with stakeholders in the capital city (usually the princi-
pal partners in the review) but also with those in other cities.
Recently, the adapted approach was implemented by IDRC in South Africa
and in China. In the case of South Africa, the request for the review came from
the leaders of the democratic movement some 2 years before it came to power;
the leaders of that movement, including Nelson Mandela, were actively involved
in this review. It played a major role in establishing fruitful discussions on S&T
policy between the government and members of the democratic movement. Subse-
quently, when a government of national unity was established it continued to
involve members of the international review team in preparing a detailed national
policy, through their work on green and white papers on S&T policy.
In China, a collection of background papers and reports replaced the initial
national report, and most of these were from a recently prepared White Paper on
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S&T. The S&T-policy review itself had the strong support of the top leadership
of the State Science and Technology Commission, including Dr Song Jian, the
Minister for Science and Technology. The Chinese policymakers are vigorously
addressing the main findings.
The particular feature of these reviews, which the national governments in
the countries appear to appreciate, is the review team's refusal to make independ-
ent judgements of the quality of research in the country it visits; rather, the team
attempts to capture and distil the experiences, assessments, and views of the
people interviewed and to engage in dialogue (to provide a mirror) regarding those
experiences and those from other parts of the world. The questions the team poses
are, of course, a reflection of its own background, experiences, and the assess-
ments it conducted elsewhere, but the emphasis is on understanding national ca-
pacities, assessments, aspirations, and possibilities. In China, the team spent 3
weeks visiting the country and talked to more than 400 Chinese stakeholders at
all levels of government and in universities, business enterprises, and the scientific
community.
The Viet Nam review: framework, scope, and new adaptations
The Viet Nam review differed from the previous exercises in a number of ways:
The principal and explicit objective of the review for the Government
of Viet Nam was to contribute directly to preparing a long-term strategy
for S&T up to 2020. As such, the review process was specifically
linked to the production of new national policy via a government White
Paper, which is to appear before the end of 1998. Because of this ex-
plicit linkage, the Viet Nam review was more like a traditional consul-
tancy study than either the traditional OECD review or previous IDRC
reviews.
Previous S&T policy reviews had been somewhat open ended. In this
instance, the international team was asked to address, inter alia, seven
specific topics of direct relevance to a long-term S&T strategy, namely,
Technology import to improve the technological capabilities of
enterprises;
Research and application of high-technology in economic sectors;
S&T for agricultural and rural development;
8 VIET NAM AT THE CROSSROADS
Basic research;
Training, education, and use of S&T human resources;
The research and development (R&D) institutional network; and
A system of agencies responsible for S&T management and a
mechanism and policy measures to manage S&T.
Compared to the countries previously reviewed, Viet Nam offered few
relevant background documents and very little statistical material. This
factor served to reinforce the need to seek the views, experiences, and
problems of stakeholders throughout the country but made it difficult
to carry out statistical and empirical corroboration.
Because of the explicit link to the preparation of a White Paper, the
Vietnamese government asked the international team to be far more
prescriptive than it normally would be.
The international team also provided some training, with a view to the
preparation of the White Paper and a long-term S&T strategy.
Over the 3-week period (14 September to 4 October 1997), the interna-
tional team conducted meetings and discussions throughout Viet Nam with some
70 Vietnamese institutions, organizations, and firms and about 325 individuals. In
almost all of these, members of the team were accompanied by representatives of
National Institute for Science and Technology Policy and Strategy Studies
(NISTPASS), an arrangement that permitted the team to have ongoing dialogue,
seek supplementary data sources, when these could be found, and take advantage
of opportunities as they emerged, through scheduling follow-on discussions or
meetings unanticipated in the original schedule.
The training contained three elements. The first of these was a week-long
course, provided by Dr Jack Smith of the Canadian National Research Council in
Ottawa, which presented a range of methodologies that had been used to prepare
an S&T strategy in Canada 2 years earlier. The second element in the training was
also a week-long course, provided by Professor Martin Fransman of the University
of Edinburgh, Scotland, to outline the S&T strategies followed by Japan, South
Korea, and Taiwan. These training components helped the Vietnamese team under-
stand the approaches of other East Asian countries to achieving industrialization.
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The third part of the training was to have members of the Vietnamese team
accompany the international team as it carried out its interviews.
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Chapter 2
THE GLOBAL AND REGIONAL CONTEXT: ISSUES,
TRENDS, AND FACTORS IN VIET NAM'S S&T
STRATEGY
The Vietnamese government's stated aim is "to apply S&T as the driving force
for Viet Nam's economic development" so that it becomes "a modernised and in-
dustrialised society by the year 2020" (MOSTE 1998, p. 1). The government
further envisages that this will happen in two stages: the government intends ini-
tially to obtain, apply, and master imported technologies and subsequently gener-
ate new technologies nationally.
Is this realistic? Can it happen? What is the evidence from other countries?
What circumstances and strategic factors in the world of today and tomorrow
would the government have to take into account in trying to frame a national
strategy to support this aim? What is the evidence of success and failure in the
acquisition and assimilation of technology? Are there some central lessons and
trends in the processes of selecting and creating comparative advantage through
technologies? In this chapter, we examine these questions briefly, with a view to
establishing a number of considerations central to the S&T policy review and
helping to provide a larger background to the S&T strategy discussions in Viet
Nam, leading to the White Paper.
It bears stating at the outset that the achievement of a modernized, industri-
alized economy by 2020 (that is, in 20-25 years) would not be unrealistic.
Industrial output has been the basis of the rapid economic expansion of many
countries, and the time frame for industrial development has been greatly reduced
over the past 30 years. Figure 1 shows the time it takes to double per capita
output for selected countries.
This figure show that during the industrial revolution, it took the United
Kingdom 58 years to double its per capita output. The United States took 47 years
during the middle of the 19th century. During the early years of this century,
Japan doubled its per capita output in 34 years. More recently, Brazil doubled its
per capita output in 18 years; Korea, in 11 years; and China, in 10 years. The
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Figure 1. Time for per capita output to double.
reasons for the dramatic gains in the output of Brazil, Korea, and China over only
a very few years are complex and have been the subject of extensive scholarship
and considerable dispute, and there is great danger in any oversimplified explana-
tion. What we may safely conclude, however, is that the time frames for industri-
alization have been shrinking impressively and that dramatic gains in industrial
output have been made in recent years.
But what about the future? Can Viet Nam achieve the same rapid industri-
alization over the next 20 years that other countries achieved over the previous
20? Certainly Viet Nam confronts a global context different from that Korea, for
example, confronted 30 years ago.
According to an old expression, "When we predict the future the devil
laughs." The complexity of global trends today, coupled with the speed of change,
should lead us to see a serious caution in this expression. We need to be aware
of the forces and trends currently shaping our world and take these as fully as
possible into account in policies for the future. But what exactly are these major
forces and trends? And if they are so complex and changing so quickly, how can
we hope to understand and deal with them? All societies confront these questions
today, and much hubris and hypocrisy would attach to anyone pretending to
provide answers. In this chapter, we cannot pretend to provide answers but only
offer a selective and modest outline of the principal factors to consider.
Globalization
Viet Nam decided to join and be an active player in the global economic and
trading community. A major step in this direction will occur in 2006, when Viet
Nam becomes a full member of the Asian Free Trade Area (AFTA). At that point,
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all tariffs on regional trade must be reduced to 5% or less. A second major step
will be when Viet Nam achieves its announced objective of becoming a full
member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Clearly, then, Viet Nam is
about to be exposed to the powerful forces and trends involved in globalization.
Like the vast majority of nations today, Viet Nam will attempt to turn those forces
to national advantage, and it will need to compete for this with other nations.
Of course, globalization generates much debate, but few serious observers
doubt that it is creating a porous world in which long-assumed boundaries are fast
decreasing in significance. Globalization means what it says: the denationalization
of economic life. Among the strategic factors associated with globalization are the
following:
Deregulation — The core element of deregulation is the abolition of
national controls over the cross-border movement of capital. This has
been occurring on an accelerating pace throughout the world. It is mov-
ing us progressively toward the abolition of differences between coun-
tries and regions, differences that had been built up over the 200-year
era of national capitalist economies. The process to global economic
interdependence is well advanced.
Foreign direct investment — Foreign direct investment (FDI) has ex-
panded dramatically and consistently during the past 15 years, and the
trend is expected to continue. FDI exerts pressure on regulatory re-
gimes, almost universally weakened since the early 1980s. This has a
good deal to do with tax aversion — international investors seek out
low-tax jurisdictions. Falling corporate-tax revenues have also shifted
the taxation burden to individuals, and this is forcing social-democratic
political parties to abandon their commitments to welfare-state spend-
ing. FDI in developing countries exploded in the last 5 years, whereas
public financing for development (overseas development assistance
[ODA]) stagnated or even declined. In 1990, FDI and ODA were rough-
ly equal, at about 60 billion United States dollars (USD). According to
World Bank calculations, for 1996, FDI had increased to more than 320
billion USD, whereas ODA was declining toward 50 billion USD.
However, FDI remains highly concentrated in a very few countries.
Trade liberalization — Trade liberalization is particularly evident in the
reduction and elimination of tariffs, which has become the dominant
issue in international relations. Tariff rates throughout the world have
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been falling rapidly and are now assessed at an average 5%. This de-
cline is expected to continue, with the recently established WTO assum-
ing a role of heightened importance in determining tariff rates.
Tightly integrated financial markets—Financial markets, especially the
major ones, have become tightly integrated, and this trend will continue.
Financial markets have the most sensitive and comprehensive influence
on national policies. Their influence is continuous, not episodic. Inves-
tors regard each country according to a total package of factors that
investors monitor closely, employing either brokerage houses like
Goldman Sachs or credit-rating agencies like Moodies. Any change in
the package, from macroeconomic policy to labour legislation or
expenditure plans, can create a reaction in the market. A political-risk
factor is built in explicitly. The penalty for changes not welcomed by
the market is a higher cost for capital. This exacts a tax on all citizens
and reduces growth and the revenue base. As an obvious result, macro-
economic policies (monetary, fiscal, and expenditure plans) are increas-
ingly becoming homogenized and the possibilities for experimentation
become almost nonexistent. This is particularly important because
opportunities for macroeconomic experimentation in support of industri-
alization and export-led growth, available to South Korea, Singapore,
and Taiwan in 1960-90, may no longer be available to countries like
Viet Nam.
Shifting fault lines between rich and poor—Globalization is producing
new gains and losses, new winners and losers. The dividing line once
assumed to stand between the affluent industrial North and the poorer
South is fading. Streeten (1998) offers the rough balance sheet shown
in Table 1.
Skewed income distribution — In almost all parts of the world, income
distribution is becoming more skewed, with larger percentages of wealth
concentrated in the privileged 10% of populations and declining per-
centages of wealth falling to the poorer 20%. Viet Nam has placed a
high value on equity as a fundamental socialist principle. Globalization
will doubtless challenge the extent to which that value can be preserved
and protected.
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Table 1. Globization.
Good for Bad for
Europe, Japan, and North America




People with high skills
Educated people
Professional, managerial, and technical people
Flexible adjusters
Creditors
























Sellers of primary and standard
manufactured products
Source: Streeten (1998).
A powerful new transnational stratum of society — A new stratum of
society is forming and is increasingly predominant in state-policy for-
mation everywhere. This stratum includes investors, rent seekers, and
high-income employees, and their interests derive from individualism
decreasingly rooted in the collective social well-being of the individual
nation-state. Real transference of power is involved in this. The control
of national governments over economic matters is becoming narrowly
constrained. The global economy can no longer be managed effectively
by a single superpower (for example, as was done by the United
Kingdom under Pax Britannica until World War I) or by a combination
of superpowers (for example, the United States and the Soviet Union
following World War II).
Supranational management of the global economy — The global
economy must now be managed supranationally, but the existing inter-
national institutions, established over decades to deal with growing
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global interdependence, are found wanting. Summits of world leaders
have failed to produce effective plans to tackle global recession and,
most particularly, the return of mass unemployment. Financial and eco-
nomic stability is proving to be far beyond the reach of the Bretton
Woods Institutions, and the United Nations has been unable to deal with
political instability in such places as Somalia and Bosnia. International
attempts to muster cooperation to respond to environmental deteriora-
tion have achieved relatively little. Whereas international cooperation
is ever more vital, it seems increasingly difficult to achieve.
Locational advantage — A key factor of globalization is the extent that
corporations are free to produce where they wish and that governments
anticipate this by adjusting state policies to retain or attract their
facilities. Here the evidence is very clear: companies increasingly have
global strategies and states increasingly adapt their taxation systems,
labour laws, health and safety regulations, environmental laws, etc., to
accommodate these corporations' interests. Some argue that low-wage
countries currently contribute only 16% of the world's manufactured
exports and that therefore low-wage exports do not threaten wages or
employment in richer countries. But no such conclusion can be drawn:
a good deal of the phenomena of flexible labour markets (for example,
casualization, deunionization, wage cuts, downsizing, outsourcing, and
shifts to casual and part-time employment) are preemptive responses to
the threat of low-wage exports brought by globalization.
Whatever the varying viewpoints on, and interpretations of, globalization,
sufficient evidence of important structural changes now clearly shows that we are
entering a qualitatively new phase in the international system and that the future
cannot be clearly predicted. This greatly increases the uncertainties for an S&T
policy or strategy and the risks of policy failure. Viet Nam's decision to join with
the forces of globalization will necessarily narrow the government's range of
policy choices and presents policymakers with the very serious and delicate task
of predicting the impact of the global economy on various kinds of national social
formation.
Technological revolution
Behind the forces of globalization is a technological revolution that is fundamen-
tally and radically altering all aspects of business, industry, and manufacturing. At
its core are the new information technologies (ITs). These new technologies, based
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on a constellation of industries growing rapidly in all the leading industrial coun-
tries (for example, computers, electronic components, and telecommunications),
have already brought vast improvements in technical performance, as well as a
dramatic fall and counterinflationary trend in prices. Their revolutionary effects,
however, lie in their influencing, although very unevenly, all other sectors and
their changing the very nature of industry, economy, and society. Some time ago,
a special supplement to The Economist (30 May 1987, entitled "Factory of the
Future," succinctly outlined this revolution in industry:
For the first time in three-quarters of a century the factory is being
reinvented from scratch. Long, narrow production lines of men crawling
all over them — a feature of manufacturing everywhere since the days of
the car-making dynasties — are being ripped apart and replaced with
clusters of all-purpose machines huddled in cells run by computers and
served by nimble-fingered robots. The whole shape of the industrial
landscape is changing in the process. In short nothing less than a whole
new style of manufacturing is in the process of being defined.
The complete reorganization of the production system is now taking place and is
far more important than any particular discrete piece of equipment. This reinven-
tion of the basis of manufacturing and industry is intensifying, and this trend must
be expected to continue.
Under the title "Change of Techno-Economic Paradigm," Freeman (1992)
provided a helpful list of some of the major aspects of the transformation occur-
ring, which is shown in Table 2.
Two among the many implications of these dramatic shifts for a national
S&T policy may be mentioned:
These changes will most likely require flexible approaches and a rela-
tively open framework. Many countries have made industrial planning
with specific targeting their preferred S&T policy approach, but it
would appear to be more appropriate and more likely to produce suc-
cess under the old paradigm than under the new. A good rule in S&T
policy decision-making today is probably to consider the structure of
the whole process in relation to a project's goal and to consider in
particular the integration of decisions on investment, production, and
marketing with those on R&D. This would entail the constant develop-
ment of technical and economic forecasts and the need to relate these
to science policy and R&D decision-making.
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Table 2. Change of technoeconomic paradigm.
Fordist (old) ITs (new)
Energy intensive Information intensive
Standardized Customized
Rather stable product mix Rapid changes in product mix
Dedicated plant and equipment Flexible production systems
Automation Systemation
Single firm Networks
Hierarchical structures Flat horizontal structures
Departmental Integrated
Product with service Service with products
Centralization Distributed intelligence
Specialized skills Multiskilling
Government ownership, control, and planning Government information coordination and
regulation; vision
Source: Freeman (1992).
Note: IT, information technology.
In Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan, governments were the critical
actors and played a very central and directive role in bringing about
development through industrialization. Based on the success of these
experiences, many people advocate similar approaches for other coun-
tries. The new paradigm suggests, however, that guidance and direction
may now be more appropriately and effectively exercised through a
gentler touch, based, as Freeman (1992) suggested, on mastery of an
inspired vision of an industrial society and its communication. Interest-
ingly, one of the main authors of previous success, Lee Kwan Yew, the
former Prime Minister of Singapore, recently suggested that progress
now depends increasingly on democratization, as the complexity of
modem technology and of organization around it requires a participative
approach (The Economist, 9 June 1991).
Creating comparative advantage: some lessons and trends from the
Southeast Asian experience
According to development theory in the 1960s, technology transfer is the key to
economic and social development. The first major United Nations Conference on
Science and Technology for Development was held in 1963. The consensus was
that the world market is like a "supermarket," filled with technology "available for
the taking." The advice given to developing countries was to take advantage of
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this and to shop wisely. In retrospect, this appears very naive, but it was the view
that prevailed during the first development decade of the United Nations. Studies
conducted in the early years of the 1970s revealed the following:
Far from being obtainable for the exclusive use of a developing country,
most technology was only available under restricted conditions (for ex-
ample, technological know-how remained with its original owner and
was not included in the transfer; the goods produced could not be
exported legally to other markets).
Productivity gains from technologies introduced in developing countries
were initially equal to those experienced in industrial countries but sub-
sequently diverged considerably, with gains continuing only in industrial
countries. This was essentially due to the fact that continuous innova-
tions and incremental small gains from the same technology occurred
in industrial countries, not in developing countries.
Circumstances have, of course, changed since the 1960s, but lessons can
be learned from previous experience. Proprietorship over technology is, if any-
thing, stronger today than it was three decades ago. S&T policy needs to take this
carefully into account and to find the appropriate policy instruments to ensure that
technological packages promote national interests. Second, the foundations of a
continuous process of innovation are of critical importance — more so today than
in the past — and must be made integral to S&T policy.
Experience and research during the 1960-80 period also showed that in
attempting to establish new export-oriented industries and new areas of R&D
work, a developing country usually began with less of an advantage than industrial
countries and leading firms. This gave rise to infant-industry policies, with a range
of measures (mainly nontariff arrangements) to protect industries in their early
years to give them a chance to become established and competitive. Although the
approaches varied, infant-industry practices were key components of the strategies
of Brazil, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan.
Infant-industry approaches are continuing today, but the much more inte-
grated global economy means these instruments must be more subtle and flexible.
Indonesia, for example, has emerged as an internationally competitive exporter of
manufactured goods only in the past 10 years. Its success in export-led manufac-
turing can be attributed to a number of factors, including successive packages
carefully assembled and timed over a decade to reshape and fine-tune the coun-
try's banking and financial system, customs arrangements, tax laws, protection
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against imports, import monopolies, licencing of investments and production, sea
communications, and state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
More generally, the experiences of Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and
Taiwan suggest that trade and financial liberalization should be carefully
coordinated with technological and industrial change. Most neoclassical analysts
do not hold this view but urge quick and wholesale liberalization. They argue that
countries should carry out comprehensive import liberalization before making
efforts to increase export earnings. This, they claim, is required to eliminate
inefficiencies generated by protective barriers and enable a subsequently stronger
response to export demand (see, for example, Kreuger 1978). But the East Asian
experience supports far more the prescription for more gradual change, with
sequencing gauged to the competitiveness of domestic industry, itself promoted
by preceding and simultaneous industrial policies (see Helleiner 1988; Krugman
1989; Wade 1990). This lends further support to the importance of imbedding
S&T policies in economic and social policies and vice versa.
An important factor is evident from the recent cases of successful transfor-
mation through manufacturing exports: international access to innovations and
know-how. This does not diminish the role that national R&D may play; however,
as is evident from the experiences of Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea, and
Taiwan, international connectivity is imperative. The case of Singapore is perhaps
most explicit in this regard, because its process was most systematic, both in
establishing substantial FDI from foreign multinational corporations (MNCs) and
in transferring technology and skills from abroad. Integral to this process was the
effort to restrain the demands of workers and trade unions. Foreign labour
(professionals, as well as skilled and unskilled manual workers) was also imported
to help fill new jobs created by the export-oriented industrialization strategy. The
government contended that
an open door policy is one which at least ensures rapid growth right from
the start. When foreign corporations bring their expertise, what we
experience, as a developing nation, is a brain drain in reverse. Naturally
we pay for this, we pay in the form of profits and know-how fees
remitted abroad and high salaries to foreign management and technical
personnel ... . (It would be wrong for us, however,) to resent the inflow
of management personnel, engineers and technicians from abroad. On the
contrary, we regard them as blazing the trail for the new industries which
we do not have the knowledge and technology to set up ourselves.
(Goh 1970, cited by Beng 1997)
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If balanced combinations of infant-industry measures and openness to
international R&D are imperative, indeed, critical, to early efforts to industrialize,
one may also make an especially compelling case for applying infant-industry
measures to establishing R&D capacities. This case was made by Freeman (1992),
who concluded from his research that if a developing country is to graduate from
importing technology to producing its own, "there is a strong case, in making
R&D decisions, for deciding sometimes to invest in a project even if the first cost
comparison shows a higher cost from own R&D to a policy of buying a license"
(emphasis added).
But such decisions are also neither straightforward nor simple. As men-
tioned earlier, in the longer run, considerations such as the importance attached
to reliance on imitation, licencing, and purchasing know-how versus one's own
R&D and problem-solving capacities go beyond economics. These are also
political and cultural decisions that depend on the kind of society one wishes to
have. Again, to quote Freeman (1992),
It is conceivable that one could rely as a matter of policy entirely on
imported know-how, and not attempt to do research. Although this is a
possible line of argument, on economic grounds it has obviously
enormous implications for cultural and political results flowing from such
a policy.
In the case of Viet Nam, this longer run decision appears to have been made.
From the experiences of Southeast Asian countries, it is also clear that the
transition from the initial stage in their industrialization, with cheap labour and
labour-intensive manufacturing, to skill-based competitiveness in manufacturing
was a difficult and delicate process. Korea made the transition after years of rapid
productivity growth but relatively stagnant wages. When it initially attempted the
transition in the early 1980s, labour costs began to rise. Until 1988, productivity
and the demand for labour continued to increase and the transition to a higher
wage, skill-based economy appeared to be going smoothly. In 1989 and 1990,
however, a wage explosion dramatically increased labour's share in the value
added, and expansion in the number of employees came to a halt (Godfrey 1997).
Singapore in the late 1970s had severe labour shortages. At the same time,
the government concluded that the wage-restraint policy of previous years had
promoted the retention of labour-intensive economic activities, hindering the
natural process of economic restructuring and making the economy more vulner-
able to competition from other developing countries. Thus, during 1979-34, the
government encouraged significant wage increases. The impact, however, weighed
most heavily on firms engaged in labour-intensive activities, and the overall result
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was that between 1982 and 1986 employment in Singapore's manufacturing sector
actually fell while labour cost rose. This trend was not reversed until 1986,
following the government's abandonment of the centralized high-wage policy
(Beng 1997).
Indonesia's more recent emergence as an internationally competitive
labour-intensive manufacture has involved increasing productivity combined with
wage restraints, as had been the case in Singapore some 30 years earlier. In the
case of Indonesia, it is not clear whether the transition can be made from cheap
labour to skill-based competitiveness, and evidence thus far suggests that it will
be both more difficult and more uncertain than it proved to be in previous cases
(see, for example, Godfrey 1997).
One lesson here is that wage policy is integral to an S&T strategy, but
another is that it is very difficult to manage, especially when "upscaling" to highly
skill-intensive manufacturing.
Education and training: special prerequisites
Everywhere we turn today, we are told that "knowledge societies" are the key to
future prosperity and that those who can obtain, generate, manage, apply, and
adapt knowledge in all its forms (including very much, of course, S&T) will
prosper, whereas those who cannot do so will fall further behind. A typical
expression of this is found in Marshall and Tucker (1992):
The future now belongs to societies that organise themselves for learning.
What we know and can do holds the key to economic progress, just as
command of natural resources once did. More than ever before, nations
that want high incomes and full employment must develop policies that
emphasise the acquisition of knowledge and skills by everyone, not just
a select few. The prize will go to those countries that are organised to
learn and to act on what they learn.
It all sounds so grand and so logical. When we pause to think about it,
however, we quickly realize it is an oversimplification — and a dangerous one at
that. The technological changes that the world is experiencing do mean that skills
and knowledge are becoming of ever-greater importance. Without doubt, this
should be acknowledged and acted on. But the comparative advantage of a country
or a community or an individual depends on multiple factors, and the availability
of natural resources remains central. Much of the recent economic success of
South American countries in gaining market access to the global economy has
depended on South America's comparative advantage in natural resources. New
exports of cut flowers, fruit, vegetables, spices, exotic agricultural products, and
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wines, along with agroindustry linkages and value-added packaging for these
exports, are at the heart of economic prosperity in much of Latin America. The
recent industrialization successes of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand have de-
pened heavily on combinations of economic and S&T policies that have increased
domestic savings via productivity and efficiency gains in the traditional sectors
and the surplus generated by giving priority to investments in agricultural S&T.
Whether a country's comparative advantage is in manufactures or primary
products depends on its relative endowments of skills and of land. An essential
distinction here is that the production of manufactures requires a higher skill—land
ratio than does the production of primary products. The skill—land ratio in Hong
Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore, or Taiwan is clearly much different from that in
Chile, India, Laos, Tanzania, or Viet Nam. National policymakers would be most
unwise to fail to take these obvious facts into account in developing their econom-
ic strategies and their S&T components.
The newly industrialized countries (NICs) of East Asia, which have led the
field in export-led industrialization, are in relative terms land and natural-resource
scarce. When they began their industrialization processes, they also each clearly
started with large supplies of educated labour, including educated female labour.
In 1965, Hong Kong, Korea, and Singapore had already achieved universal prima-
ry enrolment, well ahead of other developing countries (World Bank 1993).
Between 20 and 40% of women completed primary school, compared with less
than 5% in most other developing countries. By the mid-1980s, average years of
schooling for women had reached 6.6 in Korea, 6.5 in Hong Kong, and 5.7 in
Taiwan, not far short of the OECD average of 7.5 years (Barro and Lee 1993).
Much evidence shows that rises in educational enrolment are highly corre-
lated with increasing output and exports of manufactures. In all the East Asian
examples of rapid industrialization, educational levels have risen well above those
that would be predicted from per capita income. According to the model used in
the World Bank's (1993) East Asian Miracle study, a large part of growth in these
countries can be explained by the extent of education: different parts of education
are associated with growth in each country. Primary education is highly significant
in all these economies; secondary education is most powerful in Japan but least
powerful in Indonesia and Thailand, where secondary education has been lagging
and skill shortages have been identified. For the economies studied, 60% or more
of economic growth is "explained by the accumulation of physical and human
capital, initial income levels and population growth" (World Bank 1993).
But what exactly have education and training to do with manufacturing?
Considerable evidence at the firm level shows that the ability to adopt new tech-
nologies and the ability to make productivity advances are both attributable to
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education and training. For example, Japan's successful introduction of robotics
and microelectronics into industry was found to be related to educational improve-
ments of the 1970s and 1980s, and studies in Taiwan show similar findings (see
Aw and Tan 1987; Koike 1987).
Considerable evidence also shows that appropriate education and training
can reduce overall costs. Most of this evidence comes from industrial countries.
For example, studies in the United Kingdom (Prais 1990, cited in Freeman 1992)
show the disadvantage of the British worker, who commonly has less education
and training than his or her counterpart in competing countries. The British worker
may be paid a lower wage, but more expenditure is required for management,
supervision, and quality control; consequently, that worker is more expensive to
employ. The cost may in fact be even higher, as the evidence shows that the
technology is to some extent determined by available skills and that firms with
lower skills are unable to adapt to new techniques and technologies.
Overall, there is no doubt that the right combinations of education and
training are prerequisite to industrial performance and competitiveness. Workers'
flexibility, resourcefulness, and problem-solving capacities are qualities of increas-
ing importance in today's rapidly changing industrial market, and these qualities
seem to depend to a considerable degree on such combinations. Indeed, it is
important to consider the very large body of evidence about to the changing
character of manufacturing production and trade. Fewer and fewer products are
made first and then sold to whomever will buy them. According to one estimate,
60% of all production and sales in OECD countries is now done to meet client-
specific orders (World Bank 1992). But this must be kept in perspective: many
products are still not individually tailored to client specifications. As Cassan and
Mavrotas (1997) noted, "some products are little affected by new technology: a
can of peaches is still a can of peaches. If this were not so, there would be little
opportunity for the less-advanced countries."
The key point, however, is that its the "right combinations" that pay the
dividends (both on an individual and societal rate-of-return basis). It is also the
case, as demonstrated in numerous studies, that there can be supply-demand
distortions at all levels of education and training, negative rates of social return
on investments in education, and brain drain. It is clear that education and training
are needed for successful industrialization, but it is equally clear that education
and training do not cause it.
Innovation
Until the 1960s, focus of S&T thinking was that the process was a continuum
from scientific discovery to technological breakthrough and to economic gain.
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Little attention was given to the cumulative role of relatively minor innovations,
to innovation systems, or to the diffusion of innovation. That has changed. We
have learned a great deal about the centrality of innovation to the production of
wealth, and much S&T thinking today centres quite justifiably on the role of
innovation. Extensive studies have taught us a great deal:
The process of incremental innovation leads to very substantial pro-
ductivity gains across a very broad range of industries. Such incre-
mental innovation need not always involve a process of technical
change; indeed, it could involve organizational innovation or skill
improvements based on experience. These findings do not diminish the
importance of productivity gains from advances in science, a brand new
invention, a technological breakthrough, or a radical innovation, but
they do underscore the fact that a process of continuous innovation is
imperative to industrial success.
Successful innovation is characterized by determined and systematic
attempts to build linkages between user and producer (almost always a
microlevel or firm-level activity), on the one hand, and with external
sources of S&T information and advice (usually involving multiple
actors, including government) on the other. Successful innovators typi-
cally do their own R&D, but they also make extensive use of other
sources of technology. Failures to innovate very often result from a lack
of communication with external technology networks, whether national
or international.
The size of the firm does not determine its success or failure at
innovation. What does matter, however, is the size of its R&D project.
Innovations that fail tend to have involved fewer resources than those
that succeed, and this again underscores the importance of resource
pooling and connections with external networks.
Studies of the innovation process all indicate the interrelatedness of the
S&T system and the economic and social system in a country. The
Science and Technology Policy Instruments project in the mid-1970s
clearly demonstrated the importance of implicit S&T policies.
More recently, the interrelatedness of investments in S&T and of other
economic and social factors has led both researchers and policymakers
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to develop the concept of systems of innovation. This concept can be
applied at sectoral, regional, national, or international levels. The con-
cept makes it possible to analyze the particular constellation of policies
and strategies across many different domains that is most likely to lead
to innovation and hence enhanced competitiveness.
Given the inherent difficulties of national planning, it becomes essential
that governments put measures in place to promote innovation. Several
industrialized and developing countries have found the concept of a
national system of innovation (NSI) useful in devising the most appro-
priate measures to stimulate innovation in their societies.
So important is innovation to a firm's or a nation's competitiveness that many
countries have begun to include innovation policy as a integral part of their
national policy-making.
In thinking about a long-term S&T strategy, Viet Nam may find it useful
to carry out a "knowledge" assessment. Such an assessment can be used to deter-
mine whether a firm, institution, city, or country has the ability to create, acquire,
assimilate, use, and diffuse knowledge and thus whether it is likely to prosper or
even survive in the globalized world. Creating, acquiring, assimilating, using, and
diffusing knowledge each requires unique skills, and not all organizations need to
undertake each of these activities.
The centrality of these findings for economic success has also led many
companies and governments today to invest heavily in both national and interna-
tional knowledge and technology networks. These companies and countries are
also trying to focus R&D resources, with a view to achieving the critical mass
needed to produce results. These trends suggest strongly that an S&T strategy for
Viet Nam should assign priority to these activities.
Rapid development through export-led industrialization: can it still
happen?
The short answer to this question is probably yes, but it will be more difficult than
in the past. Interpretations of industrialization successes in East Asia usually
emphasize the importance of domestic factors, in particular establishing the right
policies. Much of what has preceded has drawn attention to such domestic factors,
but emphasis has also been placed on the new context of international factors and
trends — and for good reason. East Asian success was in good measure due to
international factors. These factors created opportunities for relatively low-cost
industrial-production sites to be integrated into the world economy. In the 1960s,
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several conditions combined to produce a special set of factors: relatively favoura-
ble access to industrial-country markets, greatly increased access to international
finance, and increasing relocation of production by MNCs to lower wage
countries. The countries able to seize these opportunities had generally already
established an industrial base through previous policies of import-substitution, had
invested heavily in basic education, and had had determined governments commit-
ted to the strong state management of the industrialization process. The successful
transition to industrialized status in East Asia is partly due to geopolitical factors.
The United States encouraged and supported the economic strength of Japan,
Korea, and Taiwan because they were key to the West's defence perimeter. Hence,
the East Asian success is partly due to favourable historical and international
circumstances.
External factors have been of great importance in industrialization, and
such factors today are vastly different from those in the 1960s, when Japan,
Korea, and Taiwan made major inroads into Western markets and Singapore was
able to launch itself along the same path. Today, Western markets are no longer
in the same expansionary phase. Also, a dramatic fall has occurred in the demand
for unskilled labour and raw materials per unit of industrial production. Tariff
barriers may be falling, but quantitative restrictions (nontariff barriers) have in-
creased, with special discrimination against developing countries. By the later
1980s, 18% of manufactured imports from OECD countries were covered by
quantitative restrictions, in comparison with 31% of those from developing
countries.
In addition to these trends, a sharp increase has occurred (as outlined
previously) in the volatility of the international economy and therefore also an
increase in uncertainty. Internationalization and deregulation of financial markets
have resulted in unprecedented flows of short-term money of as much as 80-100
times those of trade flows. As Drucker (1986) observed, this has unhinged the
relationships between exchange rates and trade, interest rates and investment, and
fiscal and monetary policies. Long-term investment is depressed, but short-term
flows thrive.
Recent events in Asia confirm this volatility. The currency and financial
crisis in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand has greatly complicated
the regional scene and added major uncertainties about the future. Conflicting
interpretations, explanations, accusations, and counteraccusations abound. Howev-
er, the downturn in the fortunes of these "recent tigers" has clearly established that
if the potential benefits of financial integration and private capital are large, so are
the risks. The experiences of the recent tigers suggest that the greatest benefits
they obtained from financial integration were the spillover effects, such as new
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technology and organizational and managerial systems. The speed and magnitude
of market reaction are, however, integral characteristics of financial integration.
The effects of the current crisis will be felt in the region for many years. This
must be expected to make the regional integration of Viet Nam more difficult.
In addition, Japan, the region's most powerful economy, has moved into
a period of very low growth, with a strong possibility of recession. And, finally,
China's recent policy announcement that unprofitable SOEs will no longer receive
financial support from the state likely means that tens of millions of low-cost
skilled and semiskilled workers will soon be released into China's vast labour
market. It must be expected that China will therefore compete directly with Viet
Nam for investment, particularly for entry-level, labour-intensive manufacturing.
The implications of all this for countries wishing to follow in the steps of
the East Asian "miracle" economies are numerous. First, integration will replace
tariff barriers with nontariff barriers, which are directed especially at light manu-
factures, precisely the products that countries like Viet Nam are urged to make
their principal export. Second, because of recent events, Viet Nam will confront
much greater competition from the existing East Asian tigers, which, having lost
a lot of ground in recent months, can now be expected simultaneously to push for
expansion into the most advanced sectors and to use technology to remain compet-
itive in light manufactures. Third, the massive low-cost labour pool about to be
created in China will complicate Viet Nam's prospects for growth in export-led
manufactures.
Also, ominous trends in technology will have potentially far-reaching
effects on a nation's comparative advantage and competitive position. The increase
in the capacity of machines to perform the work of relatively unskilled labour may
result in a shift of production back to advanced OECD countries. Alternatively,
it may allow developing countries to upscale more rapidly and at lower initial
cost.
Because of these new opportunities and risks, we can reasonably conclude
that the policies that created the economic miracles of East Asia will not work as
well or as easily as they did in the past. The less favourable and more complex
international conditions are likely sufficient by themselves to confirm this assess-
ment. It would still be a serious mistake for policymakers to fail to carefully con-
sider previous events in East Asia. However, almost certainly, no ready-made
prescription is available to help Viet Nam become an industrial society within a
little more than two decades. This is likely to mean that an appropriate set of
S&T-policy instruments, tightly imbedded in, complemented by, and complemen-
tary to a broad range of other economic, industrial, and social instruments, will be
more important and critical than before. Finally, a sound S&T-policy framework
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must perforce contend with much greater complexity and uncertainty than in even
the very recent past and must facilitate arrangements with sufficient flexibility and
agility to respond to changing circumstances and assumptions. An S&T-policy
review should be measured by the degree to which it builds a shared perception
of the need for such arrangements and its contributions to setting a framework for
an appropriate S&T-policy framework.
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PART II
The Review
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This part contains the main findings and impressions of the international team. It
deals with the central issues pertinent to the topics we were asked to address and
that formed the focus of the interviews. Not all aspects of S&T policy are
covered. In particular, we met no representatives from the health sciences, and
only one interview provided insights into environmental issues. These areas (and
others) constitute important gaps in our research.
For each issue we addressed we have attempted to put what we heard and
saw about Viet Nam into a broader context. Where appropriate we have also made
suggestions for Viet Nam on how to rectify perceived weaknesses. For easier
reading, we present these suggestions in a boxed format.
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Chapter 3
POLICY REFORMS AND INSTITUTIONAL INERTIA
After several decades (and even centuries) of resistance and war against invaders,
the Vietnamese people and particularly its national authorities, have a high degree
of confidence in Viet Nam's ability to deal with external threats. Moreover, the
Vietnamese have a willingness to question views and ideas and a nonconformist
attitude toward received authority, which have led to a rather horizontal and non-
hierarchical power structure that emphasizes achieving consensus.
The international mission met many people in Viet Nam who strongly ad-
vocated that major decisions should be made consensually and that a slow but
steady approach should be followed to reform. In the words of one senior policy-
maker, "Look at the situation in Thailand. It is the result of trying to move too
quickly. The lesson for us is to take things on a step by step basis." Thus, one
clear tendency is to approach S&T strategy with a view to making it a graduated
instrument for industrialization and modernization, to wait out turmoil, to act
primarily on the basis of patient, consensus-building processes with a view to har-
monizing all views and accommodating the legitimate concerns of anyone affected
negatively by the reform process.
Many other people believed strongly that Viet Nam had arrived at a cross-
roads and that any continuation of a step-by-step approach to reform would place
the country at a serious, perhaps permanent, disadvantage. The people who held
this view pointed to the rapidly changing economic, technological, regional, and
global context, outlined in the previous section. This new context, they claimed,
carries threats. These are not threats from a single, identifiable enemy, but diffuse
threats deriving from a variety of sources (world trade, technological changes,
diffusion of cultural patterns, financial markets). According to this viewpoint,
Viet Nam is in danger of seriously underestimating the magnitude of the challenge
it faces.
The different and conflicting viewpoints we found made it clear that
Viet Nam is experiencing serious political and economic difficulties in the tran-
sition from a centrally planned economy based on command-and-control mech-
anisms to a market economy based on incentives, risk-taking and a role for
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government based on general guidance and encouragement. Several metaphors
may be appropriate to describe the present situation:
• The Vietnamese government appears to be in the middle of the river:
there is no going back, but people seem to be reluctant and resistant to
moving forward with further and deeper reforms; and
• The Vietnamese government appears to be in the driver's seat, pressing
at same time on the accelerator (market-reform policies) and on the
brakes (persistence of central-planning habits and institutions).
This, then, is the major paradox confronting Viet Nam and its government.
On the one hand, a widespread sense of urgency is felt, arising principally from
Viet Nam's decision to become a full member of the regional and international
communities, first through its membership in AFT A, which is only 8 years away,
and second through its planned membership in WTO. On the other side is a pro-
pensity to make change slowly, to proceed step by step. This paradox is central
to the many key economic, legal, technological, and scientific reforms being con-
sidered in Viet Nam, which make it difficult to correctly assess whether a decision
can wait until a consensus has been reached or requires firm leadership and
speedy action, regardless of whether a consensus is reached. For the technicians,
specialists, and officials responsible for preparing a national S&T policy as the
driving force for Vietnamese economic development, the paradox creates great
confusion about central assumptions and appropriate measures to take.
Viet Nam did not experience an outright institutional collapse and the im-
plosion of central planning structures, as in the former Soviet Union. This allowed
Viet Nam's economy to respond more quickly to the policy changes introduced
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, such as the abolition of price controls, privati-
zation of agriculture, exchange-rate reforms, and the consolidation of many SOEs.
However, the persistence of the institutional arrangements linked to central
planning and the continued predominance of SOEs in industry also allowed the
people with vested interests in these institutions to resist further change. The result
is the present coexistence of promarket policy statements and the persistence of
centrally planned institutional arrangements. The overall direction of the reform
process is clear and has been agreed on in principle at the highest political levels,
but this coexistence has created a framework of policy inconsistencies, poor
implementation and frequent policy changes that carry a high opportunity cost.
Although, as a direct result of government policy, the Vietnamese economy
is much more open and subject to competition than only a few years ago,
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competition is enhanced through the unofficial economy, which includes a wide
array of consumer goods that are smuggled into the country. In large measure,
however, the Vietnamese economy remains in the hands of the state and is highly
protected. The view of many (which is shared by the members of the international
mission) is that Viet Nam is unprepared for the competitive forces about to be
unleashed on it, that the risk is high and growing, that the gains of the past decade
will quickly be eroded, and that Viet Nam requires urgent, rapid, and comprehen-
sive changes in policy and practice.
With specific reference to S&T policies, the central observation to emerge
from this review is that Viet Nam has not sufficiently adjusted its systems of S&T
and education to respond to its new economic and social circumstances or to meet
the competition that integration into and beyond the East Asian trading market
will impose. Competition within and between East Asian nations for technological
advantage must be expected to increase very significantly over the next few years.
Viet Nam's current policies are based on the perception that S&T can be managed
on the basis of a series of relatively modest, incremental adjustments, and that this
approach will optimize benefits to the nation. This approach may have served
reasonably well in the past, but if it is continued by Viet Nam's new government,
it will fail to serve both the modernization aspirations of the Vietnamese people
and the government's stated purposes. Continued modest incrementalism will place
Viet Nam in danger of serious and permanent disadvantage.
Second-generation institutional reforms (trade liberalization, equitization
of SOEs, and financial-sector, labour-market, and tax reforms) are proving to be
much more difficult than those in the first wave. These second-generation reforms
will require a high degree of political will and determination on the part of the
central government.
The possibility of designing and implementing effective S&T policies will
depends on whether second-generation reforms materialize in the near future.
Viet Nam will have technological innovation and a demand-driven framework for
S&T activities only if competitive pressures increase and risk-taking is rewarded.
There is an impression that the new government, which came into power in
October 1997, is determined to quicken the pace of reform. If this proves to be
the case, policy consistency is likely to increase and the design and imple-
mentation of S&T policies may face rather favourable circumstances.
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Chapter 4
EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT S&T POLICIES
Since the 1970s S&T policy analysts have drawn a distinction between policies
explicitly directed to S&T instruments (for example, patents, intellectual property
rights, and decisions about scientific endeavours to support or the specific tar-
geting of technologies, such as microelectronics or new materials) and instruments
not specifically directed to S&T but influential in its performance, success, and
failure (for example, economic and financial policies, labour codes, environmental
standards). Throughout its mission, the international team was able to garner a
very consistent picture of the current framework of explicit S&T policies and the
relationship between these and a broad range of implicit policies. Briefly, that
consistent picture may be summarized under three points:
The basic direction of Viet Nam's S&T policy framework is evolving
toward the removal of rigid controls, and this is viewed positively by
almost everyone with whom we spoke.
There are, however, too many explicit policies, and the tendency is to
create yet more, with the result that generally sound policies are be-
coming part of the problem, rather than part of the solution. These are
serving to create a bureaucratic nightmare of inconsistent signals from
government and conflicting decisions from different ministries, such as
Ministry of Planning and Investment, Ministry of Industry, and Ministry
of Science, Technology and Environment (MOSTE).
A broad range of implicit policies (and procedures to implement them)
conflict directly and seriously with explicit S&T policies.
Some policies are viewed as explicitly supportive of S&T. For example,
beginning in 1987, a government decision removed the state monopoly on S&T.
This was followed by decrees on foreign-technology transfer (1988); on organiza-
tional and individual rights to enter into contracts or to cooperate in S&T activities
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(1992); and on external grants in support of S&T (1994). A Civil Law promulgat-
ed in 1995 included protection of copyright, industrial property rights, and a legal
framework governing technology transfer; a foreign-investment law governing
S&T activities in economic projects was also passed. And a Law on Science and
Technology, now being prepared, is in its 12th draft (MOSTE 1997).
In addition to these measures, a large number of regulations, including
many of an implicit S&T nature, have been promulgated. These relate to the con-
tracting and procurement of technologies; to domestic and nondomestic financial
requirements; to ownership; and to specific technological requirements of a sec-
toral nature. All of these imply an enormous shift from the situation of only a
decade ago, when all S&T activity was under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
state. By all accounts, however, the process has not been smooth, and we were
advised that as a result, some 4 500 separate regulations now pertain in one form
or another to investment and technology access, transfer, and application. Many
people attempting to work nationally in the new market economy, to build interna-
tional linkages, and to mobilize S&T to that end expressed the view that the
number and extent of regulations have become one of the principal barriers to
Viet Nam's industrialization. "These regulations," we were told, "make it impossi-
ble to compete. They result in confusion, conflict, and corruption."
Among the specific issues of policy and policy coherence consistently
raised were the following:
Savings and investment — Economic and financial policies and the
Vietnamese financial system in general may result in a relatively low
domestic-savings rate, compared both with other countries in Southeast
Asia and with the levels of investment required to support high rates of
economic growth in Viet Nam. Academics, researchers, government
leaders, and Vietnamese businesspeople emphasized that without much
higher levels of domestic savings, the process of technological renewal
in the productive system will depend on FBI, joint ventures, loans from
international financial institutions and banks, ODA, and informal
sources of capital. Although Viet Nam has succeeded, particularly in the
early 1990s, in the mobilizing of foreign financing, this has been
declining over the past 2 years.
Overdependency on external capital — Beyond the question of the
availability of external capital to obtain new technologies, concern was
expressed at many levels over the implications of overdependency on
such capital, particularly in light of the recent financial turmoil in
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Malaysia and Thailand. A view expressed by one Vietnamese business-
person, but reflected in the comments of many, was that unless Viet
Nam's financial system is transformed and domestic savings increase
greatly, "we will continue to have little choice over where to obtain
new technology and to receive outdated equipment and machinery." If
the intention of the Government of Viet Nam is to follow such counsel,
then policies and practices to increase domestic savings are called for.
In this connection, the international team is of the view that the right
combination of S&T policies applied to Viet Nam's traditional sectors
can generate significant increases in domestic savings. More is said on
this in Chapter 5, and useful data are given in Appendix 2.
Tax constraints — The explicit S&T policies of Viet Nam are designed
to encourage and support the acquisition of new technologies, but tax
laws and the tax-collection system impose constraints on the acquisition
of technology, particularly for private enterprises. The manager of a
private firm reported receiving frequent visits by district, city, and na-
tional tax authorities and indicated his firm was not allowed to deduct
the full cost of R&D from its taxes. Practically all the firms we visited,
including SOEs, indicated that they had to pay taxes on the import of
capital goods and equipment, which, added to the lack of credit,
severely limited their capacities to renew their production lines, and
several people indicated that their firms faced problems with export
taxes and duties on intermediate goods for export products. The an-
nounced intention of the new government, to introduce a value-added
tax to replace the current turnover tax, was welcomed by all the busi-
nesspeople we spoke with. The current turnover tax is universally
thought to discourage domestic production, as it makes domestic prod-
ucts more expensive than imported ones and discourages technological
innovation. The need for tax incentives to promote R&D and to favour
investments in technology-intensive capital goods was frequently men-
tioned by managers in all types of industrial firms.
Credit — The announced intent of Viet Nam's current S&T policy is
to support "domestic R&D capabilities and to apply these to Viet
Nam's capacity for production of machinery and equipment" (see, for
example, GOVN 1992). The international team met with people at
several research institutes where R&D efforts have resulted in the
capacity to produce capital goods, but the lack of credit policies and
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venture-capital arrangements appears to undermine these efforts. Al-
though access to loans can be improved slightly through the creation of
spin-off enterprises, this appears not to have been an effective solution,
owing to the lack of credit and medium-term financing. This is one of
the problems that will severely limit the possible transformation of na-
tional, city, provincial, and industrial research institutes into engineering
firms producing and selling capital goods for industry and providing
technical and training services. Government officials, research-institute
authorities, and businesspeople mentioned on several occasions the need
for venture capital at favourable interest rates, with medium- and long-
term repayment periods, and for a financial institution with a good
knowledge of the problems of pilot-plant financing, technology up-
scaling and development, and experimental production.
Import substitution — Several senior government officials drew atten-
tion to a complex and delicate S&T-policy problem emerging out of the
relations between the trade regime and the acquisition of technology
capabilities. Conscious or de facto import-substitution policies, like the
ones in place at present in Viet Nam, may provide some breathing
space for firms engaged in the production of equipment, machinery,
consumer durable goods, and consumption goods. However, unless prop-
erly handled — especially in the short lead up to Vietnamese integra-
tion into AFTA — with systematic reduction of tariffs, conditioned on
export performance, transparency, and reliance on nondiscretionary
policy instruments, in a few years many of the existing policies will
generate severe domestic problems. We should also note the perception
conveyed to us that informal trade may be limiting the impact of pro-
tectionism in some industrial sectors, such as garments (in which local
firms are being forced to move upscale), consumer electronics (witness
the large unsold inventories of local firms), and some small capital
goods (for example, small diesel engines). To an extent, this is true, but
in our view it is no substitute for a trade regime consistent with indus-
trial development and technological-transformation objectives. Moreo-
ver, as mentioned previously, the changes in foreign-trade regimes that
Viet Nam has agreed to as a requirement for its membership in AFTA,
will radically limit the range of policy measures it can use to protect its
domestic industries.
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Import procedures — A frequently raised issue (related to the above)
is the rather cumbersome import procedures for capital goods, technolo-
gy services, and spare parts, which are limiting timely access to foreign
sources of the technology needed for some sectors of industry to func-
tion smoothly. This, we were advised, is affecting equally SOEs, joint
ventures, wholly owned subsidiaries, and local private firms. Their rep-
resentatives expressed their frustration and referred to the high opportu-
nity cost resulting from time spent in transactions with customs officers,
even without considering the costs of corruption. All of these issues
will come to a head when tariff barriers are drastically reduced by
2006, when Viet Nam joins AFTA.
Frequency of policy changes and lack of instruments — In most of the
meetings with policymakers, researchers, businesspeople, professors,
and government authorities at all levels, the issue of the frequency of
policy changes and the lack of instruments to implement policies was
a recurrent theme. This situation generates scepticism and concern. Fre-
quently, we also heard that "we have good policies but they are not put
into practice." Statements such as these betray a confusion between dec-
larations of good intention (party statements, ministerial speeches) and
effective policy-making, which must include the means of putting good
intentions into practice.
To summarize, then, we can say these are some of the problems of S&T
policy and policy coherence raised by people we interviewed. Regularly, the inter-
national team was told that the state had, on the one hand, turned over large parts
of the economy to the interplay of market forces but had, on the other, maintained
a monopoly over an array of crucial economic decisions. This was leaving many
people in a state of uncertainty about the future and, more importantly, about the
risks and the returns from engaging in market-directed entrepreneurship. The most
frequently cited factor, one of widespread consensus, is the country's financial
sector, which is proving incapable of supporting those very individuals and firms
that the government encourages to take advantage of S&T and market op-
portunities. The responsibility for this is laid by most at the doorstep of govern-
ment, because of the lack of direction on financial reform.
This underscores the fact that probably the most important question the
Vietnamese leadership faces at present is how to translate political will and gener-
al policy statements into specific measures and concrete, workable action plans.
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This will require much greater clarity and coherence between different policy in-




A possible fast track for improving coherence in S&T policy
The Government of Viet Nam recently established the new position of Vice Prime Minister
responsible for Science, Technology, Education and Training, Health and Social Affairs,
Culture and Environment. This elevates the importance of S&T as a central instrument of
national policy and affords an opportunity to bring a broad range of policies into greater
harmony.
To take advantage of this opportunity and to bring about needed changes and results in
the short term, an initiative similar to ones undertaken previously by Lee Kwan Yew might
be of value. The Vice Prime Minister might form a Special Task Force, of no more than 24
members, with one-half from within Viet Nam, some of the country's principal stakeholders
in the use of S&T for modernization and industrialization (that is, the most senior
individuals in Viet Nam's business and industry community and the heads of a few of Viet
Nam's leading R&D institutions). The remaining one-half would be mainly the chief
representatives of foreign MNCs that have made significant investments in Viet Nam,
along with very senior representatives of financial and development agencies, such as the
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.
The Special Task Force would be needed for no more than 3 months and its mandate
would be to recommend to the Vice Prime Minister a package of specific measures,
policies, and actions to be implemented without delay to reduce the contradictions in
current S&T policies (explicit and implicit) and eliminate certain immediate barriers to
effective technological transformations (for example, aspects of licencing policies, customs
policies and practices, and certain aspects of taxation).
Chapter 5
THE S&T SYSTEMS OF VIET NAM
Overview of Viet Nam's S&T
In Viet Nam, an estimated 30 000 people are involved in various forms of R&D,
including librarians, technicians, and other support staff; more than 22 000 of these
people are employed in the national centres for R&D and by ministries and gov-
ernment agencies (all these figures are total numbers of staff, not full-time
equivalents.) The rest are working mainly in the universities and other institutions
of tertiary education that perform research. Only a small fraction of the country's
R&D scientists and engineers are working in industrial enterprises.
The general institutional setup in Viet Nam for R&D can be divided into
three main components:
Laboratories and other R&D units within the government ministries or
under the control of government agencies — About 180 such R&D
units exist, located in various parts of the country, although most are in
the two metropolitan areas. In western industrial countries, many of
these highly specialized R&D units would be located in industrial
business enterprises. In Viet Nam, however, industrial firms rarely build
their own facilities for experimental development. In the planned econo-
my of Viet Nam of yesterday, the principle was that government took
the responsibility for technical change and industrial modernization, and
industry manufactured. Among the exceptions to this rule is the state-
owned Vietnam Petroleum Company, which runs four of its own
laboratories.
Some university and other higher-education departments that perform
research as part of their normal activities — Only a limited number of
faculties and academic departments at Viet Nam's universities and col-
leges truly have the personnel, equipment, libraries, and other resources
needed to undertake serious R&D. Among these, the two campuses of
the national university and the two largest polytechnic universities are
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the most research intensive. Only very slowly, step by step, is a
research-based university system in Viet Nam starting to emerge.
The national institutions for research that are not directly under an
individual government ministry or agency — These are designed to act
as national networks of S&T and are placed under the Government
Office (that is, the Office of the Prime Minister). The most significant
of these national institutions is the National Centre for Natural Science
and Technology (NCNST), with northern and southern branches and
facilities in some other parts of the country. Originally modeled after
an academy of sciences, it was restructured in 1993 to become more
like a centre for applied research and experimental development. It per-
forms advanced basic research mainly in two areas: mathematics and
theoretical physics. The National Centre for Social Sciences and Hu-
manities has the same basic structure, but only half the number of
people on staff.
These three main components of Viet Nam's national R&D structure are
expected to have close links with each other. The functional differentiation allo-
cates applied research and experimental development to the laboratories of individ-
ual ministries, whereas the universities and colleges are the prime producers of
highly specialized human resources for R&D, and the NCNST has the prime
responsibility for the most advanced forms of research and for R&D if no specific
ministry is a customer.
Given the relatively small research community, R&D performed by the
various institutions should be easy to connect by informal means. The existing
S&T-policy framework assumes a high degree of transparency for those working
inside the research system. During our interviews, however, we noted a considera-
ble lack of communication among specialists in various R&D units under different
ministries and between the three components of the system as outlined above.
This observation may seem especially surprising, given that most of the
country's R&D is concentrated in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minn City (HCMC). This is
all the more so as about one-third of all government R&D institutes and spe-
cialized laboratories are concentrated in one area of the capital city: the Nghia Do-
Cau Giay-Tu Liem area of Hanoi has more than 75 of Viet Nam's 233
government-funded R&D institutes.
A fiscal crisis is affecting the country's R&D institutions. In nominal
terms, not in those of purchasing-power parity, Viet Nam's overall R&D budget
is estimated at between 50 million and 60 million USD. Because the general wage
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level for R&D scientists and engineers remains low, and equipment is becoming
as expensive in Viet Nam as in the rest of the world, it is difficult to calculate the
real value of the overall budget for R&D.
Clearly, however, the economic conditions for Vietnamese R&D perform-
ance have deteriorated with the growth of the fiscal problems for the state. The
lack of appropriate funding and the lack of relevant research equipment have
forced the R&D institutions — regardless of their main objectives or
responsibilities — to move increasingly into contract research, technical services,
and consultancy arrangements with as wide a range of customers as possible.
During our interviews and other fact-finding exercises, we were confronted almost
universally with work conditions that promote secondary-job functions (that is,
holding several jobs or positions simultaneously) among most categories of staff.
The NCNST, for example, now relies extensively on contract research and
consultancy, without which it would probably cease to exist. As a result, the
NCNST activities have become much more applied and more clearly directed to
the demands of industrial firms and other potential customers. The total budget
from the central government for the NCNST is less than 8 million USD, and its
total staff is more than 2 000. Yet, in comparison with other state-owned R&D
facilities, the NCNST has significantly more funds available per researcher. At this
time, scientists at the NCNST, regardless of the stage they are at in their careers,
are encouraged to pursue advanced basic research outside of Viet Nam, not at the
NCNST, and for this purpose they are encouraged to seek fellowships and grants
from overseas.
In terms of S&T infrastructure for economic development, in a number of
areas Viet Nam does not lack the expertise to enable effective mobilization of
science and scientific results or particular technological know-how. At present,
however, the national R&D system is organized, financed, and managed in ways
that make the transfer of relevant information between sectors difficult and
expensive.
An assessment of some of these difficulties follows. The essential point,
however, is that the successful economic transformation Viet Nam seeks will
require its forthcoming S&T strategy to address the deficiency in the technological
infrastructure as a serious issue for the country's innovation policy.
Integration of the S&T and the economic systems
During the past few years, authoritative statements by senior government and party
officials have underlined the priority assigned to mobilizing the country's S&T
resources for socioeconomic ends. One illustration of this occurred in a 1994
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speech by General Secretary Do Muoi at the Party's Central Committee Plenum.
Do Muoi emphasized that the nation needed
to see S&T become a means for development. We must first create a
driving force for the improvement of science and technology. This driving
force rests with the interests attained by researchers, inventors and those
who effectively apply science and technology to various domains. ... It
is necessary to say that all intellectual products should belong to their
creators. They must be considered special goods and their prices should
be set in accordance with their value .... The science and technology
sector must concentrate its research on quickly applying new findings to
production and business in order to serve industrialization and moderni-
zation. It must meet the demands of new equipment in the national
economy, improve existing technologies, modernize traditional technolo-
gies and correctly adapt new technologies. It must also help to manage
and closely assess imported technologies and pay attention to the devel-
opment of electronics, informatics, biology and new materials. Through
practical renovation activities, it must get close to real life, quickly dis-
cover and improve upon the public's inventions, accelerate its studies
and clarify issues relating to the strategy for industrialization and
modernization.
Earlier in the history of modem Viet Nam, specific technological solutions
have been proposed by the government, in accordance with the expertise and
resources available, but the government avoided setting specific priorities within
whole fields of technology. About 5 years ago, however, a clear ranking emerged
in the form of four national-priority programs for high technology. Each is viewed
by government as a new attempt to modernize the country's productive forces.
High-level intermmisterial committees monitor and coordinate the national pro-
grams for IT, biotechnology, new materials, and automation.
The procedure followed to arrive at these four technology areas is unclear.
However, Viet Nam has set the same general priorities for its technological ren-
ovation as its largest neighbours (indeed, also the same as most industrial coun-
tries). The Vietnamese version of high-tech programs assigns highest emphasis to
the means to access and obtain high technology from overseas and on ways to
apply and adapt this technology in firms and institutions throughout the economy.
Much less emphasis is placed, at least initially, on generating high technology
within Viet Nam, although a degree of experimental development of technology
is encouraged.
Our many discussions with both Vietnamese and multinational industry and
with international organizations indicated strong support for this balance, although
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it is certainly not reflected universally from within the basic-research community
of Viet Nam. This approach and this emphasis are very similar to those that led
to the successful experiences of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, and we
believe, therefore, that the emphasis in Viet Nam should remain on technical and
related services, rather than on scientific research. First and foremost, Vietnamese
firms and institutions need to have better access to available modern technology
from within the country and from other countries. Only very few companies in
Viet Nam can afford the luxury of independently developing products and pro-
cesses with a high technological content.
It is also important, however, is to establish powerful mechanisms to sys-
tematically monitor the technical changes taking place in other countries and
obtain, adapt, and diffuse already available technology and related know-how. This
imperative, to develop a systematic capacity to absorb and diffuse new technology,
exceeds all others.
As policy initiatives, the four national high-tech programs have been wide-
ly publicized. It is, of course, far too early to judge the extent to which all four
will achieve the ambitious results they aim for. They all have steering committees
with experts from different government sectors, but they are all differently man-
aged. The most comprehensive and advanced of the four national programs is that
on IT.
The main weakness of the four national programs is structural. Only a few
companies are involved as partners with the dominant institutions (ministries, state
agencies, R&D institutes, university departments). The four national programs
connect R&D scientists and engineers mainly among public institutions and some
SOEs. However, R&D institutions and high-tech firms from overseas also have
a limited involvement (see below). Because of the composition of those involved
in the programs, effective diffusion of technology and related know-how is re-
stricted mainly to the government sector. Yet, opportunities for subcontracting
and other cross-border production networks will likely depend on how well
Vietnamese firms and institutions accumulate and consolidate technology-related
skills and experiences. If the programs are to become national, they will need
to include a variety of other partners, such as business enterprises. Only in the
broader economy are capabilities created to absorb new technology (see box 2).
One of the principal findings of this review, therefore, is that in Viet Nam
the relations between the S&T research institutes and the productive sector,
including both public and private enterprises, are rather limited and almost non-
existent in some sectors.
50 VIET NAM AT THE CROSSROADS
Box 2
Suggestion
Given the need for integration into the broader economy, it may prove most valuable to
commission an independent and brief review of Viet Nam's four high-tech research pro-
grams, with a view to finding effective mechanisms to more broadly involve the industry
and other firms.
Research institutions in Viet Nam tend to follow their own logic, mostly
inherited from a Soviet (mission-oriented) approach to conducting research, in
which the end user (the scientific community, educational institutions, a public
agency) does not operate in the market and is identified in advance. Until very
recently at least, researchers had little awareness of the need to orient research to
the needs of the productive system. However, a few research institutes have been
rather effective in obtaining contracts to provide technical services for government
departments and SOEs, usually applying well-known technologies. When pressed,
researchers, professors, and administrators indicated that they follow the orienta-
tions provided by the central government, primarily through preparing projects and
submitting proposals for funding as part of the four national research programs:
IT, biotechnology, new materials, and automation. The linkage to the productive
sector is usually forced by budget constraints, which make it necessary to engage
in contract research with government agencies and SOEs, although these contracts
involve little actual research.
The Draft Law on Science and Technology
The Vietnamese government is fully aware of the situation described above and
has been addressing it in a number of ways. Central among these is a proposed
new Law on Science and Technology, prepared by MOSTE and currently in its
12th draft (MOSTE 1997).
The draft indicates in article 39 that
The State shall consider investment for science and technology as an
investment in development.
1. The State shall, annually allocate at least two (2.0) percentage points
of total State budget expenditures to investments in scientific and techno-
logical development.
Article 40 of the draft states that
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the Vietnamese State shall encourage and facilitate enterprises, scientific
and technological organisations, and individuals working in the field of
S&T to obtain financial resources for a variety of sources and in different
forms.
It further stipulates that contributions, donations, gifts, and grants from local and
foreign sources for R&D will be exempted from taxes.
Article 43 of the draft proposes
the establishment of a national fund for scientific and technological re-
search, which will fund activities that are not included in the annual plan
prepared by the government. This fund will provide grants and loans with
no or low interest to research institutions, and will be managed by an
Executive Board at the national level.
Provinces and cities are also allowed to establish similar funds.
Article 44 of the draft law allows the establishment of funds for S&T
development by "local and foreign organisations and individuals," which in prac-
tice would operate like private foundations. They would be authorised to provide
grants and no- or low-interest loans to research organisations and would be created
on the basis of an initial capital contribution by the founding members and sus-
tained by periodic voluntary contributions.
The proposal to increase investment in S&T to the level of 2% of total
public expenditure, if accomplished, would represent more than a doubling of the
current level, which stands at less that 1%. As such, it would provide a major
indication of the serious commitment of government in making S&T the principal
engine of Vietnamese economic transformation. Similar patterns of increased
public investment in R&D were followed by Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. Yet,
even at 2% of public expenditure, Viet Nam will lag significantly behind some of
its principal competitors, notably, again, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, where
such expenditures are now in the range of 3% of gross domestic product (GDP)
(that is, more than 5% of public expenditure). Korea has announced its intention
to invest the equivalent of 6% of GDP in S&T, which would put it well ahead of
all other countries.
The apparent determination of Viet Nam's government to lend greater
support to S&T was welcomed enthusiastically by virtually everyone with whom
we spoke. Also, everyone interpreted the appearance on the announcement of a
2% expenditure level in a proposed national law as an indication of firm resolve.
The international team did, however, see significant expressions of concern
over other aspects of the draft law, in particular, the nature of law making and the
52 VIET NAM AT THE CROSSROADS
nature of the laws and regulations. It was noted, for example, that the draft law
continues a trend in the S&T approach and framework that began in 1987 with the
decision to remove the state monopoly on S&T. The promulgation of several laws
and a proliferation of regulations (see Chapter 4) has entailed an enormous shift
from the situation of only a decade ago, when all S&T activities were under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the state. By all accounts, however, the process has not
been smooth. Moreover, many view several existing policies as half-measures (for
example, equitization) or as barriers (a bureaucratic licencing system).
Thus, with specific regard to the proposed law on S&T, many aspects of
it would surely be applauded by Viet Nam's scientists and entrepreneurs. Yet,
other aspects may serve to reinforce rigidities and a command-and-control ap-
proach to technological transformation, rather than creating the new flexibility that
is required. The following are a couple of examples (also see box 3). Article 8 in-
dicates that "the State shall control S&T operations by means of law." Article 12,
under "Definition of terminology" used in this law, states that "science refers to
the knowledge of the laws of nature, society, and thought" (our emphasis).
Financing of S&T
According to figures we assembled from both NISTPASS and the General
Statistical Office of MOSTE, in 1996 Viet Nam had 233 research institutes and
centres engaged in S&T activities and just less than 19000 S&T personnel. The
same statistics indicated that these institutes and their S&T personnel depended
almost entirely on government financing for their activities. This situation is
clearly set out in a recent MOSTE publication (1996, pp. 11—12):
Out of 233 research institutes and centres surveyed in the second half of
1995 only 3 percent had no funding from the government budget, 69.5
percent obtained all their funds from the central government budget, and
27.5 percent obtained only partial funding from the government budget.
About 90 percent of the 687.8 billion Vietnamese Dong (approximately
US $60 million) allocated for research institutes in 1995 came from
domestic sources, of which 57.6 percent were central government budget
allocations and 32.4 percent were resources generated by the research
institutions (research contracts and contributions from local governments
and SOEs). About 10 percent of research funding came from foreign
sources, mostly from foundations, bilateral co-operation agencies and
multilateral institutions.
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Box 3
Suggestion
A law on S&T should be simple, clear, concise, and enabling. It should remove ambiguities
about, for example, intellectual property rights; facilitate ease of interpretation; and, above
all, encourage investment and creativity. Viet Nam's draft law has many strengths, but it
falls far short of these requirements.
In addition to the four national high-tech research programs, 18 other S&T
programs of significant size and standing are funded through the state budget.
Eleven of these S&T programs are oriented toward natural S&T and supervised
by MOSTE. Seven are classified as programs for the social sciences and humani-
ties and placed under the supervision of the Party.
In addition, MOSTE channels funds to smaller S&T programs and projects
conducted at various R&D institutions and at some of the 103 universities and
colleges throughout the country. The result, according to government calculations,
is that in 1995 (the last year for which comprehensive statistics were available)
226 separate institutions received grants (from state budgets) in support of some
9 000 S&T activities conducted within those institutes. What this means is that the
average amount made available to each institution was roughly 200 000 USD and
that the average S&T activity received 5 000 USD, although the figure on the
number of projects is probably a considerable underestimate, as many separate
projects may be grouped together by a research institution or a university depart-
ment. This indicates a dispersion of the very modest funding available to bring
about Vietnamese development through S&T. This situation is well illustrated in,
for example, the College of Social Science and Humanities at Viet Nam National
University of Hanoi (by most accounts the country's leading university), which
was receiving for 1997 a research budget from the central government of only
about 43 000 USD.
As a result of this, researchers perceive no well-defined and rational
criteria for deciding what level of resources are assigned to institutions at different
levels (national, city-province, enterprise) and to programs and projects within
institutions. Decisions made at the central-government level about the allocation
of funds are seen as arbitrary, nontransparent, cumbersome, rigid, and bureau-
cratic. The budget process is viewed as a source of interference with the proper
conduct of research activities, as it does not consider the time horizons inherent
to the research project, the minimum critical mass of resources required, and the
priorities established by the research institutes. People at some institutions reported
that they had practically no freedom to decide on the management of programs
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and projects and were not allowed to reassign budget allocations in accordance
with unforeseen circumstances.
This situation was summarized by one observer as follows: "The current
system is not accountable. There is a solution and it is to use our scarce resources
in a very concentrated way. We need a few big allocations over several years to
a small number of national purposes." Thus, although everyone welcomed the
government's indication of its commitment to devote 2% of its spending to
support S&T, one general perception was that the allocation system must change
fundamentally to account for the contribution such resources can make to society,
the time horizons inherent in effective S&T, and the minimum necessary critical
mass of resources.
Because of the large number of institutions and personnel and the very
modest funding available from public sources, the government has launched a
program of rationalization. Until recently, for example, research activity in some
60-70 generic categories qualified for public funding. That number was reduced
essentially to two thematic categories: social development and economic-technical
transformation. Under the first, priority is given to R&D that targets Aids preven-
tion, the provision of clean water, and the elimination of poverty. Under the sec-
ond category are IT, biotechnology, new materials, and automation.
The strategy underlying this process of rationalization has two key
components:
To assign specific research structures to a related corporate structure;1
and
To phase out a significant number of institutions through a gradual pro-
cess of reductions in subsidies, equitization, and mergers or integrations
into larger government structures.
These steps are clearly required. The rationalization program was an important
first step for government. In addition to steps the government has already taken,
however, it might use its launching of a new national S&T strategy as a timely oc-
casion to quicken the pace of reform (see box 4).
1 For example, telecommunications research falls under the National Telecommunications
Industry, and oil-and-gas research falls under the National Oil Company. The underlying ideas are
to make Vietnamese research much more demand driven and to generate new and more diversified
sources of funding for national R&D. In the judgement of the international team, this approach is
both logical and positive.
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Box 4
Suggestion
Accelerating S&T reform to build Centres of Excellence
A new policy could be announced making clear that support for S&T institutions is to be
consolidated into a limited number of large, multiyear grants, directed to establishing na-
tional Centres of Excellence. The government would need to specify criteria and then
invite proposals to meet these criteria. The proposals would be adjudicated by peer
review, including regional and international assessors. Policy approaches along these lines
were followed by Korea and Singapore in building their strong and integrated S&T
institutions.
Basic research in Viet Nam
Basic research was one of the aspects of S&T the Mission was asked to pay
special attention to. We have found that in Viet Nam, as in many other countries,
a variety of views are expressed on the precise meaning of the term basic re-
search. The draft Law on Science and Technology defines basic research as
theoretical or experimental research that aims to discover new knowledge of the
laws of nature, society, and thought (MOSTE 1997).
Some countries make further subdivisions, distinguishing curiosity-driven
("blue-sky") research and strategic research. Curiosity-driven research has the sole
objective of satisfying the curiosity of the researcher. It may at some future time
have some other useful value, but its purpose is to satisfy curiosity. Strategic re-
search, on the other hand, has the hope, even expectation, of achieving long-term
economic or social benefit. Long term in this definition means usually in excess
of 10 years. The mission takes the view that when the Vietnamese government
refers to basic research, it means both curiosity-driven and strategic research.
The following subsections cover issues relevant to any discussion of the
nature and role of basic research in Viet Nam. It would take much more investiga-
tion than was possible in the time available to the Mission to make any detailed
analysis of the Vietnamese situation, but our impressions, based on what we saw
and heard, are summarized in these subsections.
Location of basic research
In the period before the Doi Moi reform program, most basic research in Viet
Nam was carried out in laboratories and institutes of the National Research Centre
of Science (NRCS). In the last 10 years, however, the funding for basic research
in the NRCS has declined, and the organization now carries out a mix of basic
and applied research and provides technological services. At the same time, the
universities are being encouraged to expand their research activities, and several
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claimed to be doing basic research. We were unable to discover any recent statis-
tics to give us any measure of current state expenditures on basic research or its
distribution. It was clear, however, from many of our interviews that people ex-
pected the NRCS to become more demand driven and to increasingly have the
obligation to generate its funding through contract research. Basic research and
government grants for basic research will focus increasingly on the universities.
This approach would be consistent with trends occurring in many other countries.
Priority setting for basic research
Setting research priorities in Viet Nam seemed to us to be a cumbersome and at
times bizarre process. It was not enthusiastically welcomed by the scientists we
interviewed, nor was it considered transparent, either to us or to Vietnamese
scientists. It involves an iteration between the scientific institutes and ministries,
but we encountered the general perception that the criteria used were unclear.
In many countries, the state facilitates the setting of strategic research
priorities, but priorities for curiosity-driven research are almost always determined
by the scientific community. Quite sophisticated methodologies (called foresight
techniques) have been developed to identify those areas of research that might
bring economic and social rewards over a 10- to 15-year period. These usually
involve extensive interactions between scientists and representatives of the produc-
tive sectors, with the process facilitated by government. Japan was one of the first
countries to develop these techniques, but they have also been embraced by the
United Kingdom and other governments. South Africa has also begun a major
foresight exercise. The appropriateness of this approach for Viet Nam would have
to be explored, but it would seem to offer Viet Nam the possibility for a more
open and transparent process of priority setting.
Research excellence and ageing scientists
Unless basic research is excellent by world standards it is usually not worth doing.
To reach world levels of excellence requires well-qualified scientists working in
a good environment with advanced equipment and access to advances made by
other scientists worldwide. It also requires a real commitment to science and an
opportunity to devote full attention to research issues. Most of these requirements
are in short supply in Viet Nam. It is a tribute to those scientists who are still
producing world-class science in Viet Nam that they are able to do so despite the
limitations.
A particular feature of science in Viet Nam is its aging scientific communi-
ty. Before 1980, many scientists went overseas to the Soviet Union to study and
do research. Since that time relatively few have had the opportunity to study
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science at the advanced, graduate level. As a result, Viet Nam has a real shortage
of well-trained young scientists, and apparently few new entrants into the pro-
fession. It seems to the Mission that this issue deserves consideration by the
Vietnamese government. Our view is that it will need to concentrate resources on
a few critical areas of science vital to the long-term well-being of Viet Nam.
Within these areas, it will be essential to train the best scientists and engineers
overseas. Without a cadre of world-class young Vietnamese scientists, it will be
difficult to gain proper access to the world store of scientific knowledge and
exploit this knowledge for the benefit of the country.
According to the national survey of S&T potential (MOSTE 1996, about
11.2% of the 22313 persons working in 233 research institutes in Viet Nam in
late 1995 had post-graduate degrees; 51.3% had a higher-education degree (BSc
or BA); and 37.5% were technicians, workers, or auxiliary staff. The age structure
of research staff with post-graduate degrees is highly skewed toward fairly old
researchers, with about 60% of those with PhDs aged more than 45 years (Table
3). A proposal for a study on research and postgraduate education prepared by
NISTPASS at MOSTE in May 1997 indicated that the average age of staff en-
gaged in research at senior levels was between 55 and 60 (NISTPASS 1997a). The
average age of professors and associate professors employed in research institutes
(see Table 4) was 59.5 and 56.4, respectively, and the average age of directors of
S&T research institutes was 55. Aggregate figures from the 1996 national survey
of S&T potential (MOSTE 1996) show that as of late 1995, more qualified re-
searchers were leaving research institutes than coming in. In relative terms, the
loss of staff was more acute for researchers with PhDs.










































58 VIET NAM AT THE CROSSROADS
Table 4. Average age of professors and associate professors in selected research institutions.
Ministry or agency
National Centre for Natural Science and Technology
National Centre for Social Sciences and Humanities
MOSTE
Ministry of Industry
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development















































Note: MOSTE, Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment.
The issue of the aging population of Vietnamese scientists engaged in basic
science may prove significant in the long term. This is a factor to be born in mind
in preparing the forthcoming national S&T strategy. In the short and medium
terms, however, Viet Nam's drive for modernization and industrialization will
likely depend far more on the national availability of practitioners — people
who can apply and adapt technologies — than on the availability of pure scientists
able to conduct basic research. Two points should be stressed: first, to neglect the
investments required to produce the next generation of scientists for Viet Nam
would be unwise; but, second, this should be approached with balance and
perspective (see box 5).
At a more general level, the scientific community of Viet Nam is very
much concerned about its future and somewhat confused about the role it can play
in the course of industrialization. Although in some disciplines Viet Nam's scien-
tific capability is rated good and a few mathematicians and theoretical physicists
enjoy an international reputation, very few scientists expressed optimism on the
future of basic science in Viet Nam. Many Vietnamese scientists communicated
their concerns over the loss of the prestige and rewards they enjoyed during the
heyday of Soviet-style academic practice. They are realizing that science for the
sake of science cannot be justified automatically in the coming years.
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Box 5
Suggestion
Possible measures to address the problem of an aging scientific community
1. Launch, for the next 10 years, a selective postgraduate fellowship program in selected
fields of science and engineering. This would send a significant number of outstanding
young graduates to leading universities abroad for periods of 2-3 years.
2. Establish short-term programs, possibly with a summer-school format, to bring univer-
sity professors up to date with new developments in selected fields of science and
engineering.
3. Establish a significant program of small grants for young researchers returning after
completing postgraduate studies abroad. This could be structured along the lines of
the existing program of the Stockholm-based International Foundation for Science.
Because of this, some Vietnamese scientists, researchers, and academics
have the perception that Doi Moi may be good for the country, but it is bad for
basic research and for scientists. Before Doi Moi, scientists could get on with their
research and live reasonably comfortably. Doi Moi has meant a lack of stability
for the scientists, with frequent policy changes and a salary level totally inade-
quate for maintaining a family. As a result, many have had to take second jobs or
leave science altogether. In the opinion of many Vietnamese scientists, the level
of scientific excellence has fallen over the past 10 years.
We are not in a position to judge whether this decline in quality has in fact
occurred. We can see evidence of some scientists seizing the opportunity to do
good research but with an orientation to solve practical problems. In our opinion,
this trend away from basic to more applied research should be carried even
further. At the same time, areas of science judged (by foresight techniques) to be
in the long-term interests of Viet Nam should be identified, and promising young
scientists should be given the opportunity to study abroad in those fields.
In contrast to this rather bleak picture is a growing recognition throughout
the world that the dominant civilization of the 21st century will require a strong
foundation in basic science. Furthermore, the new century is expected to be an age
of integration and synthesis of basic research with technology development; multi-
disciplinary synthesis is expected to be central to new technical breakthroughs. For
this reason, many advanced and many NICs are renewing support for basic re-
search. For example, Korea established an institute of advanced study last year.
East Asian countries are collaborating in establishing the Asia-Pacific Centre for
Theoretical Physics, which started operation also last year. More than 25 Science
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Research Centres are now operating at Korean universities under long-term (9-
year) large financial (1 million USD per year) support. Enhanced support for basic
research, in conjunction with a reform of the educational system, is also happening
in Japan and Taiwan.
The pattern of support for basic research is also changing in other NICs.
No longer do we observe many examples of an approach based on the Soviet-style
academic model. Competitive research proposals are solicited, and they are invari-
ably peer reviewed, often internationally. Outputs of research projects are critically
evaluated also through peer reviews. To carry out these objective peer reviews and
funding processes, a number of nations operate science and engineering founda-
tions. In Korea, the Korea Science and Engineering Foundation (KOSEF) is re-
sponsible for processing and administering basic research projects, and it relies
heavily on the peer-review system. KOSEF administers single-researcher projects,
fellowship awards, block grants, Centres of Excellence awards, equipment grants,
and international cooperative grants for professors and universities. The Centres
of Excellence awards are particularly popular and have often been cited as effec-




A Viet Nam Science and Engineering Foundation
Viet Nam's current process of rationalization of government support for S&T might be
enhanced if an appropriate mechanism is established to accelerate the process and
sharpen the focus. To manifest more clearly a long-term commitment to S&T
development and to overcome the present uneasiness in the Vietnamese scientific
community, the Government of Viet Nam might wish to consider establishing an endowed
foundation for science and engineering (the Viet Nam Science and Engineering
Foundation [VISEF]). VISEF could be structured to ensure long-term support for basic
research and human-resource development for Viet Nam and could, at the same time,
serve to quicken the pace of reforms intended to support the revitalization of basic
science in Viet Nam. International financial support might be feasible for such a
foundation.
If a decision is made to establish the VISIF, consideration should be given to
making international peer review integral to its operations. This would add greatly to the
Foundation's prestige, help serve to invite financial support from outside Viet Nam, and
build long-term international linkages in S&T.
(continued)
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Box 6 (concluded}
The VISEF might carry out some of these activities:
• Evaluation of proposals for award of support;
• Selection and awarding of fellowships;
• Evaluation and award of block grants to universities and research institutes;
• Planning, selection, and establishment of Centres of Excellence;
• Evaluation and award of equipment for teaching and research laboratories;
• Administration of international cooperative research projects;
• Science and Engineering Awards for excellent research work;
• Improvement projects for science education; and
• Assessment of new scientific breakthroughs.
The VISEF would be able to undertake a leading role in promoting education and
training in applied systems engineering, a priority that is outlined in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 6
THE ACQUISITION AND ASSIMILATION OF
TECHNOLOGY
Following the introduction of Doi Moi more than 10 years ago, Viet Nam opened
its doors to foreign investment. It was expected that this would bring much needed
capital, new knowledge, and new technologies. This has happened to an extent,
but in recent years foreign investment has fallen, and this has been accompanied
by a decline in the importation of technology.
Broadly speaking, two approaches are taken to technology development.
One is the technological development pushed by new discoveries and break-
throughs. This involves new technologies created initially by technology push. In
advanced countries, numerous examples can be given of successful economic ad-
vance resulting from technology push. The industrial market sectors of developing
countries, however, are often formed almost overnight with the introduction of
imported products or services. Many examples can be given of East Asian econo-
mies where success in modernization and industrialization has derived from S&T
policies based on a demand-pull approach, as well as disappointing experiences
resulting from S&T policies focused on the technology-push approach.
During our interviews with policymakers and researchers in Viet Nam, we
noticed in many cases a search for policy instruments of the technology-push
variety. Inadequate attention appears to have been given the expected evolution
of technology demand in the fast-changing national, regional, and international
markets. For example, the decision to establish the four focus areas — IT, biotech-
nology, new materials, and automation — seemed to be based on observations of
general trends elsewhere, rather than on an in-depth analysis of current
Vietnamese economic structure and markets.
The starting point is also important in this context. According to MOSTE
(Thu 1997, p. 3), Viet Nam's technology is
50 to 100 years behind that of the most modern countries in the world.
Viet Nam's equipment is backward from two to three generations (20 to
30 years) or from four to five generations, depending on each specialised
sector, compared with [the] modern level in the world. The coefficient of
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value decreases because of technical backwardness and the standard of
production organisation is commonly from 0.5-0.7.
Some further factors that emerged during our interviews and bear on the
acquisition and assimilation of technology are the following:
Some significant efforts have been made to adapt imported technology
to local conditions, and electronic and software firms perform adaptive
research activities continuously. For example, one company adapted the
technology acquired through a joint-venture agreement to manufacture
refrigerators in accordance with Vietnamese conditions and consumer
preferences (variable power supply, noise level, automatic defrosting,
speed of ice making, separate compartments for different types of food).
In-house research teams, mostly financed by the firm, are in charge of
these activities. Joint ventures and technology agreements (for example,
to manufacture under an Original Equipment Manufacturer licence) are
also perceived as a major source of technical expertise, managerial tech-
nology, and administrative practices, which have helped local firms
considerably. Access to such soft technologies is obtained through tech-
nical and managerial assistance provided by expatriates, who are asked
to train local employees, or through visits to foreign enterprises and to
joint-venture partners in particular.
The cost of technology acquired through joint ventures is perceived by
some local partners to be rather high, which can be a serious problem
in industries that operate with relatively low margins (for example, elec-
tronic consumer goods and garments for export). At the same time,
some foreign partners view joint-venture agreements as rather rigid,
cumbersome, and too troublesome, primarily because of the problems
involved in the management of joint ventures between foreign investors
and SOEs. The leading local industrial firms, some of which have joint-
venture agreements, are trying to improve quality while maintaining
competitive prices on export products: "produce with Korean quality
and Chinese price" was how one manager described the objective of his
enterprise. The desire to obtain, absorb, adapt, and improve on foreign
technology has led, at least in one case, to a mix of cooperative and
competitive relations with the supplier of foreign technology: the firm
has a joint-venture agreement and sells products under the foreign part-
ner's name but also promotes its own brand of products manufactured
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with adapted imported technology (much of it obtained through the joint
venture).
The perception is quite widespread among both policymakers and
businesspeople in Viet Nam that industrial enterprises wholly owned by
foreign corporations do not engage in technology transfer to any signifi-
cant degree. They are thought to operate as enclaves that keep their
technology to themselves, at least in the short run. Although they en-
gage in a significant amount of training activities for their own person-
nel, the relatively limited turnover of technical staff does not allow their
abilities and technical knowledge to spill over to other industrial firms.
Indeed, it was reported on many occasions that foreign firms and joint
ventures attract highly qualified personnel from SOEs and local private
firms, which creates problems because of the shortage of skilled and
experienced workers, technicians, and engineers. The established pattern
we observed appears to be highly biased to acquiring technologies on
a turnkey basis.
Reverse engineering plays a major role in technology transfer in the
metalworking, machinery, and industrial-electronics sectors. We ob-
served some good examples of reverse engineering in the Vietnamese
household-electronics firms we visited. Research institutes, which be-
have very much like consulting and engineering design organizations,
carry out reverse engineering based on foreign designs. However, they
face a number of constraints regarding financing for the construction of
equipment and entering into joint-venture agreements with foreign tech-
nology suppliers. This limits their ability to expand operations, increase
in-house engineering research, and move up the technological ladder.
Nevertheless, one can appreciate the ingenuity they have shown in their
efforts to circumvent regulations and deal with restrictions.
The provision of high-technology services — such as testing, design,
calibration, and quality control for manufacturing — is another channel
for the acquisition of foreign technology. At least one foreign firm
specializing in such services faced policy and administrative constraints
(import procedures, customs delays, legal requirements) that limit its
capacity to establish links with local firms and reduce its effectiveness
as a technology supplier. The people we interviewed repeatedly men-
tioned the establishment of high-technology parks, particularly in places
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with an already significant number of high-technology research centres,
institutes, and firms as an initiative to facilitate and speed up the acqui-
sition of effective access to technology services. Other potential benefits
of such parks would be improvements in the use of equipment and ma-
chinery and greater collaboration between researchers in institutes and
those in enterprises. During our visits and interviews, people also men-
tioned the need for adequate information on foreign sources of technol-
ogy and the establishment of a "technology intelligence service."
The Vietnamese industrial sector comprises firms with widely different
levels of technology and technological capability. Although the bulk of
industrial technology appears to be at least two to three decades behind
current best practice (as exemplified by the widespread importation of
second-hand equipment, machinery, and production lines), a few rela-
tively advanced technology firms (foreign and joint ventures) show that
Viet Nam can successfully move into high-technology production. The
technological heterogeneity of industrial enterprises poses the prob-
lem of how to manage technological pluralism to increase industrial
production, improve productivity, and enhance the competitiveness of
Vietnamese industry while creating spaces for relatively efficient low-
technology firms to survive and gradually move up the technology lad-
der. Quality control within industrial firms appears adequate, at least for
the domestic market and for low-technology export niches, but it will
have to be significantly upgraded and improved to face foreign compe-
tition in coming years and to penetrate foreign markets beyond low-
technology niches.
Several issues of intellectual property rights need to be addressed to
provide incentives to invest in R&D and adapt foreign technology.
Whereas industrial property-right regulations appear to be adequate, a
perception widely shared by researchers and businesspeople is that gov-
ernment agencies in charge of these rights do not have the power to
enforce existing regulations. Software-production firms complain about
piracy of their programs (one firm indicated that for every legitimate
CD-ROM they sold, at least two were sold by software pirates); re-
search institutes in industry, agriculture, and biotechnology indicated
that they were unable appropriate the benefits of their research results;
and creative researchers have almost no incentives to innovate and
make the results of their research available to others.
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Several routes lie open to allow a country or enterprise to acquire technolo-
gy from abroad. They can encourage foreign firms to establish wholly owned
subsidiaries; the government can promote joint ventures between domestic and
foreign companies; or the local enterprises can acquire the technology through
licencing agreements. Viet Nam has acquired foreign technology through each of
these routes, but we were unable to gather credible statistics on how much tech-
nology had been acquired through each, and we do not know what the trends have
been over time.
The evidence we collected from our interview is of necessity anecdotal, but
it suggests, as indicated above, that most of the imported technology comes as a
turnkey package. All the importer has to do is to train people to operate the equip-
ment. Initially this is a very effective way of introducing new technology, but
experience in other countries has shown that over a period of a few years the pro-
ductivity of the equipment declines in comparison with that of the same equipment
in firms making incremental improvements to the technology. Also, with turnkey
transfers, local firms and suppliers have little opportunity to develop the capacity
to compete in the manufacture of components.
A more effective form of industrial development occurs when specific
steps are taken to assimilate technology. This implies training for not only the op-
erators but also the technicians and engineers who can modify, adapt, and change
the technology. These investments are expensive, and studies in Japan and South
Korea (Wilks and Wright 1991) have shown that successful firms in those coun-
tries frequently invest as much in assimilating the technology as in importing it
in the first place.
One of the most thorough studies of the technological behaviour of East
Asian firms was carried out by Professor Michael Hobday of the Science Policy
Research Unit, at the University of Sussex, in the United Kingdom. His book,
Innovation in East Asia (Hobday 1995), presented the results of his research.
Primarily he investigated the development of the electronics industry in Hong
Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan, and within this he focused on firms'
strategies. His work showed that in all four territories firms followed a similar
progression, building on imported technology. At the heart of this progression was
export-led technological learning. Hobday summarized his findings in the diagram
reproduced in Figure 2.
Hobday explained the diagram as follows (Hobday 1995, pp. 188—189):
The left-hand vertical axis represents electronics exports, which also
correspond to employment and output growth. The right-hand vertical
axis represents the innovation frontier, defined as the point at which R&D
becomes central to competitiveness.
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Figure 2. Innovation ion Esat Asia. Source: Hobday (1995). Note: R&D, research and development.
The frontier is a constantly moving, dynamic target. In order to catch up
firms must constantly narrow the gap between themselves and the market
leaders. The horizontal axis represents the acquisition of process and pro-
duct technologies by latecomer firms through time, beginning with simple
activities such as assembly and graduating towards more complex tasks
such as process adaptation and R&D. The relation between export growth
and technological acquisition is presented in the shape of a diffusion
curve, which corresponds to the slow initial start-up of the 1950s and
1960s, the adoption phase of the 1970s and the rapid take-off in the
1980s. As more latecomers entered to profit from new opportunities,
others followed in a Schumpeterian swarming fashion, bringing about the
surge in growth during the 1980s. The curve also suggests the possibility
of a slowdown in the future as more subsectors of electronics mature.
As the model suggests, latecomers passed through various historical
stages of technological development. The first latecomer firms emerged
in the 1960s, producing labour-intensive products under joint ventures or
sub-contracting arrangements with Japanese, US and European firms.
TNCs [transnational corporations] and foreign buyers were initially at-
tracted to East Asia by low labour costs. Foreign firms supplied training,
advice on manufacturing processes and product styling, as well as capital
goods. At the same time, local technicians, engineers and managers were
trained within the subsidiaries of the TNCs. The larger foreign buyers and
TNCs supplied formal training courses for assembly workers and techni-
cians to ensure that quality and delivery targets were met. Some TNCs
worked closely with local sub-contractors to buy low-cost parts and
components, giving rise to a variety of electronics support industries.
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Through the 1960s and 1970s the latecomers learned by manufacturing
simple consumer electronics and by assembling and testing semiconduct-
ors. Firms entered from the electrical goods sector, clothing and other
industries. Other companies started from scratch. Some individuals left
their jobs in TNC subsidiaries and began their own companies, often sup-
plying their former employers. Gradually the latecomers learned by up-
grading their production processes and by efforts to improve the quality
and speed of manufacturing.
Hobday also explored the various government policies of the four ter-
ritories. Singapore and South Korea followed highly interventionist policies,
whereas Hong Kong and Taiwan had more laissez-faire approaches, with the
Taiwan government intervening occasionally in semiconductors. Hong Kong and
Singapore pursued export-led policies, whereas South Korea and Taiwan combined
these policies with import substitution, controlling or banning imports to protect
local firms and using government procurement to stimulate local enterprise.
As Hobday also noticed, direct investment in Southeast Asia has been
proliferating in form and scope, as well as in national origin and destination. Al-
though equity investments once dominated, over the last decade Southeast Asia
has experienced a dramatic spread of newer relational forms of investments by the
MNCs, notably interfirm networks. According to Hobday, four types of networks
collectively define the MNC production and technology relationships of concern
to Vietnamese industrial strategy-makers:
Supplier networks — These include subcontracting, original-equipment
manufacturing, and original-design manufacturing arrangements between
foreign MNCs and domestic suppliers of intermediate production inputs,
such as materials, tools and moulds, parts and components, subassem-
blies, and software.
Producer networks — These enable competing producers to pool their
production capacities and their financial and human resources, to broad-
en their product portfolios and geographic coverage.
Distribution networks — These comprise the MNC affiliate's forward
linkages with distributors, marketing channels, valued-added resellers,
and end users, both in export and in domestic markets.
Innovation networks — These facilitate the acquisition of product
design and production technology, enable joint product and process
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development, and permit firms to share generic scientific know-how and
R&D.
In electronics, the semiconductor producers pioneered supplier networks
in the late 1960s, gradually moving from tightly controlled joint ventures to looser
subcontract and OEM relations. Starting in the 1980s, the other three network
forms began to emerge. Taken together, the coalescing networks of firms consti-
tute the infrastructure for integrated production in electronics in East Asia.
For Vietnamese firms slowly moving into technologically more advanced
positions, the four types of network open up a range of possibilities. For the
Vietnamese government, any strategy for technology and related science must
consider these relatively new forms of regional integration. Different parts of re-
gional networks are concentrated in different countries or even in different regions
of these countries. The result is a changing division of labour in electronics pro-
duction across not just Southeast Asia but also East Asia as a whole.
A feasible national strategy for S&T must be based on future scenarios of
opportunities and requirements for integration into such regional, cross-border
networks. A deeper understanding of changing opportunities will enable the gov-
ernment to select from alternative policy options.
In this report to the Government of Viet Nam, we have pointed out that
Viet Nam begins its industrialization push at a different time than the four Asian
Tigers did in pursuing their dramatic industrial growth. There can be no direct
transfer of their experiences. Nevertheless, we think that a number of common
characteristics seem to be associated with their success and that these provide
some guidelines for Viet Nam's long-term S&T strategy. These characteristics
include the following:
Industrialization was based primarily on export led strategies.
The managers of enterprises made the key decisions related to techno-
logical learning.
It took 20-30 years to build all the technological capabilities needed to
successfully exploit the innovations derived from domestic in-house
R&D. Many technical and engineering skills had to be accumulated in
the process. Starting today, the process might take only 10-15 years.
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Government policies to influence the behaviour of entrepreneurs and the
managers of enterprises varied considerably between the Tigers. But
each showed the following characteristics (also see box 7):
Governments followed a set of macroeconomic policies to provide
stability, low interest rates, and high savings (that is, they provided
an environment conducive to long-term planning and investment).
Government policies promoted export-oriented industrialization and
facilitated the acquisition and adaptation of foreign technology.
Governments developed an appropriate educational and technologi-
cal infrastructure. This included provision for widespread literacy,
vocational education, development of a cadre of engineers, and
training and support for research scientists. Vocational courses, of-
ten directed to company needs, were carried out in local univer-
sities and polytechnics.
When necessary, governments intervened to ensure that the entre-
preneurial base was strong enough to lead industrialization.
Box?
Suggestion
Measures to facilitate acquisition and assimilation of technologies
1. Implement policies that facilitate technology importation but require the full transfer of
technological know-how from the overseas suppliers.
2. Encourage the development of export-led industrialization by facilitating overseas busi-
ness travel, together with similar measures.
3. Ensure that training and education provide an appropriate balance of the many techni-
cal (and scientific) skills needed to staff the emerging industrial enterprises. In particu-
lar we urge the introduction of a crash program for training the management personnel
in charge of technology.
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Chapter 7
SYSTEMS OF INNOVATION AND INTERNATIONAL
COLLABORATION
A Vietnamese system of innovation
A strongly shared view among members of the Mission is that in the 21st century
the ability to innovate around technologies will be more than ever the major deter-
minant of the competitiveness of firms, regions, and countries. S&T are important
inputs to the innovation process, but many other economic and social factors com-
bine with the technological ones to influence success in innovation. In this regard,
we point again to the centrality of the skills of engineering systems analysis. Gov-
ernments have an important role to play in stimulating innovation by ensuring that
economic and social policies, as well as their S&T polices, reinforce possibilities
for innovation, rather than negating the process.
A useful way to consider the complex interrelationships of the various eco-
nomic, social, and S&T factors in successful innovation is to think about systems
of innovation. Particularly useful for national policy-making is the concept of an
NSI. The Mission used this concept in its thinking about, and analysis of, S&T in
Viet Nam. We drew heavily on the work of an earlier IDRC Mission to review
the S&T policies of China (IDRC-SSTC 1997). That Mission adopted the OECD
definition of an NSI, namely a "network of institutions in the public and private
sectors whose activities and actions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new tech-
nologies" (OECD 1994, p. 3, cited in IDRC-SSTC 1997, p. 58).
This definition led the China Mission to recognize that an NSI could be
thought of as a set of functioning institutions, organizations, and policies inter-
acting constructively in the pursuit of a common set of social and economic goals
and using the introduction of innovations as the key promoter of change. It is in
the interests of every country to ensure that
A set of institutions, organisations, and policies are in place to give
effect to the various functions of an NSI;
These institutions, organizations, and policies interact constructively;
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Goals and objectives are agreed to that are consonant with an articu-
lated vision of the future; and
A policy environment is in place to promote innovation.
The Mission to Viet Nam did not have the time to systematically study all
the components of the Vietnamese NSI, nor was it able to analyze in any detail
its capability to generate, acquire, assimilate, use, and diffuse the knowledge
essential to modernization and innovation. (We strongly suggest a more thorough
analysis, using this approach.) The Mission was nonetheless able to gain a number
of impressions of the ways some of the elements of that system function and
identify some of the system's gaps and shortcomings.
The principal impression was that although many of the ingredients of a
Vietnamese NSI are in place, they are not yet functioning well as a system. We
saw policy-making bodies concerned with S&T; many research organizations and
universities; national high-technology initiatives and a variety of incentives for
innovation; mechanisms for funding S&T; and strong political support for S&T.
But despite the presence of all of these components, the system does not seem to
operate as a system. As a result, the pace of technical change and innovation is
far slower than needed and desired.
More specifically, we noted the following (some of these observations have
already been made):
The linkages between research institutions and the productive sectors
are still relatively weak, compared with those in many other countries.
A high priority should be assigned to strengthening these.
Enterprises seem to invest very little in the technical capabilities needed
to assimilate and absorb the technology they acquire either from abroad
or from national sources. Japanese and Korean firms usually spend
as much on assimilating technology as they do on acquiring it. In
Viet Nam, we heard of very few firms with the capabilities to assimi-
late and master technology. As a consequence, they were unable to in-
troduce the streams of incremental innovations so characteristic of
competitor firms in other countries.
Vietnamese firms seem to have few sources of venture capital,
the ready availability of which is such a feature of other rapidly
industrializing countries. Without access to such risk capital it is
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difficult for entrepreneurs to exploit commercially new technological
innovations.
Countries that have modernized and industrialized successfully all have
dynamic innovation systems in which knowledge flows are clearly
encouraged. The innovation system in Viet Nam is more static, with
only limited flows of knowledge between institutions. This is due in
part to the tradition of secrecy in many bureaucracies and in part to a
concern over the protection (or lack of it) of intellectual property.
A major weakness in the effective functioning of the Vietnamese NIS,
as reported to the Mission by many interviewees, is difficulty gaining
timely access to knowledge. This impedes decision-making, both with
regard to policy issues and with regard to sources of the most appropri-
ate technologies. A knowledge-broker service is greatly needed to put
people who need knowledge quickly in touch with people who have it.
This applies to knowledge in both Viet Nam and abroad (see box 8).
International collaboration in S&T
Why do firms and countries collaborate internationally when S&T are recognized
to be at the heart of an enterprise or a nation's competitiveness? This issue is a
vital one for enterprise managers and national policymakers in all countries. What,
for a given country, is the appropriate mix of competition and collaboration? How
does this vary for collaboration in science and in technological development?
Box 8
Suggestion
Constructing S&T policy as innovation policy
It would be most useful to have a more thorough analysis and deliberate attempt to con-
struct an NSI using this approach, together with other factors the Mission had not enough
time to examine. To this end, we suggest that a Vietnamese task force be comprised
under the direct authority of the Vice Prime Minister and that its work be completed quickly
and in time for inclusion in the White Paper on S&T strategy.
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Collaboration in basic research is carried out for many reasons, including
cost sharing and geographic necessity (for example, research on tropical plants or
tropical diseases requires access to the tropics.) For developing countries, interna-
tional collaboration in science is an important way to keep in touch with advances
in the field and help ensure that knowledge in that field flows into one's own
laboratory and country.
In Viet Nam, until 10 years ago, most scientific collaboration was occur-
ring only with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. That has changed, and now
much more such collaboration occurs with the rest of the world, including Asia,
Europe, and North America. Every research institute or university we visited had
cooperative links with counterpart institutes in these regions. By contrast, we
heard of very few current links with Eastern Europe. The links we heard about
appeared to have been carefully put together. The agricultural research institutes,
for example, all seemed to have appropriate collaboration with the international
agricultural centres.
Collaboration for technological benefits usually occurs between firms and
universities in what is often called precompetitive research. Governments and
international organizations often promote such collaboration for political reasons.
For example, the European Union funds collaborative research involving firms and
universities in several European countries to strengthen its economic competitive-
ness and integration. Other regional international bodies, such as the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), also try to stimulate S&T collaboration
between institutions in their member countries.
A further type of international collaboration in S&T is increasing as a
result of globalization. This is collaboration between scientists and engineers in
different countries under the orchestration of a single company. In this type of
collaboration, research may be done in one country; design and development, in
a second; initial production, in a third; and after-sales service, in a fourth. If a
country has S&T assets, its workers can be included in this collaborative program.
If it does not, it will be bypassed. It is worth noting that more than 30 MNCs are
supporting research laboratories in China because of the excellent (and
inexpensive) Chinese research capacity.
International collaboration in S&T has costs as well as benefits. Although
the cost to each participant may be lower than that of going it alone, the total cost
of a collaborative endeavour is usually higher. Also, as the research gets closer to
the market place, the issue of who among research partners owns the intellectual
property rights can become serious. Also, problems occur when one partner is
scientifically stronger than the other. Under these circumstances, the stronger part-
ner often dominates the research agenda. This can result in a distortion of the
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scientifically weaker country's research priorities, which may be unduly affected
by decisions taken by the stronger partner.
Many countries have begun to realize that the costs and the benefits of
international collaboration need to be carefully weighed before formulating a
national strategy for international collaboration. The purpose of such a strategy is
to maximize the national benefits and minimize the harmful effects (see box 9).
Box 9
Suggestion
Including the issue of international collaboration in a long-term S&T strategy
We suggest that Viet Nam include the issue of international collaboration in its long-term
S&T strategy, to ensure that maximum benefits accrue to Viet Nam from collaboration. In
particular, Viet Nam should assess carefully its collaboration strategy with other countries
in East and Southeast Asia. It should aim to produce a Vietnamese strategy for interna-
tional collaboration.
In addition, we suggest that the Vietnamese government establish a new international
consultative mechanism to deal with S&T and the modernization of Viet Nam. A few years
ago, China established the China Council for International Co-operation for Environment
and Development. The members of this council include very distinguished leaders of gov-
ernment, industry, policy institutes, finance, and academia, and its purpose is to counsel
the Government of China on environment and development. Viet Nam International
Science and Technology Advisory Council could be structured along the same lines. It
could function under the chairpersonship of the Prime Minister or Vice Prime Minister and
be composed of leading industrialists, financiers, and technology and development
specialists. In addition to regularly counseling the Government of Viet Nam, its very
existence would serve to encourage investment in Viet Nam.
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Chapter 8
EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND HUMAN RESOURCES
FOR S&T ACTIVITIES
In Chapter 3, we noted the centrality of achieving the right combinations of educa-
tion and training as a precondition for competitiveness, modernization, and indus-
trialization. The World Bank made the same point in a 1996 study, Viet Nam:
Education Financing Sector Study (World Bank 1996), noting also that it is
especially difficult to achieve those right combinations with severely constrained
financial resources.
Despite Viet Nam's being one of the poorest countries in the world, its
record on education has been impressive, with 91% of children between the ages
of 5 and 10 enrolled in school and reportedly 88% of the working-age population
being literate. The Ministry of Eduction and Training has a major responsibility
for planning and directing the system, although broader policy decisions are taken
by the Prime Minister's Office, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of
Public Information, and many educational institutions fall under other ministries,
sometimes resulting in duplication and confusion (World Bank 1996). Decentrali-
zation is a major feature of the system, with different levels of government in-
volved in the administration of public financing and with education below the
tertiary level administered entirely by local authorities.
One theme that emerged consistently during our interviews was the inade-
quacy of the educational system for rural people. This view received independent
support in the research of Laufer (1996), who found that the importance of the
preschool and creche system for basic health and child development had been
underestimated and that funding for rural creches was on the decline. In addition,
Laufer found that in 1996 the rural areas had some 20000 vacancies for teachers.
A further and somewhat related factor came out in the 1996 World Bank study
(World Bank 1996), which indicated that educational attendance is closely related
to the wealth of households. The poorest households send no children for higher
education. The state subsidizes a larger proportion of the costs of education at
higher levels than at lower or intermediate levels, and this means that the benefits
of state provision go disproportionately to wealthier families.
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A second theme, raised particularly by employers, is the predominance of
monodisciplinary, specialized, and vocationally oriented institutions, along the
lines of the Soviet model, serving a single-line ministry. These were generally
thought to be inappropriate for helping the country make the transition from cen-
tral planning to market-led allocation of labour, to have a teaching content with
little reference to the market, and to produce graduates with skills that are often
not in demand. The World Bank (1996) also commented on this, finding this
structure to be a feature in the high unit costs of tertiary education. The World
Bank estimated that average recurrent costs per student—year were about 25%
higher in monodisciplinary than in multidisciplinary institutions (World Bank
1996).
A third theme, emerging in several conversations, is related to the issue of
gender in science. In most of the universities and research institutes we visited,
20—30% of the scientific staff were women. In some institutions, women had
become members of senior management, and in a few cases we met female direc-
tors. We also heard that the government intended to encourage women to partici-
pate in all aspects of scientific life in Viet Nam.
Although the participation rate of women in S&T is higher in Viet Nam
than in some other countries, it is still far less than 50%. This means that a con-
siderable pool of potential scientific talent is untapped. The statistics also show
a heavy gender imbalance among new recruits to S&T subjects in the universities
(see box 10).
The Vietnamese government views the development of human resources
as a key to defining levels of development and recognizes the challenges to its
reform program of improving its educational system. Government spending has
shown consistent increases in absolute terms and as a percentage of total govern-
ment spending, including increases of 46% in 1993 and 33% in 1994. Many re-
strictions on private-sector involvement in the sector have been loosened, and




The United Nations Commission on Science and Technology for Development has consid-
ered the issue of women's participation rate in S&T. The specific suggestions made in its
report (see Gender Working Group [1995], Missing Links: Gender Equity in Science and
Technology and Development) may be helpful to the Government of Viet Nam in address-
ing and redressing this imbalance.
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Viet Nam has recently restructured its higher-education system and created
two autonomous national-university campuses through the merger of several
smaller universities and colleges. The national-university campuses now report di-
rectly to the Prime Minister (and not to the Minister of Education). From our
interviews, people appeared to have few doubts that if properly organized, staffed,
and grounded in research, the two national-university campuses would serve as
models for reform in higher education. Within the university campuses, how-
ever, we were consistently told that the reorganization had been primarily a matter
of shifting departments and academic units. The restructuring had not signifi-
cantly modified the academic or financial and administrative practices of these
institutions.
The government hoped that the two national-university campuses would
create new synergies and that private and donor investment would follow. Accord-
ing to one senior official of the government, however,
Thus far, nothing very positive has happened. The process has been ap-
proached mechanically and poorly implemented. We had hoped for the
emergence of new programmes and curricula that would push the mod-
ernisation of Viet Nam and little of this has happened.
A partial, but only a partial, explanation is that the government has made virtually
no new investments in the new national-university campuses. According to a
senior academic, "in theory, we have a new organisational structure, but it coexists
with management and resource allocation practices that still belong to the earlier
era of Soviet-style universities." Perhaps not surprisingly, some researchers who
had earlier supported the government's creation of the two national-university
campuses afterward began to express second thoughts and to consider the reorgan-
ization a mistake.
The most comprehensive study of the costs of the expansion of the system
(World Bank 1996) indicated that judicious mixes of three main policy instru-
ments — subsidies, cost recovery, and private-sector development — could en-
hance internal and external efficiencies in service provision of education and
training. However, the same study also made clear that some objectives will con-
flict (for example, expanding enrolment, improving quality, implementing meas-
ures of cost recovery, and increasing equity).
The government envisages significantly increased allocations to vocational
and technical (VOTECH) training. Such plans relate clearly to the national objec-
tive of rapid modernization and industrialization. The World Bank, however, urges
a more cautious approach because, as its report noted, the little evidence that is
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available suggests that cost-effectiveness differs considerably among programs
subsumed under vocational and technical training. In addition, the World Bank
noted the potential for the private sector to play a large role and to increase rates
of return as economic reform progresses. Thus, the World Bank counseled pru-
dence and argued for a slower approach, with "continuous monitoring and evalua-
tion along the way" (World Bank 1996, p. 134), including regular labour-market
surveys and tracer studies. We support the World Bank's argument and suggest
that monitoring and evaluation be built into the forthcoming national S&T strat-
egy. As will be made clear in what follows, however, we concluded from our con-
versations, particularly those with people involved in large joint ventures and
MNCs with significant investments in Viet Nam, that Viet Nam has at the moment
a large, unmet demand for specific technical and vocational skills and urgently
needs a national program to address this situation.
At present, in pursuing Viet Nam's goal to become an industrialized coun-
try by 2020, the national authorities are concerned principally with raising the
required capital and identifying the key sectors and projects. In the final analysis,
however, the experiences of the Asian Tigers indicates that the most important
step in the industrialization process is to identify and educate competent planners
and managers to compete well against the sophisticated elite leaders of advanced
and NICs. Compared with the past quarter century, the next quarter century will
have even more rapid technological advances and transformations, steep world-
market competition, and extensive globalization. As noted, adaptability, flexibility,
and innovativeness will be more important virtues for Viet Nam's next generation
of government officials and business leaders. Although such well-qualified leaders
may emerge through on-the-job training and trial-and-error practices, a lesson from
the experience of the Asian Tigers is that Viet Nam would be well advised to sys-
tematically approach the development of a new generation of leaders. This should
be accorded top priority in S&T policy.
In this regard, we concluded from our interviews, especially those with
people involved in joint ventures and MNCs, that the most critical technical-skills
gap in Viet Nam lies in what we would term applied systems engineering. We use
this term deliberately to distinguish this from the skills normally imparted by insti-
tutes for technology or university programs for scientific engineering. We are not
referring to skills that go with big science and technological breakthroughs but to
the full range of applied and management skills required to make technologies
work to full advantage — in other words, to the ability to apply the technologies.
We do not wish to underemphasize the longer term importance of the basic sci-
ences or that of a number of issues and problems that emerged during the Mission
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regarding both the basic and the engineering sciences (see Chapter 5). In our view,
however, these areas are less essential at the moment to Viet Nam's quest for rap-
id industrialization and do not require the same urgent, remedial attention.
On the basis of both our interviews and the Korean experience of industri-
alization, we suggest that Viet Nam, in its national S&T strategy, give urgent at-
tention to establishing a technomanagement program. In the Republic of Korea,
the contributions of the Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST), Korean
Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST), and Korean Development
Institute (KDI) were very important in the 1970s and 1980s. KIST is an industrial-
technology research institute; KAIST, a specialized graduate school of applied
science and engineering; and KDI, a development research institute. An analysis
of the history of these institutions shows clearly that their contributions were key
to Korea's development, through their building a national capacity to formulate
and promote technoindustrial projects and in training top- to mid-level managers.
A Vietnamese technomanagement program would not train scientists and engineer-
ing scientists but produce specific cadre of people with skills needed for industri-
alization. It would also function as the "brain" trust for the Vietnamese political,
administrative, and business authorities.
Again, as a result of the Korean experience (and to some extent that of
Singapore), we suggest that a Vietnamese technomanagement be designed with
strong input from the industrial, joint-venture, and MNC community in Viet Nam.
It should be approached as an entirely new institutional arrangement, with struc-
tures that link learning systems regionally and internationally. It may, of course,
be placed within an existing structure, but it should not be constrained by that
structure, nor should the inertia that accompanies all long-established institutions
be permitted to mould the new program.
Box 11 shows an outline of a possible technomanagement.
The elements of a technomanagement would require careful study, includ-
ing an examination of facilities and programs within Southeast Asia and else-
where. To provide possible key elements for consideration in such a study, we
suggest a four-tier program, as outlined in box 12.
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Box 11
Suggestion
A Vietnamese technomanagement program
Objectives
1. To educate and train the leaders of Vietnamese industrialization in technomanagement
systems;
2. To perform technical assessments, systems analyses and syntheses, and planning and
management of both public and private projects at all levels; and
3. To function initially as Viet Nam's principal cooperative window for international collabora-
tion in technomanagement.
Programs
Postgraduate-level programs should be offered to both young college graduates and to
managers and decision-makers already on the job. Programs would include
A formal technomanagement program focused on technomanagement and project
administration;
Nondegree, advanced special programs to gain an overview of modern-day technoman-
agement, directed to incumbent government officials and enterprise managers; and
Short courses and seminars to provide packaged training on specific topics for people who
need it quickly to meet specific demands from industry.
Organization
The proposed technomanagement program should be offered at the newly established and
reorganized Viet Nam National University. The Viet Nam National University will certainly
become the elite school for the future leaders of Viet Nam. Its reform-minded leadership is ideal
for organizing and operating the proposed technomanagement program. The program can be
run as an independent unit of the Viet Nam National University, with a world-class facility and
an international faculty. Also, the success of the program will require linkages with, and study
programs at, other institutions of excellence in the region and internationally. To overcome the
barrier of inertias from the traditional sector of the Vietnamese higher-education system, the
proposed technomanagement program should be run under an international arrangement. It is
also suggested that this idea be placed before the World Bank, as a matter of highest priority
for funding under the very large educational-reform program being considered.
Curriculum
The detailed curriculum, mode of teaching, operational pattern, and business aspect should be
designed on the basis of careful comparative analysis and feasibility studies. Many important
models and outstanding examples should be taken into account (for example, MIT's
technomanagement program, KAIST's Techno-MBA program, Thailand's Technology
Development Research Institute, and the Science Policy Research Unit and Institute for
Development Studies at the University of Sussex). In Viet Nam, students may require remedial
work before being admitted to formal programs, and this should be considered in the design of
the program. Also, Viet Nam has a substantial pool of well-trained professionals abroad, and
some of these people can be invited to work with an international team of experts and domestic
stakeholders in planning the proposed Vietnamese technomanagement program.
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Box 12
Suggestion
A four tier program consisting of the following should be offered:
1. Short-term seminars for senior decision-makers;
2. Six-month programs designed for managers on the job;
3. Regular masters degree program for university graduates of engineering and social
sciences; and
4. International study programs in overseas centres of excellence and industry.
The main skill-requirement areas to be addressed (some mandatory and some optional
depending on orientation and needs) would be the following:
Introduction to, and familiarization with, the application of IT;
Management information systems;
Decision analysis through case studies;
Systems engineering and design;
Project formulation and assessment;
Project-management systems (schedules and costing);
Technology sourcing and intellectual property rights;
Marketing and after-sales service;
Operations and maintenance for small and large facilities; and
Total-quality management systems.
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Chapter 9
GENERATING DOMESTIC SAVINGS: APPLYING S&T
TO VIET NAM'S TRADITIONAL SECTORS
As already noted, Viet Nam's level of domestic savings is far too low to finance
the technological transformation intended by the government. This was the view
of many of the people the international team met. It is also the position of the
World Bank, which noted that policies are required to translate the earnings from
household business units and "the prosperous agricultural sector" into private
savings (World Bank 1995a). Agriculture represents about 30% of GDP and 50%
of export receipts and provides a livelihood for some 70% of the Vietnamese pop-
ulation (World Bank 1995a). The agronomists and agricultural-research institutes
consulted during this review were of the strong opinion that the agricultural sector
would not remain prosperous and would be unable to contribute to the economic
surplus required for Viet Nam's modernization without a major effort to apply
S&T to the needs of this sector.
The history of Southeast Asia shows that in many countries agriculture has
been the early engine of domestic savings and set in place the conditions for un-
precedented economic development. Malaysia built its economic growth on its ap-
plication of S&T to assist in its exports of rubber and oil palm. Thailand traded
rice, timber, maize, and cassava exports to build the foundations of its industriali-
zation. Indonesia blended cash crops with timber and petroleum products to fuel
its engine of progress.
Most of the agricultural scientists, researchers, and producers we consulted
expressed deep concern that Viet Nam's national S&T policy neglects and may
continue to neglect the potential to develop the country through the modernization
of its traditional sectors of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. In reviewing the
S&T-policy documents available to the international team, we noted good reason
for this concern. Current S&T-strategy documents emphasised four areas of
economic-development focus over the next 25 years — IT, biotechnology, new
materials, and automation — as the foundation concerns for the nation's future
industrialization. The documents contained almost no mention of how Viet Nam
would produce the required domestic savings or of a phased strategy involving
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deliberate application of S&T to the economic and social resources in which Viet
Nam now has, from all evidence, a large and distinct comparative advantage. In
the view of the Mission, there is a risk here of serious policy failure. A sequence
of a national S&T strategy that simultaneously builds each successive step on
those that have gone before would begin with the evolutionary development of
several of the country's basic economic sectors and then stress the modernization
of the nation's industrial base.
The view of many people, therefore, was that the development of a
primary-product strategy should be geared to providing Vietnamese agricultural,
fisheries, forestry, and livestock products to regional and global export markets.
A large, unmet, and fast-growing demand for Vietnamese agricultural products is
strongly evident in China. The concomitant S&T strategy for the social and
economic development of Viet Nam's natural-resource base should be centred on
two major goals. First, the country should liberalize and apply the productive
energies, enterprise, and skills of Viet Nam's primary-product producers and its
rural private businesspeople and investors to meet the needs of a modern primary-
product economy. Second, the country should establish conditions to attract for-
eign investment to complement domestic efforts to create an advanced agribusi-
ness infrastructure.
However, we also encountered strong objections to any S&T-economic
strategy according priority to the traditional sectors. Such objections tended to
come from economists, rather than from scientists. The largest doubts rested im-
plicitly on a despair over any prospect of improving Vietnamese agriculture, as a
result of its small farm sizes and its backwardness. The international team found
it difficult to entertain these objections seriously, as development models based
on successful primary products were launched under virtually identical conditions
in the neighbouring countries of Southeast Asia, a region with characteristically
very small, intensively cultivated farms.
We also heard the contentions that the agricultural-product market is
fraught with quality and price barriers that Viet Nam cannot hurdle. In fact, the
market for high-value Vietnamese products — such as fruits, vegetables, fish, and
livestock — has really not been assessed or tapped. For successful entry into this
market, the national development strategy must be built on a postharvest food-
processing infrastructure that prepares, packages, and handles these perishable
products to make them a valued item in regional or global markets. In the process
of pursuing sales in these markets, it may be useful to seek the help of large
multinational food and agricultural-product export firms to assist or, if possible,
invest in developing an international market for Vietnamese high-value food
products.
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Such a strategy would use the excellent array of technologies already
developed by Viet Nam's agricultural, crop, livestock, and fishery research insti-
tutes and universities. Because of the disaggregated and disbursed nature of
primary-product production, the strategy must also enlist the active participation
of the domestic private sector as a source of business investment. Private initiative
can provide the entrepreneurial talent and investment funds required to build a
modem agribusiness complex to serve producers and to create and operate the
postharvest processing systems required to meet international-market standards for
food and cash-crop economies.
The technical foundation needed to expand the output of Viet Nam's farms
to supply new markets is available. The weakness of the national economy to
accommodate such an S&T—economic-development strategy lies in the relatively
primitive infrastructure of its food-processing and farm-supply sectors. The obvi-
ous requirement here is investment in storage-facility, processing, packaging, and
preservation technologies to meet the quality standards of the international market.
The technologies needed to initiate a transformation of Viet Nam's rural
economy are, for the most part, already known and available. What is lacking is
an appropriate incentive structure to launch and support their application. This is
a core issue for national policy and central to a successful S&T strategy.
Critical to the earlier economic transformation of Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Thailand was the governments' role hi ensuring fair agricultural markets and a
measure of safety-net protection against the risks of weather and international
price fluctuations (see box 13).
Box 13
Suggestion
Some instruments to consider in economic transformation
Public funding for S&T is severely constrained. As already indicated in Chapter 5, the
government intends to increase such funding to 2% of total public outlay. To generate
the medium-term public savings needed for industrialization, the government should give
priority over the next few years to allocating a significant percentage of the new funds to
R&D in the agricultural sector. Eliminating the "green disease" in Viet Nam's fruit crops
will in itself pay handsome short-term dividends to the Vietnamese economy. Resolving
the technological barriers to increased postharvest marketing will do the same. It should
be noted that a significant percentage of such S&T in agriculture is likely to be at the
very frontiers of science in plant breeding, genetic engineering, and biotechnology.
(continued)
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Box 13 (concluded)
An Agricultural Price Board, or Commission, might be created with a mandate to an-
nounce, in advance of the planting season, a set of floor prices for major agricultural
commodities, with the assurance that the government or the state bank will purchase
designated products if prices fall below the announced floor prices. Commodities
purchased under this program might be stored as a future buffer stock to bring greater
stability to product prices within the country or to even out the year-to-year flow of export
earnings from foreign sales.
Similarly, most farmers depend at present on local money lenders for a large share of
their capital. This dependence discourages these farmers' adoption of new farming
practices, and in the case of crop failure the government has no crop-insurance program
to help farmers and their families to face the risk of bad weather. An existing official
system provides credit to farmers to purchase nonfarm production inputs, but by all
accounts the system is seriously underfunded. This results in significant losses of national
revenue.
In addition, Viet Nam has few microcredit schemes. Such schemes in other countries of
Asia have proven to be of considerable value to rural populations and have facilitated
small, incremental gains along the value chain. Moreover, such schemes are being
accorded high priority by many donor agencies, including bilateral and multilateral
agencies and nongovernmental organizations. A microcredit arrangement specific to an
agricultural population but similar to the Grameen Bank, in Bangladesh, might be
established on a pilot-project basis. This might be funded, initially at least, by a donor or a
consortium of donors.
In sum, we see compelling reasons to support a conjunction of S&T- and
economic-development strategy, with initial priority given to the primary-product
sector. This approach would hold major promise for the modernization of Viet
Nam's rural areas, provision of a large number of new, low-capital-intensive rural-
employment opportunities, and generation of the domestic savings and foreign-
exchange needed to support a medium-term program of industrialization.
Chapter 10
HIGH TECHNOLOGY
The Vietnamese government has selected four high-tech programs for priority
treatment: programs for IT, biotechnology, new materials, and automation. Each
of the programs is under the direction of a steering committee. Of these four, the
area given greatest immediate attention in Vietnam is clearly IT, and because of
the time available, we were encouraged to concentrate on this. We were well
briefed on the national IT program and heard many positive comments about its
accomplishments. We also encountered, however, some critical comments on its
shortcomings.
The national program for IT
During more than 4 years, the Vietnamese government has been implementing a
national program to develop IT. According to a senior policymaker, the national
IT program "requires that our country further develop IT in every sector," not just
in the public sector (that is, among the ministries, provincial administrations, and
other public agencies). IT should be used to enhance quality and effectiveness in
manufacturing and services, to support the country's overall economic reforms.
Formally, the national IT program derived from a Government Resolution
(No. 49/CP/1993), signed by the Prime Minister. Every government agency is
ordered to follow the guidelines and achieve specific objectives. At least in princi-
ple, every ministry must find ways to implement the national IT program. As in
the other national high-tech programs, the 1993 national IT program has a
practical orientation. It is not a program that first and foremost will generate new
technology but one to promote effective diffusion and application of existing,
relatively advanced IT. The focus is on the "effectiveness of the application of
computers in socio-economic activities." Left out of the national IT program
documents, however, are specific operational goals with clear strategies for their
implementation. These are defined by the professionally staffed Office of the
Steering Committee for the national program on IT, located directly under the
Prime Minister's office.
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The IT program was developed with three main concerns in mind: (1) the
need for Vietnam to benefit more from the modern information infrastructure,
based on computing, multimedia, and data interchange; (2) the ambition to mod-
ernize industry and related economic activities and contribute to the emerging IT
industry in Viet Nam; and (3) the need to address the competition in IT from
neighbouring countries. Regarding concerns 2 and 3, a number of initiatives have
been taken to improve the legal and regulatory environment. This includes issues
of intellectual property rights in the software industry; importation of computers
and other equipment; and tax and quota incentives to develop a base for assembly
and other types of production of IT hardware.
The main issue has concerned the education and training of IT personnel.
Viet Nam has a relatively good supply of programers but a serious lack of systems
engineers, project managers, and other middle managers and persons with academ-
ic specializations at the level of a master's degree. These issues remain high on
the program agenda.
From the first year of implementation, however, the emphasis was put on
the diffusion of IT in government and in some other sectors (for example, in edu-
cation, training, and R&D). The government was considered a lead user in data
communications. The IT program's intermmisterial Steering Committee (chaired
by the Minister for Science, Technology and Environment) gave priority to joint
efforts among ministries and offered cross-sectoral coordination in the design and
procurement of computers and communication applications. As in the neighbour-
ing countries with more developed IT infrastructures, in Viet Nam computer and
communication technologies were to be applied to every aspect of social and
economic activity.
In the name of the national IT program, all ministries and operating agen-
cies have been required to develop and implement their own IT plans, which
should be comprehensive and also include training and technical development.
Similarly, all 61 provinces are to have their own IT plans (initiated and, if neces-
sary, financially supported by the central government through the national IT
program). Some of these provincial IT plans are fairly advanced and include both
R&D efforts and industry initiatives, such as the Soft Park in HCMC, a high-tech,
low-rent building for start-up firms, including small firms developing and market-
ing computer software.
From our interviews, it seems clear that the national IT program is seen as
highly beneficial to the diffusion of IT in Viet Nam. The program has had clear
and positive effects not just in central government but also in the use of IT in a
number of provinces, the school system, and R&D institutions. But the effects in
industry and in the rest of the economy are less obvious. The national IT program
HIGH TECHNOLOGY 93
has not improved the production of software (and related hardware). It seems
obvious that the industrial ambitions of the program (to create stronger incentives
for a software industry in Viet Nam) need to be reinforced and accorded a central
place on the agenda.
From our visits to software firms in both the north and south of the coun-
try, it seems clear that people see the central and provincial governments as lead
users in software products and services. The position of lead user in a high-tech
area can be used to help drive the firms and other market players toward new
products and services that can become a basis for a software industry. Hence,
decision-makers should recognize the need to retain an industrial dimension in the
IT program.
Limits of access to data and information
Non-Vietnamese participation has been sought to finance pioneering efforts in
computing, multimedia, and data communications. This includes local-area net-
works for senior decision-makers in the public sector and e-mail access and some
other internet services for educational and research personnel. National reviews
have been conducted of all ODA projects to search for relevant IT components in
ongoing and planned development projects. The idea is to help upgrade and other-
wise improve the IT component of each project and to improve the fit of these
many independent IT components in the overall IT development of the country.
As a lead agency in government and as a pioneering user of IT in Viet
Nam, the Office of the Steering Committee for the national IT program has con-
ducted several experimental projects in both data communications and advanced
multimedia applications. Financially supported by Canadian ODA ($8 million over
5 years), the Office has been able to offer advanced consultancy to the govern-
ment sector in computing and communications, to assist in capacity-building for
IT in both central government and all the provincial administrations to develop
overall design and necessary standards for data communications, etc.
Assisted initially by a consortium of Canadian firms, the Office of the
Steering Committee is involved in a major undertaking to create standards and
access procedures for a decentralized national database to provide effective on-line
land-management, socioeconomic, detailed population, planning, investment, tax,
and other treasury data.
These approaches appeared to us to represent a solid combination of tech-
nology access, investment in assimilation, and systematic links to users. However,
significant difficulties were also reported during our interviews. The difficulties
encountered thus far in this ambitious program do not appear to lie mainly in
technology. Since 1994 Viet Nam has had access to all the IT products and
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services it needs. The main hurdle has been the lack of government policies and
regulations to facilitate the diffusion of modern IT.
For example, the excessive rates set by the telecommunications regulator
(Department General of Post and Telecommunications) and the main operator
(Viet Nam National Post and Telecommunications) seriously hamper Internet
access. In September 1997, a leased line for Internet access cost about 3 000 USD
per month for those few people formally permitted to benefit from the World
Wide Web. This virtually excludes access for Vietnamese firms and individuals
wanting to do business on the Internet, thereby denying to them the potential of
this fast-growing part of the world marketplace for goods and services.
In addition, although internet technology has been in place and functioning
since 1995, the government retains full control of Internet access, preventing not
only businesspeople but also R&D scientists and engineers, educators, librarians,
and students from using relevant services, readily accessible via the Internet.
In the course of our many interviews, we were told that contemporary
Viet Nam has little acquaintance with the tradition of sharing information freely,
even in and between R&D institutions. We were given examples of where the
legal and regulatory environment of IT seriously hampered R&D activities and
prevented local firms from competing on equal terms with foreign suppliers of IT
products and services (see box 14).
Key projects and policies linked to the national program for IT
The Steering Committee for the national program on IT has been a driving force
in establishing a national information infrastructure (using Internet standards). The
coordination of these many initiatives to improve communications inside and,
later, outside the country (including widespread use of the Internet) has been




Removal of impediments to widespread use of the Internet
The application of IT to the development and modernization of Viet Nam is crucial. It will
affect all aspects of life and will be an important tool in linking Viet Nam to the outside
world. If Viet Nam is to achieve its goal of becoming an industrialized society by 2020, it
will be essential to remove impediments to widespread use of the Internet. This is a case
in which both implicit and explicit policies must be in harmony. We suggest that Viet Nam's
new long-term strategy for S&T pay specific attention to this issue.
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As lead user, the Office of the Steering Committee has facilitated on-line
communication links for ministries and for heads of provincial administrations.
These and other wide-area networks have also been used as a proving ground for
new communications technology in Viet Nam. The government has funded these
networks, as well as local-area networks inside various ministries, so that experi-
ments can be performed with alternative technical solutions. With the procure-
ment, adaptation, and servicing of these networks, some new technology was
developed locally.
Another pioneering effort of the Steering Committee was the National
Accounts Registry, which uses the Standard National Accounts classification (a
project supported by United Nations Development Programme). Similarly, an in-
formation system for natural resources and environmental monitoring was devel-
oped for MOSTE and is monitored by the Steering Committee.
The Treasury of the Ministry of Finance has been using the expertise of
the Steering Committee in a taxation project (funded by Swedish International
Development Agency). A state bank's data system (funded by the World Bank)
was the largest of all IT projects. The trade-information system of the Ministry of
Trade and the customs-information system are both part of the national IT
program.
More generally, the inclusion of various sector programs for IT in the
national IT program has secured not only the participation of people with expertise
from the Steering Committee but also brought about a technical upgrade of most
projects and a harmonization of communications standards and training of special-
ized IT staff. Development projects have been identified, and some R&D has been
performed to match the technical achievements reached by an active procurement
of advanced IT equipment and programs from the international marketplace.
More importantly, these hands-on experiences of the Steering Committee
in large IT projects have had a direct influence on the policy debate and proposals
to the government for changes in various policies, including those affecting higher
education, training, industry, and trade. The Steering Committee has the contin-
uing ambition to create a more appropriate and supportive environment for soft-
ware development, involving such factors as open system standards, procurement
policy for the government, copyright issues, and intellectual property rights.
Clearly, the national IT program was never meant to be just a government
program, but a cross-sectoral R&D and technology-diffusion program, set in the
context of efforts to industrialize and modernize Viet Nam. In our interviews,
people strongly recommended that this broad purpose needed to be communicated
with absolute clarity by the government and that the implementation of this
purpose should be greatly strengthened. For example, the IT program does not
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incorporate systematically positive linkages between the proactive IT policy of
Viet Nam and its current policies for industry, foreign trade, education, training,
administrative reforms, and the communications infrastructure. In some of our
interviews, people indicated that they saw this as a serious weakness.
The national IT program identifies some of these cross-sectorial linkages
but limits itself in the creation and development of an IT industry in Viet Nam.
Yet, concern is growing in the interministerial IT committee over the slow growth
of a modern IT and electronics industry in Viet Nam, such as in software develop-
ment and production for the home and world markets, hardware development and
production (of selected equipment), and specialized IT services.
Earlier this year, policy issues in industry and trade relating to the future
of IT in Viet Nam were brought to the attention of a high-level ad hoc strategy
group, chaired by the former Minister for Planning and Investment. This group is
responsible for bringing together IT, telecommunications, and electronics from
a long-term combined industry, investment, and trade perspective. During our
visit, it was unclear to us how far the ad hoc strategy group would go in its
recommendations.
The need for a better human-resource base in IT
In the last few years, the issue of human resources in IT (and electronics) has
become ever more pressing. A point already noted (Chapter 9) is that the small,
emerging IT industry in Viet Nam does not lack programers, but there is an
increased demand for more specialized personnel, such as software analysts, engi-
neers, project managers, and other middle managers, as well as marketing spe-
cialists. Although the demand for packaged software in Viet Nam has increased
substantially, the local IT firms are still largely unable to meet this demand. Some
firms are moving into customized software production, adaptation of standards,
and related technical services.
Given these tendencies in the marketplace, curriculum reform is needed at
the institutions for education and training at all levels. There is a need to upgrade
available equipment for educational and training purposes. In our interviews, sev-
eral persons advocated a restructuring of IT faculties among the higher-education
institutions and the upgrade of facilities, including libraries and documentation
centres. It was also suggested that such approaches might be structured to bring
about longer term unit-cost savings.
A new IT strategy for the period up to the year 2020 is in preparation, and
it is to be completed by the end of 1998. We were told that one of the main char-
acteristics of the new plan is much greater emphasis on the application of IT in
agriculture and in the development of the rural areas. This is consistent with the
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Mission's own view concerning the need to strengthen the application of S&T in
rural areas, and it leads us to make a specific suggestion on this topic (see box
15).
High-tech parks
A technology-policy issue frequently raised on our visit was the planned establish-
ment of a number of high-tech zones, or parks. We heard people express concerns
about the number and location of the zones and their phasing and sequencing. We
met with only a few people who had any doubt that Viet Nam needed such parks
and that the infrastructural investments would bring substantial returns in the long
term.
Our own perspective on this issue was one of much greater questioning and
even scepticism about the overall merits of the new science and high-tech parks.
The world now has more than 800 of these parks. Most are in the developed coun-
tries, but several developing countries have also invested in the necessary infra-
structure. The intention is to try to locate research institutes, universities, and
high-technology enterprises in an environment that is conducive to interaction and
leads to innovation and to foreign investment. Some notable success stories have
been recorded, but also many failures. Also, a number of attempts have been made
to distil the lessons learned. The most recent was the Technopolis meeting con-
vened by the Conference Board of Canada, in Ottawa, September 1997. But too
little is known to provide clear guidelines for Viet Nam.
Four candidate sites have been selected for high-tech parks in Viet Nam.
One is in the south of HCMC, and the other three are in the vicinity of Hanoi.
One of the Hanoi sites is in a part of the city that houses 70 research institutes
Box 15
Suggestion
A pilot program to bring IT to communities in the Mekong Delta
It is suggested that donor funds be solicited to help fund a pilot program to bring the bene-
fits of IT-improved access to information and knowledge to communities in the Mekong
Delta. The idea would be to install ITs as a community-centred resource, along the lines of
public libraries, which sprang up across the world in the early part of this century. It would
be imperative that the system be interactive and that it include the knowledge and informa-
tion needed by the community (for example, information on agricultural and health issues).
A logical choice of a base for such a program would be the university in Can Tho.
Similar programs for poor communities are being developed and tested in other parts of
the developing world. Viet Nam might benefit from studying these pilot schemes and
adapting them to suit the needs of the Mekong Delta. IDRC's Acacia program in Africa is
an example.
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and several industrial companies. One of the other Hanoi sites is in the outskirts
of the city, and if the decision is made to go ahead with this site the Hanoi cam-
pus of the Viet Nam National University, now located in several places in Hanoi,
would be consolidated at this new location. The government also intends to estab-
lish advanced telecommunications, provide specialized training, a technology incu-
bator, and business-development centres within the scope of the high-tech parks.
We were made aware of a number of feasibility studies of these proposed
sites. Joint Vietnamese—foreign teams carried out several of these studies. Japan,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom provided inputs. We also understand that the
Government of Viet Nam anticipates much of the funding for the parks will come
from foreign companies and donors.
The intention of this review is not to make detailed recommendations to
the Vietnamese government. We wish merely to underscore that the infrastructural
investments need to be very high and that the evidence is mixed regarding likely
payoff, based on other countries' experiences. We do, however, suggest some
criteria for decisions on the future of the proposed high-tech parks in box 16.
Box 16
Suggestion
Criteria for decisions on high-tech parks
1. Be careful in selecting the location — The criteria for selecting the most
appropriate site (or sites) for a high-tech park should be elaborated before any
decision is taken. Decision-makers should consider carefully both the
advantages and disadvantages of each site. Alternative locations should also be
discussed in detail. Experiences from other countries show that the choice of
location is of paramount importance. Detailed site analysis may even determine
at a very early stage the probability of success or failure of a high-tech park.
2. Look into the strengths of the existing technoindustrial infrastructure — For
instance, a survey of R&D resources in the Hanoi area was completed in 1997,
to provide a general overview and an analysis of available (and some potential)
resources for the Hanoi high-tech park. The survey contained an analysis of
available S&T facilities and other resources for industrial innovation, which could
be linked to a high-tech park in the greater Hanoi area. Ideally, the decision





3. Identify short-term benefits — Success is more likely if the high-tech park has both
short- and long-term benefits for tenants. The final version of the conceptual design for
a park should include everything considered achievable in the first few years of
operations and in consecutive time periods.
4. Combine the efforts of central and local governments — The chances of success for a
high-tech park will greatly improve if decision-makers in the central and local govern-
ments achieve a clear consensus on the goals of the high-tech park and the means to
reaching these goals.
5. Consider carefully the implementation strategy — Developers should not
underestimate the complexities of high-tech parks. To succeed, the developers will
have to draw on a variety of financial, technical, and human and other resources — to
be combined in joint efforts. The criteria for choosing the first domestic and foreign
partners to become anchor tenants may influence the profile of the park for a
considerable length of time.
6. Develop a comprehensive policy framework — This is to be used to clarify problems
facing the developers. A blend of policies will influence the development of a high-tech
park. The current policies (rules and regulations, government support schemes, etc.)
should be discussed in detail, and changes in the regulations should be introduced to
make the early implementation of the park effective.
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Chapter 11
S&T AND INNOVATION INDICATORS
Strategies for S&T and innovation must be based on valid, reliable and rele-
vant information on the performance of R&D, access to modem technology from
abroad, and diffusion of this technology and related know-how. To a considerable
extent Viet Nam lacks such information.
Among the most industrialized countries, over the past decade or more,
internationally comparable statistics on S&T and innovation have improved con-
siderably. Standard methods are in use throughout Europe (including Eastern and
Central Europe), North America, and Northeast Asia for observing and "taking the
temperature" of the national and regional R&D activities through a variety of
input and performance indicators. Evaluations and policy-relevant assessments are
based on relatively sophisticated combinations of statistics on R&D and innova-
tion, such as various input, output, and process indicators. Even the technological
interaction between branches of industry over national and regional borders is
monitored, with the help of skillful statisticians depicting technology balance of
payment and trade performance in high-tech and other product areas.
From our fact-finding and interviews, we have come to recognize that
Vietnamese decision-makers urgently need to have better access to comprehensive,
up-to-date indicators on S&T and innovation, along with overall performance indi-
cators for the Vietnamese economy and the economies of its neighbours and coun-
tries in other regions. The current indicators of R&D and innovation in Viet Nam
are not good enough. The current indicators do not lend themselves to compari-
sons over time with various subsectors of the economy or with other socioecono-
mic indicators.
Furthermore, for its national and regional planning and policy-making,
Viet Nam ought to modernize its system of S&T and innovation indicators to take
account of the country's transition to a market economy. Decision-makers in
Vietnamese government and industry should have the same (or better) indicators
as those of their colleagues in neighboring countries. Vietnamese government
decision-makers need to know certain details, such as those concerning the flows
of funds to R&D and innovation, human-resource and development, and trends in
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the mobility of highly skilled personnel. They will also need to compare the out-
puts of the Vietnamese R&D system with those of other countries in enough detail
to take relevant action.
The first step in improving such indicators and statistics is to secure
arrangements for standard classifications to be applied. This is needed for any
comparison. This also involves developing reliable business and other registers and
using these to gather statistics on S&T and innovation.
The following steps imply a close interaction between the producers of the
statistics on R&D and innovation and the several user groups throughout
Viet Nam. Vietnamese users may actually help define the specific needs for
improvements in statistical series and for entirely new and more relevant data,
such as statistics on industrial innovation; the diffusion of technology in various
economic subsectors; data on technology balance of payments for Viet Nam in
relation to other countries; secondary data, such as patents, licences, royalties,
publications, and other performer-based data; and data on human-resource devel-
opment and migration. In all of these areas, internationally accepted manuals are
available for the collection and processing of the data. Viet Nam's own statisti-
cians and policy analysts must attain at least the same qualifications and practical
experience in producing and using these kinds of data as their colleagues in other
countries.
This implies that Vietnamese specialists need to cooperate more actively
with statistical and other units abroad, particularly with the international or-
ganizations responsible for standardizing R&D statistics on regional and interna-
tional bases, such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) and the OECD, among the highly industrialized coun-
tries. To some extent, Viet Nam already complies with UNESCO standards; how-
ever, as underlined in a recent Southeast Asian program for developing indicators
of R&D and innovation, the standards must go beyond that of the elementary
statistics processed and published by UNESCO (see box 17).
Box 17
Suggestion
Creating an observatory for S&T and innovation
Viet Nam should create a more advanced system for the production and distribution of
indicators of S&T and innovation and encourage use of these indicators for assessments
and prognostics. Internationally comparable indicators should be used more frequently in
performance evaluations of R&D institutions and assessments of technological services,
(continued)
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Box 17 (concluded)
trade in technology, human-resource development, etc. In cooperation with other govern-
ment bodies and other organizations, a well-staffed unit, or observatory, of professional
statisticians should be made responsible for providing government and other stakeholders
with up-to-date data on the actual performance of the institutions (and firms) involved in
R&D and related innovative activities. International training should be granted these statis-
ticians to make their output fully comparable with that of other countries.
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Chapter 12
GENERATING THE SHORT-TERM ECONOMIC SURPLUS
NEEDED TO FINANCE INDUSTRIALIZATION: THE CASE
FOR APPLYING S&T TO AGRICULTURE
This chapter focuses on the development potential of the agricultural technologies
now available from Viet Nam's S&T institutions. These are available for almost
immediate application in the development of Viet Nam's agricultural, forest, and
fishery sectors, the principal sources of national income. Further, Viet Nam's
incomplete integration of its S&T policies into its development policies has had
detrimental effects on its implementation of strategies for economic and social
growth. This chapter briefly examines these contentions and suggests an alter-
native path for liberating the productive energies of Viet Nam's people and apply-
ing these energies to the development and modernization of Viet Nam's social and
economic pursuits.
This alternative path rests on the belief that a national S&T policy is the
core instrument for building the foundations for the social and economic develop-
ment of the country and that the quickest and most immediate way to expand the
nation's economy lies in a technological transformation of the agricultural sector
from farm to consumer. The S&T basis for such a transformation exists now and
is constrained only by the ambiguities and contradictions in three central develop-
ment policies: an S&T policy that focuses on building almost from scratch an
economy based on high technology and industrialization; a domestic economic
policy that inhibits private economic activity through a system of controls and
licencing while giving monopoly or quasi-monopoly powers to SOEs that are only
marginally competitive domestically and decidedly uncompetitive internationally;
and a foreign economic policy that seeks Vietnamese membership and participa-
tion in international bodies and trading blocs that within a few years will open the
economy to the very chill winds of global competition.
The economic and social development of nations with proud histories and
ancient traditions and artifacts can be achieved through the application of science-
derived technologies to their citizen's productive activities. In reviewing the
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present S&T-policy documents available to the Mission, we found an underlying
neglect of the potential to develop the country by modernizing its traditional sec-
tors of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries.
A strong education policy at all levels is a precondition for the moderni-
zation of Viet Nam's economy. An early and strong S&T involvement in fostering
the modernization of the traditional productive sectors would open employment
opportunities, increase prosperity, add to the national tax base, and contribute to
meeting Viet Nam's short- and intermediate-term foreign-exchange requirements.
These earnings will be critical to realizing the longer term industrialization goals
of the strategy. To be more than a failed dream, the vision of industrialization
with high-technology activities, large investments per worker, and an extensive
base of advanced S&T-development institutions must be supported by a strong
national economy.
To provide the central core for longer term social and economic develop-
ment, a national S&T policy must begin with an assessed inventory of productive
resources. This inventory must include a realistic appraisal of natural resources,
geographic advantages, human resources, skills, state of technical knowledge, and
the capacity and capability to increase the social and economic products these
resources can provide. The next step is to formulate the strategic policy to provide
the operational foundation for obtaining real output from this national resource
base. S&T policy in not a dream: it begins with a rigorous assessment of the pro-
duction potential in the here and now, and its policy contributions emerge from
an equally rigorous appraisal of what must be done.
The review and assessment of resource inventories is crucial to screening
alternative development paths and opportunities. Each must be evaluated for its
time boundaries, skill requirements, costs, and returns. These parameters determine
the final composition of a phased strategy to be implemented in the years ahead.
S&T strategic vision must explicitly embrace the parameters that condition the
tactics of policy implementation.
The evaluations and assessments underpinning Viet Nam's current S&T
strategy were unavailable to the Mission. It is not possible, therefore, to comment
critically or usefully on the wisdom of focusing on IT, biotechnology, new materi-
als, and automation. It is possible, however, to comment critically on what seems
to be neglected.
From a miscellaneous set of external (often, nongovernmental) reports,
documents, and interviews, we found that the paths outlined in Viet Nam's present
S&T policy have a strong bias in favour of manufacturing and industrial technol-
ogies. This results in serious neglect of opportunities to make better use of the
nation's traditional human, land, water, and coastal resources. Our belief is that
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these traditional resources, now employing about 70% of the work force, can
quickly and easily be made very much more productive. There seems to be over-
whelming evidence that the productivity of the primary-product sectors can be
enhanced through the spread of advanced high technologies, but also with relative-
ly simple, often low-level, technologies. Many of the needed technologies are
already available in Viet Nam; many more can easily be acquired from neighbour-
ing countries or abroad.
The bias in favour of high technology and industrialization in Viet Nam's
current S&T policy was ably defended by many of senior government officials we
met. But the scientists and researchers in agriculture and forestry expressed,
almost universally, the concern that the increased productivity possible in these
sectors was not included in the current S&T strategy, as a lull and complementary
development path. Those not resigned to being neglected by the formulators of
S&T policy (and there were a few such people) argued with conviction and
intensity that they held the technological tools; with relatively little investment,
the country could bring the traditional sectors to much higher levels of output
through improved farming and forest-exploitation methods and improved post-
harvest and food-processing techniques. The Vietnamese government would only
need the political will to reform many of its economic-development policies and
to carry these reforms through with constancy and vigour.
These scientists and researchers believed that the case for emphasis on the
traditional sectors had not been made. They argued that it could be made if S&T
policy was more broadly defined, made more broadly analytical, and brought into
more comprehensive focus. They suggested that this would require appraising the
nation's natural-resource potential, its dynamic and innovative agricultural econ-
omy, its highly fertile soils and irrigation-water availability, its huge potential for
renewal forestry, its abundant fresh water and marine fisheries, and its recent
advances in aquaculture.
In the remarks that follow, the emphasis is on the agricultural sector.
Because of time limitations, the other primary-product sectors of forestry, fisher-
ies, and mining were not included in the Mission's visits, although there was some
discussion with foresters at the universities visited. However, from some com-
ments made during the Mission's discussions, it seems evident that similar impres-
sive gains in output might be found in these sectors with the adoption of modern
forestry practices and the transformation of the rather basic technologies now in
use in the mining sector, especially an upgrade of the mineral-extraction methods.
The Mission is of the view that an early and detailed formulation and
implementation of a focused policy for the modernization of Viet Nam's ag-
ricultural technologies would lead to easily secured, very large dividends:
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prosperity, enlarged employment opportunities, and social advance in the country's
rural areas. We are also convinced that this would give a significant lift to the na-
tional budget, the gross national product, and the nation's current-account balance.
Primary products (excluding oil and petroleum) and rural services to
primary-product producers account for almost two-thirds of Viet Nam's GDP.2 In
the past few years, these sectors have experienced a restored dynamism in growth,
with rates now exceeding 4% per annum. This dynamic has likely created the
conditions needed to sustain a concentrated short-term push to maintain the
present momentum and further liberate the productive energies of the almost three-
quarters of the Vietnamese people who make their living working with primary
products and who thereby contribute the lion's share of national economic well-
being.
The inventory: assets
Viet Nam has at least eight separate identifiable agroecological regions. Each
region has been well studied by scholars, and their work is well documented. Each
has it own set of advantages and disadvantages. Regrettably, the Mission did not
have time to visit each region or to undertake a comprehensive review of each
region's present and possible future productive potential. However, we did visit
the Mekong Delta region, and we were impressed with the following resource
inventory:
The competency of the farmers was impressive, along with their knowl-
edge and their capacity as producers of rice, fruit, livestock, and an
array of other products wrested from the land and nurtured with their
care.
2 The mission used data obtained from the World Bank covering the GDP estimates for Viet
Nam (World Bank 1995a). These data place the contribution from the agricultural sector at just
below 40%. The United Nations Industrial Development Organization report of July 1997, Viet
Nam: A Medium Term Industrial Strategy (UNIDO 1997), places the agriculture, forests, and
fisheries at just under 30%. The difference is not critical to the argument in this section. What is
critical is the observation of many people that at present the country's agricultural sector is
performing much below its potential, from production to product marketing. Growth rates in the
GDP contribution of the sector have been steadily increasing since 1991, and the available evidence
suggests that this trend could be accelerated with a sustained drive to modernize the production
technology and provide the capital needed to remove marketing and postharvest-processing
constraints. These constraints are preventing the sector from reaching its full potential to contribute
to the nation's economic and social development. On the balance-of-payment accounts, agricultural
products, forestry, and fisheries contribute close to two-thirds of Viet Nam's nonoil exports. The
nation would have greatly enhanced opportunities to expand exports with an economic and social
development program for the primary-product sectors, underpinned by an aggressive research and
technology transfer activity designed to expand output.
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The innovative drive among these farmers who adopted and adapted
new rice-farming,3 fruit-orchard, and livestock-rearing technologies
(among others) that have provided rural areas and the agricultural econ-
omy with a strong growth dynamic.
The climate and soil can produce an abundance of food for both farm
families and the market.
High-yielding rice varieties are remarkably uniform (indicating the high
purity of varietal seed sources), well tended, and without serious signs
of nutrient deficiencies or significant damage resulting from pests or
plant diseases.
The poultry and hogs we saw were of good quality, and the meat pro-
ducts were of a commercial standard, although the technologies used in
the meat-packing industry will be in need of some obvious upgrading
if Viet Nam's prepared livestock products are to enter the more de-
manding regional and global markets. If the meat-processing industry
is modernized and some innovations are made in the transportation in-
frastructure, Vietnamese meat products will easily find ready markets
in China, Hong Kong, and other Southeast Asian nations.
Also impressive were the Mekong Delta research institutions for rice
and fruit. Both the quality of the research and the research staffs strong
desire to make their work relevant to the farming community were very
evident and impressive.
These research institutions will be national assets in Viet Nam's quest
for rapid economic growth. Properly supported, they will be powerful
sources of new farm-level technologies. The applied orientation of the
staff will ensure that their findings are passed on to the local extension
services and directly to farmers through demonstrations and training
programs. Both of the research institutions we visited work with very
3 It is of interest to note that between 1988 and 1996 paddy output increased by 57% (from 17
million t to 27 million t). Most of the increase was due to a 37% increase in yields, resulting from
an expansion in irrigation facilities (cropping intensities were up by 21%, although cultivated areas
declined by 17%), an increase in fertilizer use, and the use of high-yielding varieties of rice. Given
the tools, the Vietnamese farmers are very proficient at doing their job.
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small budgets and in relative isolation, with limited, but very important,
information access to international sources of advanced technologies.
Can Tho University has a major agricultural faculty, with an aggressive
teaching and research program in agricultural sciences that is pioneering
in the development of direct contact with local cultivators. The Mission
believes that this academic and out-reach institution should have greater
interaction with the region's research institutions of the central-govern-
ment ministries, through formal linkages, including personnel sharing.
Such linkages would be likely to generate a strong synergy among all
the region's research, administrative, and educational personnel.
The Mission was gratified to learn of close collaboration occurring
between the Mekong Delta research stations and international agricultur-
al research institutes in Asia and abroad. These links are an important
source of varietal material for local adaptation, knowledge of the latest
agronomic and other scientific practices, and interchange of information
and data through interaction with a worldwide network of researchers.
The inventory: liabilities
The Mission learned of several constraints to the rapid expansion of agricultural
output and a more productive agricultural economy in both the Mekong Delta
region and in other parts of the country. These must also be included in the
inventory:
Realized farm-gate prices paid to the farmer for rice and fruit are
depressed because of the unequal marketing power of many fanners
against a few middlepeople buyers. It is hoped that the new cooperative
law will encourage farmers to mount a combined front to redress this
imbalance of power between buyers and sellers. The Soha State Farm
in Can Tho Province is an important buyer of rice in the region and is
well equipped to provide postharvest services for the farmers in the
immediate area. But more needs to be done to encourage farmers to
form informal groups to market their surpluses and ensure a fair return
for the risks they take with their innovations and for their investments
in family labour and purchased inputs.
Discrimination against Vietnamese rice in the international export
market appears to result from a lack of a widespread use in Viet Nam
GENERATING SHORT-TERM ECONOMIC SURPLUS 113
of modern postharvest quality-control technologies, such as dryers,
sorters, and high-tech storage facilities. The Mission learned that some
Vietnamese rice (as well as coffee) was being purchased by off-shore
middlepeople at lower than the prevailing international prices; the pur-
chased rice was then sent to Singapore (and perhaps to Hong Kong) to
be sorted, dried, regraded, and resold in the international market at full
value, with the difference pocketed by these enterprising middlepeople.
In response to a query as to why this was not being done by Vietnam-
ese exporters, the answers were fuzzy, but central to them was the mo-
nopoly role of the two large rice-exporting SOEs, VINAFOOD 1 and
2, which dominate the rice-export sector. Other factors were the use of
export quotas that channel export opportunities to a select few dealers,
a lack of ready investment capital to facilitate investment in rice-
processing equipment and improve quality for both the export and do-
mestic markets, a fear of obligations under the rice-export tax, and the
general difficulty of mobilizing private-entrepreneurial activities to com-
pete in a business that is now a state-dominated activity. One informant
said that "government will not allow private or joint investment in this
kind of activity, it would compete with the SOEs."
These responses suggest the need for a comprehensive S&T policy that
is detailed, that is supported by the nation's political power structure,
and that clearly defines the role of the financial and market sectors in
supporting adoption and spread of new technological innovations. In
this example, investment in postharvest technologies would raise the
quality of Vietnamese rice exports, which would in turn command a
higher price. Making such opportunities for such investment available
to the private sector would introduce competition in marketing from
farm to consumer, releasing a dynamic that would foster more innova-
tion and technological change at all levels of the rice economy.
The rice anecdote is not an isolated case. The same stories of poor qual-
ity control over exports and the consequent loss of foreign-exchange
earnings were cited for coffee and rubber, and this may apply as well
to other primary-product exports.
At Mekong Delta universities and research institutions, people felt a
sense of isolation from the main stream of the scholarly work in their
disciplines. They explicitly hoped for the early introduction of ITs to
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break this isolation by opening easy access to information sources and
interactive exchanges with professional colleagues within and beyond
Viet Nam. The research workers and institute administrators found the
fax machine an important part of their information access.4 Already,
some of the Mekong Delta scientists are talking about extending ITs,
such as the Internet or local Intranets, to farm and rural communities
(based on the local schools or community centres) to transmit the latest
findings of their research and experimental work to their rural clients.
The promise
This section focuses on the intersection of S&T and economic development. If
Vietnamese S&T policy has a legitimate claim on the resources of the nation, it
must focus on operational goals to ensure that S&T is applied to further economic
and social growth. A central concern of the people who formulate S&T policy
must be to diagnose and integrate aspects of general and specific economic de-
velopment to establish and foster the conditions conducive to technological
innovation. These are prerequisites for the transformation of the national economy.
In what follows, we touch on many of the elements needed to mesh a robust S&T
policy for innovation with aspects of economic policy designed to promote growth
and development.
The current S&T policy for Viet Nam has been criticized for being
oriented to urban growth and capital-intensive industry and thus ill-suited to the
economic structure of an agrarian, small-business society. This is not to question
the wisdom of a longer-term urban-industrial orientation. The issue is one of
timing, phasing, and building from strengths.
There is little justification for society as a whole to bear the imme-
diate risks of this segment of the economy, given the nature of primary-product
production and marketing, the economic services required by primary-product
producers, the weather and other risks borne by people engaged in primary-
product enterprises, and the volatile characteristics of primary-product pricing and
markets. The present emphasis on primary-product service SOEs should be
reconsidered in this light. A case in point is the acquisition and handling of fertili-
zer by the Viet Nam General Corporation for Agricultural Materials (VIGECAM)
and other parastatals (notably provincial administrators). After the collapse of
4 E-mail was anticipated by many, and it was believed that it would open significant avenues
for keeping in touch with colleagues throughout the country. The Internet is a much awaited
addition to help contact international research and academic centres and break the barrier of relative
silence felt by many of these dedicated researchers as they work at small stations located at
considerable geographic distances from the more dynamic national centres of science and research.
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arrangements with COMECON, in the early 1990s, VIGECAM and the provincial
authorities imported fertilizers almost unchecked, certainly uncoordinated, and by
1993, the country had a large oversupply. As a result, in 1994, VIGECAM re-
ceived the authority to import 60% of total estimated fertilizer needs. This has
lessened some of the problems of oversupply, but the internal distribution to meet
the timing demands of local crop cycles still has many problems.
Fertilizer shortages in some regions at particularly critical times in the
planting and manuring cycles for various crops is an oft-cited farm-supply com-
plaint. Because Viet Nam's agriculture is very diverse, regional crop cycles create
differing peaks and troughs in farm-level fertilizer demand. Rainfall and flooding
uncertainties add additional difficulties for anyone attempting to make smooth
predictions of farmer off-take. Thus, the central supply agency and the parastatals
face problems with local shortages in one region being out of phase with an over-
supply in another part of the country. Viet Nam bears the costs of wastage in
storage and in extra transportation levies to move supplies among regions, the
losses in lowered crop output resulting from underfertilization, and the frustration
of farmers with their difficulty operating a nationwide supply system. Indeed, as
long as fertilizer (along with other farm-supply products) is handled by a single
major SOE controlling a centralized procurement and distribution network for the
entire nation, the people of Viet Nam will be bearing unnecessary risks and incur-
ring unnecessary costs of state-sponsored inefficiency.
In other countries, these risks and costs fall on a group of private importers
and distributors, who deal in relatively small lots of fertilizers and are in close
touch with the local needs, local microclimatic variations, and the immediate
demands of the relatively small, geographically scattered, rural-farm communi-
ties they serve. The flexibility of a private agribusiness-service sector is the key
to meeting and controlling the social costs of the decentralized and inherently
risky economic conditions of producing primary products. Transferring these risks
to local markets and local businesspeople means transferring the costs from
society to competing individual entrepreneurs. A strategy of building a strong,
private agribusiness sector in the rural areas would transfer these manifold risks
of primary-product industries to individual businesspeople and provide rural
producers with a competitive array of services tailored to their local circumstances
and needs.
Average rice yields in Viet Nam are already greater those of many Asian
countries. But yields per hectare per crop in the best-endowed areas of Viet Nam
are lower than those in similar rice-farming areas in the more advanced Southeast
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Asian nations. The fault is not with the farmers or the research stations. The fault
is with the inadequate support systems available to the farmers. We characterize
these systems as follows:
An underpaid and undertrained extension service, often isolated from
the mainstream of agricultural research (difficulty attracting agricultural
graduates to the rural areas has weakened the provincial extension serv-
ices and was often cited as a significant impediment to the on-the-
ground effectiveness of extension workers, who are the principal means
of transferring new farming technologies to cultivators);
Poor communication and incomplete demonstrations of the latest farm
production and cultivation technologies;
Premodern methods of caring for livestock;
Inadequate postharvest facilities;
Primitive, often exploitative, marketing systems; and
Weak communication of market information, prices, and harvest expec-
tations, notwithstanding the effectiveness of rural radio as a notable
exception.
Television programs directed at farmers are now being tried and appear to be very
effective, as well as being appreciated by the rural audience. Videotapes that
extension workers can leave in the villages for people to further study also appear
to be effective ways to demonstrate new production technologies. It seems likely
that as mass-communication techniques improve and as the universities and
extension services gain more experience with them, many of the present deficien-
cies in communicating new technologies to the rural peoples will be overcome.
Weaknesses of particular note can also be found in the timely availa-
bility of crop-production inputs and the storage and processing plants that should
make up the infrastructure of a modern agricultural economy. Although these
inadequacies cannot be rectified easily or quickly throughout the whole country,
Mission members believe an aggressive early program of modernization, focused
on regions with high production potential, can generate large dividends through
the rapid expansion of farm output for domestic and export markets. With suitable
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policies and implementation tactics, foreign-market studies supported by ag-
gressive marketing of a Vietnamese agribusiness community could make the agri-
cultural sector the early engine of remarkable growth. Rural investment would
increase greatly and create thousands of new jobs, with relatively low investment
per worker. This would also be a vibrant source of the foreign exchange and
domestic savings needed to establish the industrial base for subsequent phases of
the S&T strategy.
Viet Nam has more productive natural resources in agriculture and coastal
fisheries than its neighbours. These should be exploited in the first stage of the
nation's growth strategy. The tactics for implementing such a strategy should
become central to a phased S&T policy. Critical to the implementation tactics of
the early phase of this strategy would be the role of the government in ensuring
fair agricultural markets and providing a safety net for the risks of weather and
price fluctuations that must be borne by the farmers.
Government programs are needed to encourage the private sector to expand
the agribusiness sector to provide farm-product processing, supply farm inputs and
input-use advice, and generate new employment opportunities in rural communi-
ties, agricultural-service centres, and villages. A strong agribusiness sector would
ensure the sustainability of a powerful dynamic in rural areas.
The Mission did not visit the uplands or more remote areas of the country-
side. People who knew more than the Mission members about Viet Nam, ex-
pressed caution over the inadequacy of the rural infrastructure in many parts of
the nation, to support a dynamic rural service sector and agribusiness complex,
especially the inadequacy of market facilities, roads, transportation, communica-
tions, and available electric power. To rectify these difficulties will take time, but
a vibrant rural sector in the early stages of growth offers the promise of an
expanded tax base, which can finance social investments in rural infrastructure.
For this reason, the Mission suggests initiating the proposed strategy in
areas of high production potential, with embryonic off-farm appurtenances of a
modem agricultural and rural economy. As the development strategy unfolds, tax
receipts from the new prosperity will enable the various levels of government to
launch and sustain these activities. And in line with current practice, the govern-
ment should continue its supervision to ensure fair markets, encourage farmers to
cooperate in handling and selling their crops and livestock, and enforce weights
and standard measures for farm products and purchased inputs.
If the government takes these actions and follows up with a determination
to make them effective, it will establish the enabling conditions to garner the
domestic and foreign investment needed for Viet Nam's agricultural transforma-
tion. Investment in the much larger agricultural-infrastructure projects in irrigation
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and drainage and in building a fertilizer and agrochemical and -machinery industry
could follow in the later phases of an overall industrialization program.
This chapter has given little attention to the agricultural economy's in-
creasing need for plant nutrients. A 1996 report of the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) "Fertiliser Donation and Distribution:
Viet Nam, Project Findings and Recommendations," reviewed the results of
fertilizer-demonstration trials in five rice-growing areas of the country, covering
a total of 769 ha. These trials indicated that farm applications of fertilizer were
considerably below economic optimum. Regression analysis of the FAO results,
adjusted for regional differences, indicates that additional fertilizer, especially
added nitrogen, increased paddy yields by more than 0.41 Mt/ha for each 10 kg/ha
of additional N and P2O5 over present farm-level applications. Overall, fertilization
rates in Viet Nam are below those of the other Southeast Asian countries. It is
highly probably that as new rice varieties are developed and as the rural-
agroindustrial infrastructure expands to better serve the farm economy, demand for
fertilizer will grow rapidly. Newly discovered gas fields off the coast of Viet Nam
promise a domestic feedstock supply for the manufacture of nitrogen fertilizers,
such as urea. The decision to manufacture will depend on the relative economics
of the classical make-or-buy choice of any manufacturing enterprise. But whether
from domestic sources or imports, farmer adoption of new rice varieties now being
developed within Viet Nam will increase the demand for local supplies of
fertilizer. This demand will only add to the already substantial growth in fertilizer
use resulting from current trend toward commercialization in the agricultural
economy and its greater orientation to the production of marketable surpluses and
cash crops.
The doubts
In discussing the impediments to energizing the agricultural sector, the mission
encountered many people with doubts. The agricultural scientists and researchers
had little doubt that it could be done but doubted the sustained resolve of the gov-
ernment to mobilize and sustain such a strategy. Each had his or her own vision
of what could be done, and each had priorities that closely paralleled the obser-
vations of the others. Mission members found the observations penetrating, often
insightful. Indeed, we observed and were greatly impressed by an agricultural-
research establishment that had accomplished multitudinous tasks on minuscule
budgets. We found this all the more impressive because of the extra-heavy burden
of rigid and bureaucratic administrative processes unsuited to providing flexibility
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in the management of research. It is not surprising, therefore, that their doubts
reflected a wariness about the lasting quality of a program requiring the continued
attention and steadfast resolve of government.
Other doubts were focused on the international market for Vietnamese
agricultural products. The contention was that this market is fraught with quality
and price barriers that Viet Nam cannot hurdle. In fact, no one has really ever
assessed or tapped the market for high-value Vietnamese products, such as fruits,
vegetables, fish and livestock. To successfully enter this market, the national
development strategy must be built on a postharvest food-processing infrastructure
to prepare, package, and handle perishable products to make them a valued item
in regional or global markets. To pursue sales in these markets, it may be useful
to seek the help of large multinational food and agricultural-product export firms
to assist or, better still, to invest in developing an international market for Viet-
namese high-value food products.
The marketing problem is, in fact, not unduly complicated. The develop-
ment of a food-industry infrastructure involves a fairly straightforward application
of well-known technologies and business principles. With the right investment
incentives and government policies that foster and encourage private investors to
build storage facilities, refrigerated depots, meat-packing plants, food processing
factories, and transport capacity, the international market can be opened to Viet
Nam's exports. Viet Nam's Southeast Asian neighbours did just that. Their experi-
ence provides a valuable lesson in how to walk the road to success in international
agricultural marketing.
Most of the doubters were people who implicitly despaired of improving
Vietnamese agriculture because of its small farm sizes and its current backward-
ness. The Mission did not seriously entertain these objections, as development
models based on primary products were successfully launched under virtually
identical conditions in the neighbouring countries of Southeast Asia — a region
with very small, intensively cultivated farms.
Agriculture and the environment
The research scientists raised a caution centred on the impact of high-intensity
fanning on the natural environment. For example, difficulties are almost certain
to arise in controlling pests and diseases, and these need to be taken very seri-
ously. The solution to this difficulty, however, rests on the talents of the same
scientists who raised the concern. When challenged, these scientists offered many
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solutions to this problem, all resting on innovative research, the spread of new
plant varieties, and improved methods of integrated pest management.
Mission members familiar with agriculture added the maintenance of soil
fertility as an environmental caution, although this not raised specifically by the
Mekong Delta farm scientists. High-yield, high-intensity farming can deplete soil
nutrients, especially trace elements vital to sustaining crop yields, and in the
upland areas it will be necessary to constantly monitor the condition of the soils.
Such monitoring can have its beneficial side: the baseline analysis of the soils
often reveals previously undetected but correctable nutrient and soil-structure
problems that limit the initial productivity of land.
Of more general concern to scientists and researchers in the Mekong Delta
(and a valid concern in other agroecological areas as well) is one the Mission
takes very seriously. It is the impact of high-input, intensive farming on the
environmental balances of the Mekong Delta's complex hydrological ecosystem.
This matter will require careful long-term research, but it should not be forgotten
that development and population pressures in the region are already causing alarm,
as they are an immediate threat to the unique ecology of the Mekong Delta. A few
signs show this threat abating under current trends and conditions. In fact, it
would be a gratifying result if a new agricultural-development strategy is launched
in the Mekong Delta with built-in environmental safeguards and amelioration,
included in its design and implementation.
The agricultural-research milieu
Visits to agricultural universities and research institutes revealed a dynamic, strong
research establishment, supporting the acquisition, adaptation, assimilation, and
development of modern technologies suited to Viet Nam's agricultural economy
and production environment. Two examples are worth specific mention:
The Cuu Long Delta Rice Research Institute (CLDRRI) is working to
adapt a new variety of rice that offers significant yield increases for
Mekong Delta and other rice farmers. The base genetic material was
supplied from the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the
Philippines. Tests and adaptation trials are now under way at the
CLDRRI. The new variety is of long duration, to bring it through the
rainy season, with harvest occurring after the rains. This is an important
attribute if yields per hectare are to be as high as predicted. Harvesting
after the rains in the dry season reduces the need for artificial drying
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and a concomitant investment in dryers.5 The long-duration growing
season intercepts more light for carbon fixation from photosynthesis, a
major element in higher yields. The long season will also open greater
opportunities for integrated pest management, thereby reducing reliance
on pesticide chemicals. The new genetic materials give the plant an
upright stature, with stiff straw that can support a long and heavy pani-
cle. It tillers well and, with proper fertilization (it does require heavy
applications of nitrogen) it permits high plant-population densities,
another lift to yields. Presently, these new varieties yield 14—15 t/ha of
paddy per crop.
The CLRRI will cross this exotic varietal material with locally adapted
varieties to preserve pest and disease resistance of the Mekong Delta
environment and, after testing and demonstration, will release the newly
adapted varieties to local cultivators. Discounting experimental yields
and assuming that the yield potential of the basic genetic stock is pre-
served, perhaps even enhanced, the release of varieties incorporating
these new genes may increase the average production of a typical
Mekong Delta rice farm by one-third to more than one half.
The CLRRI has strong ties with the IRRI. It participates in the in-
ternational rice biotechnology network, sponsored by the Rockefeller
Foundation, and has close contacts with other rice-research centres in
India, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere abroad. These contacts bring a
flow of information that keeps the CLRRI research staff members
abreast of new developments in their disciplines, and enables them to
provide up-to-date information to farmers.
The Long Dinh Fruit Research Centre (LDFRC) is selecting supe-
rior clones for many different fruit products produced hi Viet Nam.
LDFRC researchers are certain that Viet Nam has an enormous unfilled
domestic and export demand for all of these many fruit varieties
5 Noteworthy is the need for a small, easily transportable village-level rice dryer. Evidently,
such a machine has been designed and manufactured by Sameco of the HCMC Department of
Industry. However, it is not easily available in the local market. In fact, there is some question
whether, even if available, it would be an attractive investment for most farm villages. Because it
costs a reported 17 million dong (VND) for a capacity of 2 t per 8-hour shift (about enough for
two-thirds of a hectare at average yields), the feeling was expressed that the Sameco machine is
hardly an efficient substitute for a larger dryer plant that can serve many farms or a village (in
1988, 12 987 VND = 1 United States Dollar [USD]).
122 VIET NAM AT THE CROSSROADS
providing they meet the quality requirements of these markets. The
LDFRC's international ties with Australia, India, Indonesia, Israel,
Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand, and the United States, to name but a few
of its collaborators, keep the centre well abreast of what is happening
outside Viet Nam. Efforts to free the nation's citrus farmers from the
devastation of the green disease, which destroys the tree stock of the
citrus orchards, are among the LDFRC's most important applied-
research activities.
The staff members at both the CLRRI and LDFRC will become eager users
of a newly introduced system of e-mail when the global Internet is more widely
available in Viet Nam, and they are looking forward to using it to extend their
interaction with other research organizations throughout the world.
The Mission was most impressed during its visits to the CLRRI and
LDFRC with the strength of the orientation and dedication of the staff members
to their scientific and academic responsibilities. More impressive, however, was
the research scientists' dominating concern to develop and transmit new, adapted,
and tested productive plant materials, cultural practices, and knowledge to their
farmer clients, enabling them to enhance farm incomes and agricultural output.
The CLRRI and LDFRC were, however, not alone in their concern to serve their
clients. Virtually all the institutions engaged in furthering the course of national
economic development had a strong sense of serving the nation through the ap-
plication of new technologies. This topic dominated discussions at the food-
technology and agricultural-research institutions and at the agricultural universities
working on research, teaching, and rural extension. It was the central topic at pro-
vincial departments of S&T, at environmental project centres, and at the planning
departments and chambers of commerce in major cities.
Virtually without exception, however, our discussions with personnel at
these centres and departments revealed a high level of frustration with how slow,
confusing, and contradictory were the government policies they were expected to
administer. In the end, they expressed widespread frustration over difficulties in-
fluencing and making more realistic the policies they were supposed to work with
and implement. As one person put it,
We work with the best we can and develop new opportunities for the
people we are supposed to serve but we have no voice in the policies of
the Government. At our level these policies seem too often to ignore what
our clients want and need and which can only be provided if the
Government permits or directs. We know the problems of the people, but
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we have no role in making or implementing — or should I say, the non-
implementing of — policy.
Others added that the opportunities to liberate the productive energies of the
people were all around them, but, as another person put it, the liberation "seems
to be stymied by but a conscious failure of government to act or even permit
others to act." Even the most dedicated public servants privately complained that
policy duplication, policy conflict, policy ambiguity, policy uncertainty, even
policy vacuums, conspired in one form or another to restrict and constrain their
ability to fulfil their responsibilities and obligations as public employees. In the
summation of one senior official, "the main issue facing the economic develop-
ment of Viet Nam can be summed up in three words: Policy, policy, policy!"
The need for large investments in postharvest technologies is a particular
case in point. This need is evident to the researchers in all the institutions dealing
with farm crops. The necessary technologies are known. They can be imported or
obtained in Viet Nam. In fact, Vietnamese firms have designed and produced
some machines needed to protect farm harvests. But people who have tried to take
advantage of the commercial opportunities offered by investments in postharvest
activities expressed frustration with a policy framework they claim provides more
disincentives than incentives for firms to commercialize technologies and their
downstream applications.
A scientific constant the world over is that the public-sector researchers,
university professors, and extension workers of a nation are not content with their
pay scales. This discontent was forcefully expressed at our meetings. It was
claimed that public-payroll researchers in food and agriculture receive salaries
one-half or less than those paid in the private sector. The discrepancy causes low
morale, a continuous search for better career prospects, and in too many cases the
researchers' taking second or third jobs or consultancies to augment personal
income. Frequently, these extracurricular jobs supersede, in time and attention, the
original public-service contract. More crucially, low wages discourage the truly
talented researchers' entering the public service, which consequently reduces the
excellence available to serve the needs of the nation. Indeed, the wonder is that
taking into account their salaries and the conditions under which many of them
live and work, these researchers and teachers are as dedicated and involved in the
work they do as they are, as well as in the service they give to their clients. These
problems must be expected to increase as Viet Nam's economic transformation
proceeds. This matter should be addressed in the forthcoming national S&T
strategy.
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Mission members with experience in other research and university
institutions abroad were deeply impressed with the very high level of technical
competence and professional skills of the people the Mission encountered, despite
the pay and conditions. Because the tune the Mission spent at the research
institutes and universities was so brief, many of the members were strongly
tempted to prolong their stay at most of the places visited, to profit further from
discussions with the talented people who extended their hospitality and gave so
generously of their time and wisdom to the outside intruders.
The issue of fair compensation for the scientists and other research workers
should become a high priority for an appropriate pay-review body. Perhaps the
government should consider establishing a formal Viet Nam Agricultural Service
cadre for people who qualify as highly skilled and trained professionals, with
appropriate emoluments and in-place promotions and salary increases, reviewed
for each member of the service every few years. As an added bonus, the prospect
of joining an elite service on graduation might reverse the disturbing decline of
the past few years in student enrolments in the agricultural faculties of the nation's
universities.
Inadequate research budgets are also a worldwide complaint of most
research institutions. Again, at least in the case of agricultural research in Viet
Nam, the research workers seem to have a valid complaint. External ODA to the
universities and research institutions provides an important budgetary lift that
appears to be well and properly used. However, as a leading researcher put it,
They [people at his government ministry] have given us more autonomy
in how we formulate and carry out our research and have told us to
contract with the private sector for research projects. But we serve
farmers. Who among them will contract for our research? We have more
autonomy but no more money. I would like to have my research group
made even partially accountable for what we do to raise the incomes and
productivity of our farm clients and, then, have our budget tied to that
accountability. Let them [people at the ministry] give us support for what
we do for the nation. Let them put support for each of the research
institutes on that basis and we will, together, show them what we can do
for the country."
How central-government research budgets are prepared and how the project
allocations are made were unsolved mysteries for the institute directors and re-
searchers with whom we met. They prepared and submitted research project pro-
posals to higher authority for approval, but they compared the processes and
criteria used in decision-making more to a lottery draw than a system of rational
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review and priority assessment. They were of the view that the research priorities
they indicated had little influence on the outcome. They told us that as a result,
research enthusiasm flags, morale and confidence in the central administration fall,
and in the extreme cases institute directors surreptitiously divert funds to the
research regarded as a priority. Unfortunately, this erodes respect for the budgetary
process and for the implementation of the unknown (or unappreciated) S&T
policies that are supposed to underlay the budget allocation process. A participa-
tory, consultative process in budget allocations would go a long way to dispelling
ignorance while building confidence among people in the research community
with those who administer public funds.
Partly as a result of the assistance of external donors and partly as a result
of the efforts of the government to support the physical facilities of its S&T
institutions, research-staff members at the places the Mission visited expressed
satisfaction with the general adequacy of their facilities. As might be expected,
however, they called for additional or upgraded scientific equipment — a common
plea of scientists across the globe.
Some concern was expressed at both the university and research-centre
levels about the difficulties communicating with other institutions within the
country. It was hoped that the new e-mail system would solve some of the
difficulties. One suggestion was to establish one or more internal (that is, within
Viet Nam) Intranets to link centres of similar interests via common communica-
tions protocols to permit these centres to share a full array of documents too bulky
for e-mail. Researchers obviously regarded the relative difficulty communicating
with their peers at similar institutions in the country as a bottleneck to improving
research efficiency and better integrating national research activities. Also men-
tioned with some frequency among the communications gaps was the need for
easier access to official government data sets, especially those containing econom-
ic data. The case in point was the tracking and analysis of the nation's sugar
policies and a review of that policy with economists and other scientists at other
Vietnamese institutions. Data on stocks, import contracts, production, and acreage
were believed to be collected by and available from the central and provincial
governments. Access to these data was requested for independent economic
analysis. Because sugar prices in Viet Nam are volatile and because sugar farmers
are vulnerable to price swings, an early analysis of crop prospects and national
stocks would be valuable information to guide cultivators in planning their year's
planting and for sugar factories in assessing the likely cane and product prices
they would face in their refining operations. The essence of this plea was to open
more of the nation's economy to independent, academic analysis, as part of the
process of generating a more widespread policy dialogue. A national Intranet for
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economic and policy research centres would be an obvious answer to this need for
easier access to official government data sets.
In summary
The Mission is convinced that Viet Nam's new S&T strategy requires a phased
or sequenced approach which, in its initial stages, assigns both high priority and
major resources to modernizing the primary-product sectors, especially agriculture,
forestry, and fisheries.
The development of a primary-product strategy should be geared to pro-
viding Vietnamese agricultural, fisheries, forestry, and livestock products to
regional and global export markets. The concomitant S&T strategy for the social
and economic development of the nation's natural-resource base should be centred
on two major goals. First, it should seek to liberalize and apply the productive
energies, enterprise and skills of Viet Nam's primary-product producers and rural
private businesspeople and investors to meet the needs of a modem primary-
product economy. Second, the S&T strategy should strive to establish conditions
conducive to foreign investment to complement domestic efforts to create a truly
advanced agribusiness infrastructure to serve primary-product producers.
The proposed two-pronged strategy would use the excellent array of
technologies already developed by the nation's agricultural, crop, livestock, and
fishery research institutes and universities. Because of the disaggregated and
disbursed nature of primary-product production, the strategy must also enlist the
active participation of the domestic private sector as a source of business invest-
ment. Private initiative can provide the entrepreneurial talent and investment funds
needed to build a modern agribusiness complex to serve producers and to create
and operate the postharvest processing systems required to meet international-
market standards for food and cash-crop commodities.
The technical foundation to expand the output of Viet Nam's farms to meet
the needs of new markets is available and considered more than adequate. The
weakness of the economy to accommodate such an S&T economic-development
strategy lies in the relatively underdeveloped infrastructure of its food-processing
and farm-supply sectors. Investment in storage, meat-packing plants, fruit-
preservation systems, etc., must be the main focus of a program to build modern
agribusiness complexes in those areas with the resource base to increase the
production of high-quality outputs. These outputs, when properly processed, must
be able to meet the quality demands of the international market.
The implementation of the proposed strategy for primary-product devel-
opment rests on the already proven capacity of farmers to innovate by rapidly
using new production techniques. Because the technologies needed to initiate a
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transformation of Viet Nam's rural economy are known or are readily available
in the country, what the country most needs to do now is to build an incentive
structure to launch and support these technologies' application and use. This is a
core issue for national policy. Indeed, the national policy's full implementation
will bear with heaviest weight on the resolve and will of the government. Strong
concerted action must be taken on all government fronts to initiate a set of
comprehensive incentive policies to foster and encourage the transformation of the
primary-product sectors from their traditional role of supplying mainly the
domestic market alone to that of also supplying the demands of regional and
global buyers.
Indeed, the lessons from successful transformations of other Asian nations
strongly suggest that the conjunction of an applied S&T strategy with an economic-
-development strategy for the primary-product sector can vitalize the rural
economy and society. Its implementation can modernize rural areas, provide many
new rural employment opportunities in relatively low capital-intensive jobs, and
earn the foreign exchange needed for a broader program of industrialization.
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Chapter 13
THE EMERGING HIGH-TECH ZONES IN VIET NAM
The actual locations for research, experimental development, and related services
is seen as a key factor in a more effective economic exploitation of new technolo-
gy. Science-based technology needs a critical mass of specialists and an environ-
ment in which communication among these specialists is made easy and effortless.
During our interviews, we were repeatedly told that Viet Nam should make
optimal use of its academic and other highly qualified specialists and let them
become increasingly involved in product development, engineering design, testing,
and standardization, etc. Moreover, we encountered a growing concern among
senior Vietnamese decision-makers that the country's S&T infrastructure needs to
be radically improved. In the past few years, a set of actions have been taken to
make contacts among scientists easier and increase the mobility and improve work
conditions for technical and other specialists. However, much remains to be done.
The most spectacular among the government's intended efforts to improve
S&T infrastructure — and to help shape innovative capabilities for industrial and
other purposes — are two high-tech parks. During the past 4 years, detailed plans
have been made in both Hanoi and HCMC to relocate the R&D laboratories and
facilities of the two campuses of the national university to the vicinity of two
high-tech zones. The purpose is to stimulate closer interaction between academic
staff and other specialists among Vietnamese and foreign firms and institutions.
It is assumed that the spiral pattern of innovation, involving university—industry-
government experts in a high-tech park, will capture the evolution of multiple
linkages at different stages of the expected commercialization of S&T and related
know-how.
Two key questions raised in our many conversations on the intended high-
tech efforts are the following: Could these high-tech zones — with the active
participation of foreign direct investors — be effective in creating and shaping
much-needed innovative capabilities in Viet Nam? Will the parks become nodes
in international networks of S&T and industrial experts interested in transferring
and adapting significant technological capabilities to Viet Nam? The two questions
are of genuine concern in today's Viet Nam, as an effective high-tech park will
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require substantial investments and involve considerable risk-taking for the park
developers.
The two parks are to differ from the export-processing zones (EPZ) and
other designated industrial areas in the two metropolitan areas. The parks' tenants
will benefit from a more advanced infrastructure (including power supply and tele-
communications), specialized-training and other educational institutions, a technol-
ogy incubator, and business-development centres, which could tailor services to
high-tech companies. Still, the park tenants will have special privileges, compared
to those at the EPZs.
The high-tech industrial park of HCMC is to be placed in an attractive
environment in the Thu Due area, where the new campus for the southern branch
of the National University is currently being built. The project was launched sev-
eral years ago by the city administration (the People's Committee) and is now part
of the national high-tech-park program. A corporation to develop and manage the
park has been established, and the recruitment of anchor tenants to invest in the
park is on its way. In this process, foreign institutions and firms have provided
inputs to the design of the park (a prefeasibility study) and to its implementation
strategy. However, in 1997, the central government in Hanoi imposed a set of
controls on the park's development, which may impel the Department of Science,
Technology and Environment to reconsider its current plans for the park's
development.
The high-tech park in the Hanoi area, if implemented, will be placed in the
Dong Mo-Ngai Son area about 30 km from the centre of the city, where the new
campus of the northern branch of Viet Nam National University is to be located
— next to a national cultural centre and an attractive industrial zone. The park
plans were recently examined in a joint study conducted by the Japan International
Cooperation Agency (Japan) and an expert team from MOSTE. The first phase of
Hanoi's high-tech development may take place in the western part of the city it-
self, along a "high-tech corridor," where more than 70 of the country's R&D insti-
tutions and some foreign-owned high-tech service facilities are already located.
The Ngia Do-Tu Liem area may emerge as the Science City of Hanoi. As in the
case of the high-tech Park in Dong Mo-Ngai Son, the Prime Minister has ordered
further studies, before a final decision can be made to go ahead. Together with
interested partners, the Department of Science, Technology and Environment,
Hanoi, has developed detailed plans for a "pre-engineering zone" to be located in
the Nam Thang Long area, not far from the Science City and the capital's interna-
tional airport.
In the long term, all four high-tech zones may be developed, but the
sequencing of the investments could become a matter of controversy. At present,
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the two major high-tech parks in Hanoi and HCMC remain the centrepieces in
government thinking. Although the feasibility studies for the two high-tech parks
in Hanoi and in HCMC are not fully complete, the highest level of government
appears to be generally committed to implementing both projects. Both projects
appear to be integral to the government's plans for industry and modernization.
However, the necessary investments have yet to be allocated for the basic
infrastructure for both high-tech parks. The government hopes to receive the bulk
of this funding from MNCs and from governments of other countries. Except for
contributing to the feasibility studies, the central government has made direct
capital investment only in the road to Dong Mo-Ngai Son. The government con-
tinues to search for overseas partnerships to make the parks internationally attrac-
tive sites for high-tech investments. Several governments have shown an interest
but have made no legally binding commitment. Despite the apparent lack of fi-
nancial resources earmarked by the central government of Viet Nam to high-tech
projects, the Commission of the European Union (EU) and several EU member
governments have signaled an interest in supporting Viet Nam's policies for indus-
try and modernization.
To pave the way for more European firms and institutions to invest in Viet
Nam and to expand the base for economic cooperation between Western Europe
and Viet Nam, the European Commission has consulted with MOSTE and the
Ministry of Planning and Investment about a high-tech-support program. The very
first part of this program is already being implemented: transferring experiences
of successful European science parks, research parks, high-tech industrial parks,
etc., to Viet Nam.
Vietnamese high-tech experts have, on a bilateral basis, shared experiences
with representatives of several European high-tech parks, such as Sophia-Antipolis
(France), Ideon (Sweden), and Symbion (Denmark), particularly on how to make
a high-tech park economically feasible and commercially successful. Various EU
nations, such as the United Kingdom (through the British Council) and Sweden,
have made experts available through university—industry collaboration schemes,
also on a bilateral basis. A similar bilateral collaboration is under way between
Japan and Viet Nam, endorsed by both governments. Both government and indus-
try are supporting the conceptual design for the Hanoi high-tech park in Dong
Mo-Ngai Son. On behalf of the Japanese government, experts from JICA have
participated in a feasibility study for high-tech investments in the Dong Mo-Ngai
Son area. One of the central questions is how make a high-tech park in Viet Nam
economically effective.
The high-tech parks in the Asia—Pacific region, more so than those in the
highly industrialized countries of the West, emphasize high-tech manufacturing
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over R&D. In Southeast Asia, this reflects the current resource profile of NICs
with relatively limited R&D activities. Compared with other developing regions,
the links between technology, industry, and commerce seem to be more direct in
Southeast Asia.
Early in their development, most high-tech parks in Southeast Asia con-
verged with FDI, with subsequent shifts toward local industry. The main excep-
tions to this step-wise development, from global to local, are found in parts of
China, where some high-tech parks or research parks began with an emphasis
mainly on local R&D institutions and firms.
It is clear from our interviews that Vietnamese high-tech-park experts
consider each high-tech park a unique combination of resources, whether it is
called a science park, research park, or technopole. Each and every park is
moulded by different socioeconomic and political circumstances, driven by firms
and institutions with different perceptions of high-tech networking and an ever-
changing mix of available local resources. The impression given is that the two
high-tech parks should serve as models for the country's industrial achievement,
with rapid industrial growth, environmentally clean production facilities, foreign-
induced technological change, plus other innovations, and exceptional international
connections.
Ideally, a high-tech park in Viet Nam will offer plenty of unexplored
commercial opportunities for its foreign direct investors and provide new
challenges to the domestic firms and institutions interested in linking up with
high-tech firms from overseas. If properly handled, these new links will make the
transfer of high technology and related know-how to Viet Nam faster, economical-
ly much more effective, and possibly also more appropriate to the country's
socioeconomic development. For the Vietnamese park developers we have inter-
viewed, no high-tech park in the world could easily serve as blueprint model for
a new park in Southeast Asia. It is widely recognized that a park in Viet Nam
must follow its own course for investments to fit its particular objectives, its
socioeconomic environment, and creative atmosphere.
To establish a high-tech park anywhere amounts to undertaking a
megaproject. To do so in Viet Nam today will likely require substantial invest-
ments from the government (or high opportunity costs if funded by others), and
the risks are extremely high. To succeed, the orchestration of investments —
particularly those for infrastructure — must be accomplished at an early stage.
Park developers usually only get one chance; if mistakes are made, they cannot
always be repaired. Initially, a number of anchor tenants will help set the pace and
direction for the park's development and raise the park's reputation among inter-
national industrial firms. If these early activities go wrong, the whole park may
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have an image problem that will take considerable time and effort to repair, if
repair is even possible.
What to consider while constructing the high-tech parks?
Having examined the documents from the prefeasibility studies for the high-tech
industrial park in HCMC and the more recent feasibility studies for the Hanoi
high-tech park, we would like to suggest the brief general checklist in box 13 for
the consideration by Vietnamese decision-makers.
The interviews also pointed to specific issues in the actual design of a
high-tech park, in both Hanoi and HCMC, and benefits that might be achieved in
the first 5 years of a park's operation, given a particular conceptual design. Based
on evidence from similar initiatives elsewhere, it would be important to clearly
specify at the planning stage the park's goals and objectives and its means of
achieving them, as well as specifying the constraints and difficulties with equal
clarity.
Such clarity is required if obvious and easily resolved disincentives to
high-tech development are to be removed. For example, during our visits to com-
panies and institutions, we were told that Viet Nam imposes a number of such dis-
incentives to high-tech investors for import and export of specialized technical
equipment, such as a lengthy approval process for any application and other bu-
reaucratic practices. Labour codes, systems of human-resource management, and
legal frameworks may also be among the implicit S&T policies that bear on the
success or failure of high-tech parks. For example, based on the interviews we
held, special attention should be given to the legislation applicable to Vietnamese
scientists and engineers establishing new high-tech firms and institutions.
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Chapter 14
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND SUMMARY
During our Mission, we observed many strengths in Viet Nam's S&T, and these
provide an important base to build on, most particularly,
A strong political commitment to the integration of S&T instruments
into the larger socioeconomic objectives of the country and to making
S&T a driving force in Vietnamese modernization and industrialization;
An inventiveness and ingenuity that is conducive to absorption of new
technologies and, most importantly, to the management and adaptation
of those technologies to local requirements and the needs of Vietnamese
society;
An existing network of institutions engaged in S&T activities that can
be mobilized to make S&T a driving force in Vietnamese economic
development;
A clear indication of Viet Nam's intention to establish national institu-
tions (that is, the two campuses of the national university that will com-
bine excellence in research, learning, and teaching with the needs of
production and competitiveness; and
In some sectors (notably in agriculture), people have a very strong
sense of what exactly needs to be done through S&T to meet the needs
of production and competitiveness.
These are important strengths, and to these must be added the universally ac-
knowledged inventiveness of the Vietnamese people under the adverse conditions
that history inflicted on the country. Also, Viet Nam has had many accomplish-
ments in more recent years in its quest for modernization. These factors give justi-
fied reason for optimism about the future
138 VIET NAM AT THE CROSSROADS
Yet, throughout our interviews and conversations (including those with
very senior officials of the new government), it was clear that Viet Nam has now
arrived at a crossroad. The new forces of globalization and regionalization are
posing completely new challenges for all countries, whether they are developed
or developing. For Viet Nam, as for the rest of the world, the past is no longer
prologue.
The central observation of this Mission is that Viet Nam has not sufficient-
ly adjusted its systems of S&T and education to respond to its new economic and
social circumstances or to meet the competition that integration into and beyond
the East Asian trading market will bring. Viet Nam's current policies of relatively
modest, incremental adjustments will fail to serve both the modernization aspira-
tions of the Vietnamese people and the stated purposes of the government. In the
neighbouring countries of East Asia, spectacular technological advancements —
centred around ITs, biotechnology, and other high technologies — are reshaping
the material basis for agriculture, industry, and the rest of the economy. Modest
incrementalism may place Viet Nam at a serious disadvantage.
Among the issues and difficulties highlighted in this report are the
following:
Policies are inconsistent and even contradictory. Economic, financial,
legal, banking, credit, and institutional policies often work in contrary
directions and may undermine otherwise sound policies for S&T.
Decision-making processes pertaining to the entire S&T system are
slow, burdensome, and bureaucratic. If these problems are not addressed
quickly, they will seriously hamper Viet Nam's efforts to integrate itself
into AFTA and the global economy. We made a number of suggestions
to streamline the S&T systems and processes.
Viet Nam does not have well-developed systems or capabilities for
technical and economic forecasting or foresight. This places the country
in a vulnerable position in comparison both with its more experienced
neighbours (China and the Tigers) and with others in the globalized
marketplace.
Viet Nam has limited technology acquisition under existing arrange-
ments, and some local partners perceive the cost of technology acquired
through joint ventures to be high (most of which involve turnkey pro-
ducers of final products, rather than of parts or components).
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Viet Nam has a weakness in the assimilation of new technologies and
underinvestment in assimilation following the purchase of new technol-
ogies. This is not the case in other countries in the Asian region, and
this problem needs to be addressed urgently, as it places Viet Nam at
a disadvantage.
The national R&D system in Viet Nam is highly fragmented. The limit-
ed resources available are not strategically well targeted. (In Chapter 4,
we made a number of suggestions for actions to improve this situation.)
Perhaps most seriously, the international team was reminded repeatedly
of very serious underinvestment in technology management and systems
engineering. Without urgent attention to this issue, Vietnamese owner-
ship and control over its S&T will be constrained in the competitive
world it is entering.
The S&T Strategy should accord a high priority to the application of S&T
to the traditional sectors — especially to agriculture, forestry, and fisheries —
including postharvest technologies and agroindustry. These are vital investment
areas for the nation and a source of productive and sustainable livelihoods for
some 70% of the population. The energy and dynamism of these sectors — if
aided by investments, including investments in building and applying S&T — will
be essential to generating the economic surplus (domestic savings) that Viet Nam
needs to achieve its goal of modernization and industrialization by 2020. We
emphasized this point and suggested a number of S&T issues to be addressed in
this context and a number of applications of high technologies in these sectors.
The national system for the allocation of resources to higher education and
to research should be modified dramatically and given a clear strategic focus. We
made a number of somewhat specific suggestions in this regard. Our conclusion
is that the scarce resources available can yield high dividends if these suggestions
are put into place and that the new mechanisms will also attract external sources
of capital.
An urgent and ambitious effort is required to establish a broad national
capability in technology-systems management. We are not referring to capabilities
in basic or engineering science but to a national cadre adept in
Information techniques;
Management-information systems;
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Decision analysis;
Project formulation and assessment;
Project management, including scheduling and costing;
Technology sourcing and intellectual property rights;
Marketing and after-sales service;
Operation and maintenance of both large and small facilities; and
Total-quality management.
Our report placed a very strong emphasis on this. We concluded from the full
range of discussions during this Mission that without such an effort, the founda-
tion for a national S&T strategy will be vulnerable.
We also emphasized the requirement for an NSI, including linkages with
international knowledge networks. Innovations occur almost always at the firm
level, but high value and high return on investment can result from national sys-
tems that encourage and support such innovation through taxation policies,
incentives, awards, and other supports. In our report, we made some suggestions.
Linked to the above is the need to make an S&T strategy address and
provide a national enabling environment for the acquisition, absorption, and trans-
formation of technologies. We have addressed this issue and made a few sugges-
tions about factors, policies, and some experiences elsewhere that may be useful
to consider.
The four priority areas for Viet Nam's S&T strategy are ITs, biotechnolo-
gy, new materials, and automation. These are well known to be priority areas in
many other countries, as they are the enabling technologies transforming all as-
pects of production and distribution. The real issue is how to judiciously apply and
appropriately balance these technologies to gain comparative advantage. This is
exceedingly difficult, as it requires truly vast combinations of knowledge and
systems built on agility, flexibility, and entrepreneurship. If such combinations are
to be achieved, a strategy is imperative. The idea that this can be achieved by way
of a plan must be discarded: a good strategy serves as a compass, not as a road-
map. It invites and enables flexible responses and rapid adjustments to changing
conditions and opportunities, and we believe this is both what Viet Nam requires
and what it is in the process of building.
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND SUMMARY 141
Accordingly, our report emphasized the importance of a broad, enabling
framework and building instruments, policies, and arrangements to support on-
going economic and technical forecasting and foresight. We suggested establishing
a new international consultative mechanism, the Viet Nam Forum for Science,
Technology, and Modernization (see box 9). The forum we have in mind would
function under the chairpersonship of the Prime Minister or the Vice Prime Minis-
ter and would comprise international, regional, and national leaders of business,
industry, and finance (supported by people in the membership with certain com-
plementary skills). Its task would be to provide independent and ongoing counsel
to Viet Nam to move its S&T strategy and modernization forward; by its very
involvement and commitment, it should mobilize international awareness of, and
support for, Viet Nam's efforts to modernize its economy.
The members of the international team considered that we have been
greatly honoured and privileged to be invited to carry out this important assign-
ment. We are firmly convinced that Viet Nam has a major window of opportunity
but that the window will close quickly and Viet Nam needs to take urgent action.
We hope that the above indicates how seriously we approached our task and that
our report may be a helpful to Viet Nam in realizing its national objectives.
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Chapter 15
FOLLOW-UP AND FEEDBACK
The methodology for international S&T-policy reviews requires a return visit from
the team for discussions with a broad representation of the individuals consulted
during the initial visit. These discussions are sometimes referred to as the confron-
tation sessions, the idea being that the findings, conclusions, and suggestions of
the international team should be held up for rigorous review, assessment, and
feedback from the principal national stakeholders. This component of the method-
ology has been deliberately constructed to depart from the standard international
consultancy, in which the written report is usually the final product. In S&T
reviews, the report is intended to serve as a dynamic product, generating discus-
sion, ongoing debate, examination of policy alternatives, and a continuous process
of review and adjustment.
The members of the international team returned to Viet Nam in February
1998. The report had been very widely distributed and, in preparation for the re-
turn visit, NISTPASS had organized a series of discussions with stakeholders.
These had been organized in each of seven working groups, one for each of the
main themes addressed by the team. These groups reviewed the relevant sections
of the report and drew up a list of issues for further debate with the international
team. These issues were raised in the course of a full-day discussion on 12 Febru-
ary in Hanoi. More than 100 Vietnamese stakeholders participated. In addition,
discussions were held with representatives of NISTPASS and with the Minister
of Science, Technology and the Environment on 11 and 13 February.
The stakeholder meeting: feedback and commentary
In opening the conversation with stakeholders, Dr Bezanson cautioned that the
timing of the report might raise special issues. The interviews had been held,
comments received, and the report written in September and October of 1997,
predating the full realization of the financial and economic crisis in East Asia by
a few weeks. The broad geopolitical framework then shifted somewhat, together
with, for the short term at least, the financial and economic prospects of the re-
gion as a whole. At a minimum, he suggested, this would increase intraregional
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competition and destabilize some aspects of the environment for policy conver-
gence within the region (for example, AFTA). He recalled that the Minister of
Science, Technology and Environment had provided a set of basic assumptions at
the start of the mission and that these were made explicit in the report. Among the
key assumptions were that Viet Nam would become a full member of AFTA by
the year 2006 and would obtain membership in the WTO shortly thereafter. These
assumptions had guided the comments of many stakeholders during the first visit,
as well as guiding the thinking of the members of the international team. The new
context and the extent to which it influences the AFTA and WTO intentions of
Viet Nam's political leadership might have a major bearing, particularly on mat-
ters of timing and the pace at which changes are implemented.
Notwithstanding the East Asian economic crisis, which appeared with such
suddenness and ferocity, the central structural aspects of the report remain valid
in the judgement of the international team. Viet Nam's systems of S&T have not
been adjusted to accord with the goal of integration into the global marketplace
and a broad range of implicit S&T policies remain at significant variance with that
goal. Dr Bezanson outlined some of these in his introductory remarks, notably that
unlike the East Asian Tigers over most of the past two decades, Viet Nam is
running high current-account and fiscal deficits. Also, the domestic-savings rate
in Viet Nam is less than half that of the Tigers. Unless these factors are addressed
and corrected, the stated goals of rapid modernization and industrialization are
likely to prove elusive.
A central message of the report underscored during the introduction to the
stakeholder meeting was that the application of S&T in Viet Nam's traditional
sectors should be accorded the very highest priority and that the much higher rates
of domestic savings required by Viet Nam are likely to depend on this. Yet, there
has been relative neglect in this area in recent years, and it seemed to the team
that there was a risk of further relative neglect under a national policy that accords
importance to IT, biotechnology, new materials, and automation. The report also
suggested the need to focus on innovation, not just on S&T. Other main messages
and suggestions were to build the capabilities for managing technology, streamline
the policy-making process, ensure that both implicit and explicit science policies
are in harmony, and take a cautious approach to basic research.
The international team was advised during the stakeholder meeting that its
report had been very well received, met with widespread approval, and was re-
garded as provocative and candid. It was emphasized that the report had stimu-
lated extensive debate and questioning. This was especially gratifying to the
members of the international team, as a principal purpose of the review had been
to do exactly this. Given that it was widely viewed as provocative, however, what
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was surprising was that the areas of disagreement and dispute seemed to be so
very few. Some of this may have been due to the size of the forum; meeting with
smaller groups with specific interests might have revealed more extensive points
of difference in people's interpretations. However, the work that NISTPASS had
done with its seven working groups may have generated a high degree of
consensus-building.
In any case, we have little to report in the way of substantive or major
disagreement. Quite to the contrary, the commentary suggested a high degree of
consensus on all major aspects of the report, including the importance of a priority
application of S&T to traditional sectors. Almost all of the questions and com-
ments were aimed primarily at obtaining greater elucidation of key points.
One suggestion was that the report would have benefited from paying more
specific attention to factors of Vietnamese history and culture. This appeared to
the international team to be a more philosophical than practical point and to imply
issues featured in debates on the philosophy of science for many years, including
the cultural specificity of science, its social ethics, and the boundaries of the
reductionist method and positivism. These are all fascinating avenues of thought,
but clearly beyond the scope of this S&T review. In addition, given the terms of
reference and methodology of our exercise, it is doubtful that even a team with
vast knowledge of Vietnamese history and culture would have produced a very
different report.
A second general comment related to the team's interpretation of the
phrase step by step. The international team had interpreted this phrase, repeated
frequently by our Vietnamese interlocutors during the September interviews, to
mean an incremental approach. Our presumption, it was pointed out, equated
incremental with a relatively slow process of decision-making. Such slowness, we
noted in our report, would disadvantage Vietnamese interests, especially in light
of the relative weaknesses in the national S&T system, coupled with the timing
for accession to AFTA. It was pointed out that the step-by-step approach could
also mean a logical and systematic process of decision-making, without the inter-
vals between policy components necessarily being long. The international team
recognized the validity of this second interpretation of the phrase, but emphasized
that it had no doubt that the majority of Vietnamese stakeholders who used the
phrase during the interviews had done so in an manner entirely consistent with the
team's interpretation.
The procedure followed in the return visit to Vietnamese stakeholders dif-
fered from previous IDRC S&T reviews. In Viet Nam, there was only a single
meeting with stakeholders, in Hanoi. In the other reviews, there had been other
sessions in other cities, some of which had been with smaller groups with specific
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interests. The approach adopted by NISTPASS, to have a single stakeholder
conference following a process of consultation by the principal host agency, has
the clear advantages of parsimony and bringing all interest groups to the same
conversation. What this approach lacks, however, is both diversity and the
opportunity for the candor that can come with one-on-one settings and exchanges.
Comparing the Vietnamese experience with those of previous reviews, the interna-
tional team concluded that on balance the more diversified approach remains
preferable. The two approaches taken as complementary and in sequence might
represent an ideal, but such arrangements clearly involve issues of time and cost.
Additional consultations
On 13 February, following the stakeholder meeting, meetings were held with the
NISTPASS team responsible for preparing the long-term S&T strategy for Viet
Nam. These conversations confirmed widespread approval of the report. For the
most part, these meetings focused on clarification and matters of detail. We were
advised that Viet Nam's political leadership wished now to proceed expeditiously
to formulate a national S&T strategy, establish the proposed Viet Nam Forum for
Science, Technology, and Modernization, structure a new technomanagement
program, and apply S&T in traditional sectors. On these matters, the NISTPASS
team requested further information.
NISTPASS is now mandated to proceed with the detailed preparation of
the long-term S&T strategy, and the international team was asked whether we
would counsel it concerning specific methodologies.
As a part of the international review process, EDRC and the Canadian
International Development Agency (CIDA) arranged for Dr Jack Smith of the
National Research Council of Canada to spend a week in Viet Nam to teach a
course on the methodology of preparing an S&T strategy. Dr Smith described
some 52 different approaches and methods considered in preparing the Canadian
Science and Technology Strategy, published 2 years ago. This set forward a menu
requiring judicious selection, but the methods and approaches are variable and all
require adaptation to specific circumstances. In this regard, the international team
has little to add to Dr Smith's presentations and his emphasis on tailoring the
process to meet circumstances. A factor the Vietnamese team will need to careful-
ly take into account is the relative weakness in reliable statistical material. The
international team encountered this problem in its work and commented on this
in the report.
The review of existing policies, including an assessment of their effective-
ness, is an essential ingredient in the preparation of an S&T strategy. The report
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of the international team has, we hope, made a modest contribution to this
ingredient.
The innovation approach to an S&T strategy
The NISTPASS team wanted to know how, in preparing the long-term S&T
strategy for Viet Nam, it could benefit by focusing on the concept of innovation.
The international team had stressed the concept of innovation because it
enables the role of S&T to be put more clearly and centrally within economic and
social policy. Economic competitiveness is now a concern of all countries. Techni-
cal, institutional, and managerial innovation is at the heart of a country's competi-
tiveness. When innovation is made a central policy-making focus, the role of S&T
becomes much clearer. If S&T policy-making is carried out independently of
economic and social policy, it is more likely that the emphasis will be on technol-
ogy "push," without a commensurate concern with market "pull"; a greater focus
on innovation means that the technology supply and demand dimensions are more
likely to be in balance.
An emphasis on innovation also provides a way of harmonizing socalled
implicit S&T policies, inherent in a country's economic, social, and fiscal policies,
and its explicit S&T policies. In many countries, including Viet Nam, these explic-
it and implicit policies are often in conflict. The team believes that by putting a
greater emphasis on innovation, Viet Nam is more likely to succeed in making
both its implicit and its explicit policies contribute to the strengthening of the
ability of Vietnamese firms to innovate and compete in world markets.
Innovation is not the only concern of S&T policy or strategy, but in many
countries it has been neglected. That is why we believe it is important to empha-
size the issue.
Our report pointed out that many countries have found it useful to think
of an NSI, and a few, such as South Africa, have used the concept to help them
develop their S&T policies and strategies. Not everyone believes that the concept
of an NSI is sufficiently well advanced to provide a solid basis for policy-making.
Furthermore, as an innovation approach cuts across the interests and domains of
several ministries, it is sometimes resisted by vested interests. Nevertheless, the
team thinks that the concept of an NSI is useful in looking at the effectiveness of
a country's S&T system. The tools and approaches developed to examine a coun-
try's NSI can provide a helpful check list for anyone responsible for developing
a country's S&T strategy.
Such a check list was developed by the international team reviewing the
Chinese S&T-policy reforms. Table 5 was included in the China report but might
be a useful starting point for a Vietnamese framework for innovation.
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Table 5. Functions of an NSI.
General functions Specific functions
Core functions of government
Policy formulation Monitoring, review, and formulation of policies and, in some countries,
and resource plans concerning national S&T activities
allocation
Linkage to other policy domains (such as the economy, trade, education,
health, environment, and defence)
Allocation of resources to S&T from overall budgets and first-order
allocation among activities
Creation of incentive schemes to stimulate innovation and other technical
activities
Provision of a capacity to implement policies and coordinate appropriate
activities
Provision of a capacity to forecast and assess the likely directions of
technical change
Regulatory and Creation of national systems for metrology, standardization, and
protection calibration
Creation of a national system to identify intellectual property
Creation of national systems to protect safety, health, and the
environment
Implementation functions
Financing Management of financing systems appropriate for implementation of the
other functions of the system
Use of government purchasing power to stimulate innovation in
production of goods and services the government requires
Performance Execution of S&T programs, including all kinds of research and
technological development
Provision of scientific services
Provision of mechanisms to link R&D outputs to practical use
Provision of linkages to regional and international S&T activities
Provision of mechanisms to evaluate, acquire, and diffuse best-practice
technologies
Creation of innovative goods, processes, and services embodying the
results of S&T activities
(continued)
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Table 5. Concluded.
General functions Specific functions
HRD and Provision of programs and facilities to educate and train S&T personnel
capacity-building
initiatives Creation of institutional capacity in S&T
Provision of mechanisms to maintain the vitality of the national S&T
community
Stimulation of public interest in, and support for, national initiatives in
S&T
Infrastructure EOM of information services, including libraries, databases, statistical
services, a system of indicators, and communication systems
EOM of technical services, such as metrology, standardization, and
calibration
EOM of a system to award, record, and protect intellectual property rights
EOM of mechanisms to ensure the protection of safety, health, and the
environment
EOM of major national facilities for research
Source: IDRC-SSTC (1997).
Note: These functions — both policy related and implementation related — are carried out by
different stakeholders in any country's NSI, with the particular combination being unique to that
country. EOM, establishment, operation, and maintenance; HRD, human-resource
development; NSI, national system of innovation; R&D, research and development; S&T,
science and technology.
An international advisory mechanism on S&T policy and practice
The NISTPASS team requested some brief elaboration on how an international
advisory mechanism on S&T policy and practice might be shaped and its possible
composition and terms of reference.
As a previously centrally planned economy moves to a market economy,
more and more decisions about the role of S&T will be made outside government.
The new environment will require multiple inputs to decision-making, and these
must come from multiple sources, both within and outside of the country. The role
of government becomes much more that of a general facilitator, rather than a regu-
lator and more that of the communicator of vision than a principal actor. It be-
comes critical in such a transition to have a reliable mechanism to obtain advice
from both national and nonnational sources and from outside government chan-
nels. Almost all market economies have a variety of such advisory mechanisms
to advise individual ministries and agencies of government. Most also have an
advisory council that reports to the prime minister or president on issues in which
S&T cut across the interests of several ministries or agencies. These advisory
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councils comprise suitably qualified people representative of the business
community, higher education, and civil society. In its early drive for moderniza-
tion, Singapore replied heavily on a number of such mechanisms. Thus, the inter-
national team believes that a carefully structured and well-supported Viet Nam
International Science and Technology Advisory Council (VISTAC) would provide
a most valuable service to the country.
A model for such a council can be found in the China Council for Interna-
tional Co-operation for Environment and Development (CCICED). The CCICED
is a group of about 50 international and Chinese leaders in the field of environ-
ment and development. The CCICED meets once a year and presents its policy
recommendations directly to the senior Chinese leadership.
The CCICED has established a number of working groups on different
aspects of environment and development. Each working group comprises about six
Chinese and six foreign members, all of whom are experts in the working-group
theme. The working groups meet twice a year and commission research on care-
fully selected topics. The working groups draw their conclusions from the research
and make recommendations. Their reports are submitted to the CCICED for its
consideration, and after debate recommendations are forwarded to the Chinese
leadership. All of the recommendations are given careful consideration by the
Chinese authorities, and many have been implemented. The funding for the
CCICED comes mainly from CIDA, which has contributed $15 million over a 5-
year period. The funding for each working group comes from different sources.
Our suggestion for Viet Nam is to establish something similar to the
CCICED but focusing on S&T policy. We envisage a council of about 30-40
members, half of whom would be Vietnamese, including some overseas Vietnam-
ese. The rest would be leading international figures from the business world,
academia, and people knowledgeable about S&T policy issues. We expect that
many of the foreign members will be from East Asia.
Working groups would be established in each of the areas of concern to
the Vietnamese authorities. For example, working groups might be established on
such topics as
S&T education and training;
Technology transfer and the role of foreign corporations in Vietnamese
industrialization;
S&T and the traditional sector;
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International collaboration in S&T; and
Research foresight.
Establishing VISTAC would be a way to ensure that government received
the very best of advice on all these matters in the most impartial and authoritative
ways. If it is decided to go ahead in principal with VISTAC, then a prospectus
should be prepared, together with a budget. The detailed draft of this could be
written up within a few weeks by a small team of experienced professionals. On
the basis of this draft prospectus, Viet Nam would be able to seek expressions of
interest from international donors.
A technomanagement program for Viet Nam
The NISTPASS team wondered if we might offer some further thoughts on how
to put such a technomanagement program into practice and queried further why
we had not drawn attention to polytechnical schools.
To answer the later query, we drew attention to the fact that a technoman-
agement program would be aimed at preparing people to manage the full process
of technological transformation. We believe our report makes this clear. This is
entirely different from education for specific subsets of technical skills. Success
in the competitive global marketplace will require highly skilled people who can
manage full technological process, and our suggestion is that new arrangements
must be tailored to meet this objective.
When the international team began its work, it was asked to draw on its
knowledge of other East Asian countries to make specific suggestions for Viet
Nam. The experiences of Singapore and Taiwan and, most particularly, of South
Korea led the team to suggest that Viet Nam should establish a major technoman-
agement program. We envisage this as comprising a training program to improve
the skills of both government and corporate managers and a consultancy activity
to carry out technology assessments and research-foresight activities.
In the report, we set out some of the activities and approaches of a techno-
management program for Viet Nam. These were intended as examples of the sorts
of activities that might be pursued. If the Vietnamese government agrees in princi-
pal to establish such a program, then clearly a detailed feasibility study should be
carried out. Several technomanagement programs already exist in both developed
and developing countries. Some of these are degree programs, and others are short
courses especially designed for in-service training in industry and government. The
feasibility study should review these existing programs and identify one or two
that might be willing to work with Vietnamese counterparts in designing a
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program appropriate for Viet Nam. The feasibility study should also identify the
most appropriate institutional arrangements in Viet Nam to implement its techno-
management program.
The terms of reference of the feasibility study might be as follows:
1. Identify the specific needs of Vietnamese firms and government depart-
ments for training in the management of technology and innovation;
2. Review existing technomanagement programs in other countries;
3. Identify a few of these programs that are particularly appropriate for Viet-
namese needs and suggest ways in which representative of these programs
might work with Vietnamese counterparts to prepare a crash program of
training;
4. Identify the needs of Vietnamese government departments and industrial
firms for technology-management advice, technology assessment, and
research foresight (from this review, design the institutional mechanisms
to provide these services and advice); and
5. Prepare a budget for a 5-year technomanagement program and a budget for
providing advice and consultancy in this and related fields.
The feasibility study should be carried out over a 6-month period.
Particular applications of S&T to strengthen traditional sectors of agriculture,
fisheries and forestry, and to improve life in rural areas
The NISTPASS team wondered if we might offer a few additional thoughts on
just what types of measures might be given priority in strengthening the traditional
sectors and how to go about implementing these.
The international team has three main suggestions:
1. Strengthen the agricultural-research system in Viet Nam — The
Vietnamese researchers are already well integrated with their colleagues
overseas and in international research centres and have good ideas on what
new research is needed. They are, however, frustrated by a lack of
financial resources and by a variety of bureaucratic obstacles. A system of
professional incentives is needed to encourage scientists to work in rural
areas. We suggest that as a first step an international team should carry out
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a thorough review of research and the application of research results and
that their report be used to provide a basis for specific recommendations.
Our own coverage of the traditional sectors was too limited to make many
specific recommendations.
2. Improve access to new technologies for rural industries — Many
developing countries experience difficulties acquiring technologies needed
to develop rural industries. We did not visit enough of the countryside to
make any judgement as to whether this is also a widespread problem in
Viet Nam. But if it is, we would suggest two successful foreign programs
for study by Viet Nam. One of these was established by Ashok Khosla and
the Development Alternatives group in India. Their approach is to
recognize that for technologies to be used in rural industry, packages of
technology, finance, technical services, and marketing advice are needed.
These packages are provided for specific proven technologies by way of
a franchise. The second example is the SPARK Program in China. Here
too, the technology provided is robust and is complemented with the
provision of credit and follow-up technical assistance through government
programs. These programs were designed for the specific situations in
India and China and are not likely to be replicable in the Vietnamese
situation. Nevertheless we recommend that they be studied to learn any
possible lessons for Viet Nam.
3. Develop a program on Information Technology for Rural Communities —
The international team has been impressed by a number of experimental
programs currently under way in other countries to bring the benefits of
ITs to poor communities. By providing access to knowledge for poor
farmers through the use of computers, it is anticipated that they will be
able to improve their economic livelihoods and quality of life. These
experiments are still in their early stages, but the results are sufficiently
encouraging to persuade some international donors to invest substantial
resources to give poor communities access to ITs. We have found much
enthusiasm for mobilizing ITs for development in Viet Nam, and we are
aware that in Viet Nam some thought has been given to programs to
provide access to these technologies in rural areas. We did not have the
time or opportunity to study these schemes. We do, however, strongly
recommend that a major experiment be carried out in a few selected
communities to assess the potential benefits of improved access to
knowledge provided by IT.
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Concluding session
A concluding session took place with the Minister of Science, Technology and
Environment, the NISTPASS team, and the international team. At this session, the
following points were agreed on:
The report of the international team would be published. This would
include a chapter summarizing the follow-up discussions in Hanoi.
IDRC would be responsible for the publication in English; and
NISTPASS, for that in Vietnamese.
The international team would provide brief responses to the specific
questions posed by NISTPASS within a few weeks of our visit.
Any further elaboration or feasibility studies would require a commit-
ment of intent to implement from the Vietnamese and additional donor
funding.
It was also decided that the NISTPASS team would send copies of the draft of
their long-term strategy to the international team for comment. If funding
permitted, some members of the international team would return to Viet Nam for
further discussions of the strategy document.
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Ministries or government agencies
Institutions with their own information section
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Source: Data compiled from Vietnamese ministry sources.





















Source: Data compiled from Vietnamese ministry sources.
Appendix 2
STATISTICAL INDICATORS OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY
Table 6. S&T institutions by structure and administration.
158 VIET NAM AT THE CROSSROADS
Table 8. S&T institutions by ministry and government agency.
Ministry or government agency
National Center for Natural Sciences and Technology
National Center for Social Sciences and Humanities
Ministry for Science, Technology and Environment
Ministry of Industry
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
Ministry of Marine Products
Ministry of Public Health
Ministry of Construction
Ministry of Transport and Communication
Ministry of Education and Training
Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs
Ministry of Trade
Vietnam Petroleum Corporation
General Department of Hyddrometerology
General Department of Land Management
Institute for Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh ideology
Others






































Table 9. S&T institutions by type of science.
Type of science
Natural sciences
Agricultural, forestry and aquatic-products sciences
Medical sciences
Technical sciences















Source: Data compiled from Vietnamese ministry sources.
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Table 10. S&T institutions by source of S&T funds.
Source of S&T funds
Not funded through government budget
Fully funded through government budget










Source: Data compiled from Vietnamese ministry sources.
Table 11. S&T institutions by size of S&T funds.
































Source: Data compiled from Vietnamese ministry sources.
Note: VND, Vietnamese dong (in 1998, 12987 VND = 1 United
States dollar).























Source: Data compiled from Vietnamese ministry sources.
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Source: Data compiled from Vietnamese ministry sources.
Table 14. Number of S&T personnel by type of science.
PhD
Type of science (ri)
Natural sciences 91




Social sciences and humanities 21
PhD MSc or BSc or
candidate MA BA Others
(n) (n) (n) (n)
501 24 1 392 530
285 108 2197 2768
157 31 1615 2210
499 39 4388 2465
535 144 1 855 384
Source: Data compiled from Vietnamese ministry sources.
Science and technology personnel
Table 13. S&T personnel to 1 July 1997.
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Source: Data compiled from Vietnamese ministry sources.
Table 16. Number of S&T personnel by ministry and government agency.
Ministry or government
agency
National Center for Natural
Sciences and Technology





Ministry of Agriculture and
Rural Development
Ministry of Marine Products
Ministry of Public Health
Ministry of Construction
Ministry of Transport and
Communication




PhD candidate MSc or MA BSc or BA


























































Source: Data compiled from Vietnamese ministry sources.
162 VIET NAM AT THE CROSSROADS
















Ministry of Public Health
Ministry of Construction
Ministry of Transport and
Communication



































































Source: Data compiled from Vietnamese ministry sources.
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Table 18. Structure of S&T personnel by qualifications.
Ministry or government PhD
agency (%)
National Center for 4.8
Natural Sciences and
Technology
National Center for Social 0.7
Sciences and Humanities
Ministry for Science, 0.6
Technology and
Environment
Ministry of Industry 0.5
Ministry of Agriculture and 0.4
Rural Development
Ministry of Marine 1 .0
Products
Ministry of Public Health 0.3
Ministry of Construction 0.3
Ministry of Transport and 0.2
Communication











































Source: Data compiled from Vietnamese ministry sources.

































Source: Data compiled from
Vietnamese ministry sources.
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Table 20. Change of workplace of S&T personnel.
Change of workplace
Number of people moving in
Percentage of total S&T
personnel
Number of people moving on
Percentage of total S&T
personnel

































Source: Data compiled from Vietnamese ministry sources.
Major physical infrastructure and funds for science and technology
Table 21. Allocation of equipment by type of science.
Type of science
Natural sciences




























Source: Data compiled from Vietnamese ministry sources.
Note: VND, Vietnamese dong (in 1998, 12987 VND = 1 United States dollar).
Table 22. Personal-computer use by type of science.
Type of science
Natural sciences




























Source: Data compiled from Vietnamese ministry sources.
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Source: Data compiled from Vietnamese ministry sources.
Note: VND, Vietnamese dong (in 1998, 12987 VND = 1 United States
dollar).





























Source: Data compiled from Vietnamese ministry sources.
Note: VND, Vietnamese dong (in 1998, 12987 VND = 1 United States dollar).
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Table 25. Funds of S&T institutions by ministry and government agency in 1994.
Ministry or government agency
National Center for Natural Sciences
and Technology
National Center for Social Sciences
and Humanities
Ministry for Science, Technology and
Environment
Ministry of Industry
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development
Ministry of Marine Products
Ministry of Public Health
Ministry of Construction
Ministry of Transport and
Communication




General Department of Land
Management
Allocation % of Per person



























Source: Data compiled from Vietnamese ministry sources.
Note: VND, Vietnamese dong (in 1998, 12 987 VND = 1 United States dollar).
Table 26. Structure of funds of S&T institutions by source of

















Source: Data compiled from Vietnamese ministry sources.
Note: VND, Vietnamese dong (in 1998, 12 987 VND = 1
United States dollar).
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Table 27. S&T expenditures of S&T institutions by type of science in 1994.
Expenditure (billion VND)
Research,

















machinery Tax Total Production
16.9 1.6 10.5 1.0
7.1 1.1 12.9 9.5
24.0 0.5 37.8 12.6
14.5 7.4 130.9 102.8
7.0 0.3 4.9 0.3
Source: Data compiled from Vietnamese ministry sources.
Note: VND, Vietnamese dong (in 1998, 12987 VND = 1 United States dollar).
Table 28. Structure of S&T expenditure of S&T institutions by type of science in 1994.
% of total
Research,

















machinery Tax Total Production
18.4 1.8 11.5 1.1
8.5 1.3 14.8 10.9
19.6 0.4 30.9 10.3
5.1 2.6 46.3 36.3
10.9 0.4 7.6 0.5
Source: Data compiled from Vietnamese ministry sources.
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Table 29. S&T expenditure of S&T institutions by type of science in 1994.
Expenditure (billion VND)
Research, Equipment
Type of salary, and Investment and
science management outlay machinery Tax
Natural 50.9 11.7 16.9 1.6
sciences




Medical 45.6 14.4 24.0 0.5
sciences
Technology 111.4 19.1 14.5 7.4
sciences










Source: Data compiled from Vietnamese ministry sources.
Note: VND, Vietnamese dong (in 1998,12987 VND = 1 United States dollar).
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Table 30. Expenditures of S&T institutions by ministry or government agency in 1994.
Expenditure (billion VND)
Ministry or Research,
government salary, and I
agency management
National Center for 33.3
Natural Sciences
and Technology











Ministry of Marine 7.8
Products




















outlay machinery Tax Total Production
9.2 15.3 0.1 8.3 0.3
1.0 1.2 0.1 1.9 —
2.3 2.6 0.2 2.5 —
7.3 5.3 4.5 85.7 77.1
8.6 7.8 1.2 13.0 9.1
2.1 0.1 0.0 1.5 1.5
14.4 24.0 0.5 37.8 12.6
3.3 0.9 0.8 20.3 15.3
4.7 0.5 1.5 5.6 5.5
1.0 1.0 0.1 0.9 0.9
0.2 4.8 1.3 2.5 0.7
1.8 1.0 0.2 1.0 0.7
0.1 0.2 0.3 9.4 2.1
Source: Data compiled from Vietnamese ministry sources.
Note: VND, Vietnamese dong (in 1998, 12987 VND = 1 United States dollar).

















































































Source: Data compiled from Vietnamese ministry sources.





Type of science management
National Center for 50.3
Natural Sciences and
Technology
National Center for 81 .5
Social Sciences and
Humanities





outlay machinery Tax Total Production
13.9 23.1 0.2 12.5 0.5
4.4 5.3 0.4 8.4 —
11.1 12.6 0.8 11.8 —
Other selected indicators and statistics
Table 32. GDP structure by sector.































Note: GDP, gross domestic product.
Preliminary.


























































Note: GDP, gross domestic product.
Preliminary.











































Note: USD, United States dollars.
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Note: USD, United States dollars.
a Excludes revoked or canceled projects.







































































































































Note: FDI, foreign direct investment; USD, United States dollars.
Includes investment by domestic joint-venture partners.
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Note: FDI, foreign direct investment; USD, United States dollars.
a Includes investment by domestic joint-venture partners.
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Appendix 3
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AFTA Asian Free Trade Area
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CCICED China Council for International Co-operation for Environment and
Development
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
CLDRRI Cuu Long Delta Rice Research Institute
EU European Union
F AO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FDI foreign direct investment
GDP gross domestic product
HCMC Ho Chi Minn City
IDRC International Development Research Centre
IRRI International Rice Research Institute
IT information technology
KAIST Korean Advanced Institute of Science and Technology
KDI Korean Development Institute
KIST Korea Institute of Science and Technology
KOSEF Korea Science and Engineering Foundation
LDFRC Long Dinh Fruit Research Centre
MNC multinational corporation
MOSTE Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment
NCNST National Centre for Natural Science and Technology
NIC newly industrialized country
NISTPASS National Institute for Science and Technology Policy and Strategy
Studies
NRCS National Research Centre of Science
NSI national system of innovation
ODA overseas development assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Developnent
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R&D research and development
S&T science and technology
SOE state-owned enterprise
SPRU Science Policy Research Unit [University of Sussex]
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
USD United States dollar(s)
VIGECAM Viet Nam General Corporation for Agricultural Materials
VISTAC Viet Nam International Science and Technology Advisory Council
VSEF Viet Nam Science and Engineering Foundation
WTO World Trade Organization
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The Institution
The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) is committed
to building a sustainable and equitable world. IDRC funds developing-
world researchers, thus enabling the people of the South to find their own
solutions to their own problems. IDRC also maintains information
networks and forges linkages that allow Canadians and their developing-
world partners to benefit equally from a global sharing of knowledge.
Through its actions, IDRC is helping others to help themselves.
The Publisher
IDRC Books publishes research results and scholarly studies on global and
regional issues related to sustainable and equitable development. As a
specialist in development literature, IDRC Books contributes to the body of
knowledge on these issues to further the cause of global understanding and
equity. IDRC publications are sold through its head office in Ottawa,
Canada, as well as by EDRC's agents and distributors around the world.
